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INTRODUCTION ; Presentation of the Problem
The finite-God theories of two prominent American philosophers, Wil­
liam James and Alfred North Whitehead, will be the subject of this re­
search study. My major effort will be directed to a consideration of 
these theistic positions in an attempt to discover the philosophical mo­
tives upon which both positions are developed. Each writer's position is 
constructed in explicit and partial opposition to the theory of an in­
finite God. As a part of my task, I hope to clarify just where the basic 
lines of divergence lie between these two finite-God theories and the 
infinite-God theory. Further, I shall make a comparative study of the 
finite-God theories of the two men.
After a brief introductory presentation of the major problems in­
volved, I will survey the evidence for the existence of God and the nature 
of the divine limitation as found in both James and Whitehead. This ini­
tial step will be concluded with a brief comparative precis, restating the 
basic problems.
The second major undertaking of this research will be a delineation 
of the basic conflicts which both James and Whitehead appear to have with 
the infinite-God position. While both men are critics of the traditional 
theistic positions, there is some dissimilarity in the arguments they 
present. In spite of the differing reasons each gives for the finitude 
of God, their presuppositions appear similar. Their effect in each case
is the same— to excise the possible grounds of agreement with the opposed 
infinite-God theories.
Further, the philosophical motives of James and Whitehead will be 
considered. Evidence for their positions, not unknown to others who con­
tinue to maintain that God is infinite in every respect, entails the 
finite nature of God for James and Whitehead. I shall attempt to clar­
ify the philosophical motives of both James' and Whitehead's theisms by 
an accompanying exposition of their philosophical methodology.
Upon initial survey, James and Whitehead would seem to be almost 
polar opposites in the philosophical sphere. James was an outstanding 
spokesman and accomplished leader of the pragmatic movement in American 
philosophy. On the other hand, Whitehead fits into that group of phi­
losophers known as process thinkers. As a pragmatist, James kept 
company with notables like Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, neither 
of whom were writers within the theistic tradition. Whitehead, on the 
other hand, works within a somewhat different tradition. His emphasis 
upon creativity, along with the primordial and consequent natures of 
God, centers within an organismic philosophy.
It might appear that James and Whitehead had little in common when 
one notes that they reside in different philosophical camps. Actually, 
their theisms do show some marked similarities. Both men consider their 
philosophical approach to God as partially an empirical one. When using 
the term "empirical" here I refer to the evidence drawn from the data of 
our experiences, both objective and subjective, as well as from the con­
clusions of modern science. In using the term "subjective" I mean such
factors as value experiences or "needs'* we have. This empirical approach 
is such that their theistic analyses tend to remain on a very concrete 
level, not readily moving from the data of experience to a conception of 
God remote from that experience. The theistic analyses of both men are 
carried out in constant reference to the empirical order. Problems un­
derlying man's relation to God, or God's relation to man, are decided 
in a rather special experiential fashion. I obviously do not mean by 
this that the demands of consistency are ignored, but only that the is­
sues are discussed in continued openness to the data of experience. It 
it hoped that my analysis will reveal this with some degree of clarity.
In addition to the empirical factor, both men are intent upon dis­
cussing God in terms which are religiously meaningful to man. The God 
they wish to discover is the God of our everyday worship— albeit, not a 
denominational deity. Were God not to meet the requirements of our 
worship, he would not be worth discussing. Both of these philosophers 
are concerned with the area of religious experience. As we shall note, 
a (totally) transcendent deity is found lacking; the stress is upo; a 
God immanent in the world with whom we enter into a real relationship 
just as he reciprocally does with us. Such a God is seen as having max­
imum relevance to our lives. (It should be noted parenthetically that 
Whitehead, much more than James, is also interested in God as partially 
transcendent.)
While our dominant interest is in those factors that are responsible 
for their conceiving God as a finite being, this consideration will best
be understood when viewed through the reasons which both men give for 
their acceptance of the existence of God in the first place. Conse­
quently, some time must be expended in situating the problem in view of 
the evidence each man offers for the finitude of God, as well as in giv­
ing an analysis of the philosophical motives involved in treating this 
problem.
JAMES: Evidence for the Existence of God
If one is to assess the evidence for the existence of God within the 
philosophy of William James, he must attempt to ferret out a preliminary 
idea of what we mean by this God. James is aware of the attributive na­
ture of God as disputed by theists, but he contends that most would 
agree on some essential features. "First, it is essential that God be 
conceived as the deepest power in the universe; and, second, he must be 
conceived under the form of a mental personality.His earliest writings 
suggest that James considered this "mental personality" as "something 
outside of my own."^ (He later disavowed this early contention.) Fur­
ther, James adds that this God must be considered as a power of righteous­
ness, and as a being who takes account of man.^
Within James' philosophy no logically cogent proofs for the existence 
of God are to be found. However, he does offer certain arguments or
^William James, The Will to Believe (New York; Longmans, Green and 
Company, 1897). All references are to the republication (New York: Dover
Publications, 1956), p. 122.
^Ibid. 3lbid.
respected positions as to why he does believe in God and will continue 
to believe in God. In place of demonstratively constructed proofs, most 
of James' statements about God appear to be points of a practical posi­
tion. The question of the existence of God can be put to James, and it 
will receive a favorable reply.
In answer to a questionnaire presented to him by Professor James B. 
Pratt, James attempted to formulate his answers as to why he believed 
in God. Pratt asked James, "Why do you believe in God? Is it from some 
argument?" James replied, "Emphatically, no." Pratt continued, "Could 
it be because you claim to have experienced his presence?" James re­
plied, "No, but rather because I need it, so it must be so."^ James has 
summarized an initial position by claiming a "need" of God; therefore,
God must exist. One familiar with James' writings will not be shocked 
by this position. James maintained that our heart is "our deepest organ 
of communication with the nature of things."^ The heart becomes for 
James a dependable pioneer in discovering the ultimate nature of reality. 
The nature of the will, or the volitional aspect of man, assumes a basic 
importance for the existence of God. But why would our. .volitional na­
ture necessarily direct us toward the conclusion that God exists?
James contends that our volitional nature must produce relevance 
within the sphere of man's affairs. A philosophy, if it is productively
^William James, The Letters of William James, ed. Henry James (2 
vols.; Boston: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), II, p. 213.
^William James, The Will to Believe, pp. 62, 141.
accepted, "must define the future congruously with our spontaneous pow­
ers." A philosophy must be cognate with our desires, and it must con­
tribute an adequate stimulation to our life. I shall return to this 
point later, but let it suffice for the moment to say that James' grasp 
on the finitude of God requires a philosophy that regards actions as 
instrumental and indispensable in creating the ultimate meaning of re­
ality. At this point, let me just reiterate that James finds that God's 
existence is demonstrated by our needs. "Anything short of God is not 
rational . . . James says. It appears that by using "rational" James 
is contending for that which is acceptable to our whole human nature.^ 
One of the basic reasons for our belief in God, according to James, 
must therefore be an "answer to our needs." He states:
Not an energy of our active nature to which it does not auth­
oritatively appeal, not an emotion of which it does not nor­
mally and naturally release the springs. At a single stroke, 
it changes the dead blank ̂  of the world into a living thou. 
with whom the whole man may have dealing.®
This seems to indicate that the agnostic's position is unteneable to
James, for it is a world-view without God, simply an "it--world" of no
lasting or satisfying meaning. Theism finds its impetus in meeting our
needs; therefore, our "needs" become a dynamic reason for our belief in
a God.
James suggests that the works of God are empirically verifiable. 
From the psychological point of view, James has posited a God who com­
forts the ill, encourages a positive healthy-mindedness, and produces
*Ibid.. p. 82. ?Ibid.. p. 116. ®Ibid.. p. 127.
converts and saints. The reality of religion is, according to James, 
that which produces effects within another reality (and) must be termed 
a reality itself; therefore, we have no philosophical excuse for calling 
the unseen or mystical world unreal. Since religion becomes such a 
positive power in the lives of persons, and because of this basic dy­
namic, James contends that the truth or falsity of an idea is determined 
in no other way than through its workableness.
On pragmatic principles, if the hypothesis of God works 
satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true.
Now whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience 
shows that it certainly does work.^®
The workableness or the effectiveness of the idea within the lives of
the religious converts is taken as support for his basic premise that
God exis ts.
Obviously, this evidence for the existence of God is part and par­
cel of the basic claims of the pragmatic theory of truth. The lives of 
people serve as a valid witness to the workings of religion. Unless the 
sceptic can explain away these workings of religion, then it will stand 
the test of disorder or illusion. Further evidence is claimed by James 
for the existence of God through the myriad experiences of the mystics. 
For the mystic, experiencing the presence of God is ample testimony for 
His existence. While one might question the validity of the mystic's
QWilliam James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: 
Longmans, Green and Company, 1902). All references are to the republi­
cation (New York: University Books, 1963), p. 424.
lOwilliam James, Pragmatism (New York; Longmans, Green and Company, 
1907), p. 299.
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claim, perhaps based on one’s own inexperience, the mystic’s testimony 
cannot be termed valueless. James claims that it must be classed with 
other empirical facts which would bear on the existence or the non­
existence of God.
Regardless of the source of these religious claims, whether from 
the far-out realms of mysticism or the more traditional religious hab­
its, the empirical data arising from religious experience do make the 
existence of God more feasible to accept. The very kernel of James' 
claim for the existence of God turns on that basic concept of the prag­
matic hypothesis— our need of God. James demands that man’s ethical 
dimensions be relevant; this world cannot be neutral to man’s basic 
needs. As we view the reasons why James holds that God is a finite 
being, this "need factor" seems to be crucial. James contends that 
there is a God— because man basically has a need of God.
JAKES: Nature of the Divine Limitation
It is of interest to note how James' mind matured in his thoughts 
concerning God. In an early address (1881) entitled "Reflex Action and 
Theism," James said that God’s "personality is to be regarded, like any 
other personality, as something lying outside my own and other than me, 
and whose existence I simply come upon and find."^^ This emphasizes his 
belief that God and man are distinct personalities. Later, James seems 
td reverse this position, and to hold that as humans we are substantially
^William James, The Will to Believe. p. 122.
fused with God. We become "internal parts"^^ of God, "part and parcel 
of that deep r e a l i t y . " T h e  pantheistic problem, to be discussed later, 
becomes two-fold. James seems to place God within the confines of the 
lesser world of humans, while at the same time giving much greater im­
portance to mankind's inclusion in the divine.
James presents God as an inclusive being; yet there must be divine 
limitation, for God is not all-inclusive.^*^ According to James' descrip­
tion, God must be a being; that being must be within an environment, must 
not be an all-inclusiveness, but an individual form like man. Since God 
is not all-inclusive, he must confront the world— part of which is other 
than his creation. As to the nature and magnitude of this reality, James 
seems to pay little heed. James considers the essential factor to be that 
this divine "environment" reduced God to a type of life similar to that 
of man. Therefore, it makes God finite, and he cannot be omnipotent and 
omniscient, because some part of the universe resides outside his domina­
tion.^^ After relegating God to a finite environment, James is just one 
step away from saying that God is a temporal being, for he has a history, 
much like that of humans. James stresses this characteristic of God, 
for it seems to most cogently answer the absolutist's doctrine of the
l^William James, A Pluralistic Universe (New York; Longmans, Green 
and Company, 1932), p. 318.
l^Ibid.. p. 30. 14lbid.. pp. 310^311, 322.
ISlbid., pp. 124, 311; of. Letters. H ,  p. 269.
IGlbid.. pp. 38-40.
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"Timeless Absolute." This timeless characteristic of God, James seems 
bent on removing.
Again, James in thé Varieties leaves open the possibility of a 
polytheistic interpretation of his position concerning God. Apparently, 
he could see no reason for stating that monotheism is more plausible than 
polytheism, or vice versa. Be it many gods or one, James remains con­
vinced that the divine element in the universe is still finite in nature. 
James did not work out a systematic theology; however, he stressed a few 
basic facets central to a discussion of God in human terms.
WHITEHEAD; Evidence for the Existence of 
God, and the Nature of the Divine Limitation
Contrary to James' life-long interest with the theistic question, 
a chronological study of Alfred North Whitehead reveals that he gave 
little attention to the problem of God until his later years. This is 
not to indicate that he never contemplated the question, but merely to 
state that his earlier writings are relatively free of any mention of 
the problem. It apparently arose in his mind after his thoughts turned 
to the metaphysical speculations on an organismic universe. One should 
not overlook Whitehead's own statement to the effect that the great 
things are never first but always come later in the order of experience. 
While he does not view the question of God as one of mechanical neces­
sity, Whitehead does infer God as an absolute necessity for the interpre­
tation of experience and for reality.
l^william James, Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 396.
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Whitehead views philosophical understanding to "aim at piercing the 
blindness of activity in respect to its transcendent f u n c t i o n . I t  is 
also an "endeavor to obtain a self-consistent understanding of things 
o b s e r v e d . "19 He states that "speculative philosophy is the endeavor to 
frame a coherent, logical, and necessary system of general ideas in terms 
of which every element of our experience can be interpreted."^® For 
Whitehead, it seems rather clear that fact and interpretation cannot be 
separated, but instead are correlative. Philosophy is to reveal fact and 
interpretation laced together within experience. It makes available the 
proper system by which this interlacing can be explicated, since fact and 
interpretation are components of the same world of experience. If White­
head is to espouse God as the final explanation of things, then God must
be part of the world which is being explained; or at least God must be
discovered as an element within the analysis of experience.
It is obvious that Whitehead introduces God into his process philos­
ophy, for the primordial and consequent natures of God give an adequate 
final explanation. God is contrasted with other actual entities because 
of the difference in His primordial and consequent natures. In God, 
Whitehead finds an answer to the beleagured paradoxes of traditional
^®Alfred North Whitehead, Nature and Life (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1934), p. 46.
19lbid.. p. 28.
2®Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 4.
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theistic approaches. The Whiteheadian process view will account for the 
eternal vs. the temporal, the determined vs. the free, and the permanent 
vs. the changing. They will be shown to be interacting within the process 
philosophy of Whitehead, which places God at the acme.
Whitehead's process philosophy conceives God as an actual entity 
who is both determined and free, eternal and temporal, static and active, 
absolute and relative, permanent and changing. His approach will try to 
bridge the harassing question which has plagued both theologians and meta­
physicians. Whitehead says:
The notion of God as the 'unmoved mover' is derived from 
Aristotle, at least so far as western thought is concerned.
The notion of God as 'eminently real' is a favorite doctrine 
of Christian theology. The combination of the two into the 
doctrine of an aboriginal, eminently real, transcendent crea­
tor, at whose flat the world came into being, and whose im­
posed will it obeys, is the fallacy which has infused tragedy 
into the histories of Christianity and Mohammetanism.21
There is another stream of thought in which "the vicious separation of
the flux from the permanence leads to a concept of an entirely static
God, with eminent reality, in relation to an entirely fluent world, with
nodeficient reality. Both of these approaches are viewed as phllosoph- 
ical cul de sacs by Whitehead; therefore, he endorses a conception of God 
as an evolving actual entity in organismic relations with this actual 
world.
One cannot overestimate the significance of Whitehead's claim that 
God is an actual entity, sharing likenesses and showing differences with 
other actual entities. He states;
Zllbid.. p. 519. 22lbid.. p. 526.
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The presuaçtion that there is only one genus of actual enti­
ties constitutes an idea of cosmological theory to which the
philosophy of organism endeavors to conform. The generic 
character of an actual entity should include God, as well as 
the lowliest actual occasion, though there is a specific dif­
ference between the nature of God and that of any occasion.23
As he indicates, God’s primordial character is the solution to the prob­
lem of process. ’’God is to be taken account of in every creative 
p h a s e . I n  succeeding chapters I shall spend additional time with the 
problem of God’s relation to the world of process.
In Science and the Modem World, Whitehead refers to God as the 
substantial activity underlying all occasions. "It [substantial activ­
ity] is a general metaphysical character which underlies all occasions.
. . . There is nothing with which to compare it; it is Spinoza’s one in­
finite s u b s t a n c e . "25 Apparently, his opinion of the primordial is that
"the general activity is not an entity in the sense in which occasions
26or eternal objects are entities."
Further evidence of God shows Him to be the antecedent of particu­
lar occasions. Whitehead si^s:
The fact that there is a process of actual occasions, and the 
fact that the occasions are the emergence of values which re­
quire limitation, both require that the course of events 
should have developed amid antecedent limitations composed of
23 l b i d .. p. 168.
2^Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1926), p. 4.
25Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modem World (New York; 
The Macmillan Co., 1925), p. 255.
26Ibid.. p. 256.
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conditions, particularizations and standards of value 
God is the ultimate limitation, and His existence is the ul­
timate irrationality.
The preceding two functions, substantial activity and antecedent limita­
tion of actual occasions, suggest that without God there could be no suc­
ceeding actual occasions.
We turn now to view the connection between the principle of concre­
tion and actual entities. Some Whiteheadian proponents have adopted 
Whitehead’s definition of God as the "principle of concretion" to enhance 
their own views. However, a closer view of the conception of God as the 
principle of concretion will show it to underwrite what Whitehead means 
when he says that God is an actual entity.
The principle of concretion was meant as a support doctrine by 
Whitehead for his notion of God as an actual entity. He says, "the gen­
eral principle of empiricism depends upon the doctrine that there is a 
principle of concretion which is not discoverable by reason."^® Further 
he states, "In this sense God is the principle of concretion; namely, he 
is the actual entity from which each ten^oral concrescence receives that 
initial aim from which self-causation s t a r t s . A g a i n ,  he contends,
"The principle of concretion is the primary action of God on the world
. . . whereby there is initiated a definite outcome from a situation
30otherwise riddled with ambiguity." God becomes for Whitehead the
^^Ibid.. p. 256. 28ibid.. p. 257.
^^Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 374. 
®Qlbid.. p. 523.
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unique actual entity. He is the well-spring of all decision, original­
ity, and novelty within the process world.
Within the evidence which we have submitted, Whitehead has accepted 
(partially) the finitistic concept of God based upon a developing organ­
ismic system. (It should be noted parenthetically that there is a very 
definite sense in which God's primordial nature is infinite. This will 
be considered in Chapter Three.) Whitehead's experiences reveal that 
final real things are really processes. He has viewed the world as a 
gigantic process, but this has presented some problems. Process as the 
basic reality makes it imperative that God be viewed as an actual entity. 
Like all actual entities, God has His primordial and consequent natures, 
his mental and physical poles.
Whitehead cautions that the problem which swept traditional theistic 
views into failure was its conception of God as the final explanation,
, a static, transcendent God which excluded change. Whitehead over­
comes this failure when he postulates the concept of God as an evolving 
actual entity, whose progress is at least partially dependent upon the 
world (consequent nature). The finitistic implications show God's rela­
tion to the organismic actual world. In particular. Chapter Four of this 
dissertation will be given to the development and interpretation of the 
consequent nature of God as viewed by Alfred North Whitehead.
It has been the intent of this introduction to indicate how James 
and Whitehead present differing kinds of evidence to support their finite- 
God theories. Traditional theism and the philosophy of the Absolute seek 
to establish (with certainty) the infinite nature of God as necessarily
16
true. With neither James nor Whitehead do we find that certainty of 
knowledge about God which is claimed by the traditional perspective. We 
must look at the philosophical motives which both men present, as well as 
the methodology they use.
The exposition will show the cnçirical emphasis which underlies the 
finite-God theories. The question of meaning and value in relation to 
this concrete God will be shown. Both James and Whitehead stress the 
immanence of God, and this will be seen partly in the discussion of re­
ligious experience. Both finite-God theories emphasize the relevance of 
God to our lives.
My purpose in the following chapters will be to support the finit­
istic approach to God through an exposition of both James and Whitehead's 
views. Both depend heavily upon forms of experience to support the fi­
nitistic approach. The meaning of truth will become an important aspect 
of both theories. A further question will be encountered: the nature
and extent to which both James and Whitehead see reality as intelligible.
CHAPTER ONE; JAMES’ ENCOUNTER 
WITH THE INFINITE-GOD THEORY
Chapter One
JAMES’ ENCOUNTER WITH THE INFINITE-GOD THEORY
In December of 1880 James wrote to Renouvler:
My principal amusement this winter has been resisting the in­
roads of Hegelism in our University . . . . It is a strange 
thing, this resurrection of Hegel in England and here after 
his burial in Germany. I think his philosophy will probably 
have an important influence on the development of our liberal 
form of Christianity. It gives a quasi-metaphysic backbone 
which this theology has always been in need of, but it is 
too fundamentally rotten and charlatanish to last long. As 
a reaction against materialistic evolutionism it has its 
use, only this evolutionism is fertile, while Hegelism is 
absolutely sterile.1
In the following decades, James will indulge his "amusement" with rapid
increment flavored with an apparent bitterness. We will view a few of
the representative works of his polemic directed toward an excising of
the Absolute.
James; Critic of the Absolute
In an essay entitled "On Some Hegelisms," published in 1882, James 
specifies for the first time a bill of particulars against this particu­
lar brand of "Absolutism." James states that while the "real is identi­
cal with the Ideal, yet the real, upon examination, seems irreducibly 
plural." To him it appears united only by "three great continua":
^William James, Letters. I, p. 208.
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"Memory or personal consciousness," "Time and s p a c e . T h e  unity 
effected by these continua is "ruptured on every side" when the "mate­
rial qualities of being" are confronted; only a few "a priori couplings" 
hold things together, and It seems to James "deeply probable" that the
slight cohesion accomplished by first principles Is all one can hope 
3for.
Why may not the World be a sort of republican banquet .. ., 
where all the qualities of being respect one another’s 
personal sacredness, yet sit at the common table of space 
and time? . . . Why, If one act of knowledge could from one 
point take In the total perspective, with all mere possi­
bilities abolished, should there ever have been anything 
more than that act? Why duplicate It by the tedious un­
rolling, Inch by Inch, of the foredone reality? No answer 
seems possible. On the other hand. If we stipulate only 
a partial community of partially Independent powers, we 
see perfectly why no one part controls the whole view, but 
each detail must come and be actually given, before. In any 
special special sense, It can be said to be determined at 
all. This Is the moral view, the view that gives to other 
powers the same freedom It would have Itself . . .  A
James' Reaction to Hegel's Idealism
James Indicates that there will be those who scorn this simple 
truth, for they prefer an "intellect . . . Insatiable enough to declare 
that all existence must bend the knee to Its requirements." Yet, he 
asks why this warrant should be allowed, and the "theorizing faculty 
l^allowecQ to ride rough-shod over the whole." "I confess I can see no
2william James, "On Some Hegelisms," Mind, 1882, p. 264; reprinted 
In Will to Believe, pp. 263-298.
%llllam James, Will to Believe, pp. 266-271.
4lbld.. pp. 270-271.
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a priori reason for the exception. He who claims it must be judged by 
the consequences of his acts, and by them alone. Let Hegel then con­
front the universe with his claim, and see how he can make the two 
m a t c h . " 5  And when Hegel takes up the quest, "The universe absolutely 
refuses to let him travel without jolt."& Ultimate unity is simply not 
accessible when one considers the diversity of beings which comprise the 
real.
But Hegel has decreed a synthesis of opposites, the identical show­
ing through the apparent contradictory; "Let all that negation which 
seemed to disintegrate the universe be the mortar that combines it, and 
the problem stands solved."? James objects that this "utterly defies 
understanding," especially since Hegel seeks to make it rational by ap­
peal to data whose proper interpretation demands the prior acceptance of 
the principle. If one is to ask "how self-contradiction can do all this, 
and how its dynamism may be seen to work," Hegel can only reply by show­
ing him (the datum, £.£., space) and saying:
'Lo, thus.* In other words, instead of the principle of 
explanation being more intelligible than the thing to be 
explained, it is absolutely unintelligible if taken by it­
self, and must appeal to its pretended product to prove its 
existence. Surely, such a system of explaining notum per 
ignotum, of making the explicans borrow credentials from 
the explicand. and of creating paradoxes and impossibilities 
where none were suspected, is a strange candidate for the 
honors of being a complete rationalizer of the world.8
S i b i d .. p p .  2 7 2 - 2 7 3 .  ^ I b i d .. p. 2 7 3 .  
7 l b i d . 8 i b i d .. p p .  2 7 6 - 2 7 7 .
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James holds that "the principle of the contradictoriness of iden­
tity and the identity of contradictories is the essence of the Hegelian 
system," that it is more understandable by a companion principle called 
the "principle of totality." This principle holds that a part cannot 
be known until the whole of which it is a part is known. Noting that 
this is not a Hegelian possession, James holds that it is "an integral 
part of empiricism, an integral part of common sense":
. . . empiricism contends that we must everywhere distinguish 
between the intrinsic being of a thing and its relations, and, 
among these, between those that are essential to our knowing 
it all and those that may be called adventitious. The thing 
as actually present in a given world is there with all its 
relations; for it to be known as it there exists, they must 
be known too, and it and they form a single fact for any 
consciousness large enough to embrace that world as a unity.
But what constitutes this singleness of fact, this unity? 
Empiricism says. Nothing but the relation-yielding matrix in 
which the several items of the world find themselves embed­
ded,— time, namely, and space, and the mind of the knower.9
This curtailed version of the theory of relations will not be ac­
ceptable to the absolutists:
Hegelism dogmatically denies all this to be possible. In 
the first place it says there are no intrinsic natures that 
may change; in the second it says there are no adventitious 
relations.10
The validity of this Hegelian version of the principle of totality, 
"which demands that if any one part be posited alone, all the others 
shall forthwith emanate from it and infallibly reproduce the whole,"H 
stands in contradiction to James' position of empiricistic pluralism.
9 l b i d .. pp. 277-278. lO l b i d .. p. 279. 
lllbid.
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Given the theory of Hegel, it appears as erroneous to call it a 
monism as to call it a pluralism. "The truth refuses to be expressed in 
any single act of judgment or sentence." While Hegel persists in com­
bining under one proposition the diverse propositions that announce the 
world's complexity, James takes the view that
the unity of the propositions is that of the mind that har­
bors them. Any one who insists that their diversity is in 
any way itself their unity can only do so because he loves 
obscurity and mystification for their own pure s a k e s . 1 2
Empiricism Preferred to Idealism
In reaction to the Hegelisms. James professes a distinct taste for 
the finite and the pluralistic, as over against the absolute and the 
monistic. Geared by his background in British empiricism, James opposes 
the rationalist systems that manipulate the raw data of sensation within 
the perceiving mind alone. The pragmatic test of meaning which James 
had been developing during his early years adds its weight. The moral 
question becomes relevant, for absolutisms seem to leave no room for 
freedom and responsible human action. It is of interest to note how 
James draws these ethical ends together, and ties them with another 
cord— his early acceptance of moderate idealism.
James claims a discovery from his exploratory surgery on Hegel's 
dialectic. The ugly tumor of irrationality seems to be the find. He 
claims that Hegel's
IZ l b i d .. p. 280.
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sovereign method of going to work and saving all possible 
contradictions, lies in pertinaciously refusing to dis­
tinguish. He takes what is true of a term secundum quid, 
treats it as true of the same term simpliciter. and then, 
of course, applies it to the term secundum aliud.l3
Hegel's account of the mutability of the real world seems to James a
prime example. The "notion of a being which forever stumbles over its
own feet, and has to change in order to exist at all," James considers
a "picturesque symbol";
But how is the reasoning done? Pure being is assumed, 
without determination, being secundum quid. In this re­
spect it agrees with nothing. Therefore simpliciter it is 
nothing; wherever we find it, it is nothing still, and hebt 
sich auf.
It is as if we said, Man without his clothes may be 
named 'the naked.' Therefore man simpliciter is the naked; 
and finally man with his hat, shoes, and overcoat on is the 
naked s t i l l .14
When one begins to ferret out other instances of metaphysical pred­
ication, other Hegelian principles find their explanation. Rules such 
as "to know a limit is already to be beyond it," and "the knowledge of 
opposites is one," seem to indicate to James that Hegel foundered on 
the aspects of being.15 While missing the point of being itself, Hegel 
reveals the purpose he intends to posit:
If I characterized Hegel's own mood as ^^/Ots * the inso­
lence of excell, what shall I say of the mood he ascribes 
to being? Man makes the gods in his image; and Hegel, in 
daring to insult the spotless space and
time, the bound-respecters, in branding as strife that law 
of sharing under whose sacred keeping . . . the dance of 
the atoms goes forward still, seems to me but to manifest 
his own deformity.16
13lbid.. p. 280. 14lbid.. p. 281.
ISlbid.. pp. 283-290. IGlbid.. p. 289-290.
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James has clarified his own attitude towards Hegelian idealism when he 
states, "I have not myself the least objection to idealism . . .  an 
hypothesis which voluminous considerations make plausible." His objec­
tion is against idealism's attempt to prove by "patient ready-made 
Â priori methods that which can only be the fruit of a wide and patient 
induction."17 If idealism were to be true, James states, "the great 
question . . .  is whether its truth involves the necessity of an infi­
nite, unitary, and omniscient consciousness, or whether a republic of 
semi-detached consciousnesses will do." Hypothetically, James concedes 
that either will do, but "whether the egos be one or many, the nextness 
of representations to one another within them is the principle of unifi­
cation of the universe."!® If we are to insist on this extrinsicality, 
the Hegelian logic with the "senseless hocus-pocus of its triads" is 
wiped out. The cosmos requires a manifestation more consistent with 
itself.
In short, the notion that real contingency and ambiguity may be
features of the real world is a perfectly unimpeachable 
hypothesis. Only in such a world can moral judgments 
have a claim to be . . . .  In the universe of Hegel—  
the absolute block whose parts have no loose play . . .
— there can be neither good nor bad, but one dead level 
of mere fate.19
As far as I can determine, this is the first appearance of James'
l^Ibid.. p. 290.
l®Ibid.. p. 291, cf. review of Royce's Religious Aspect of 
Philosophy. Atlantic Monthly. April, 1885.
19lbid.. p. 292.
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reference to the "block universe," a concept later to be found in most 
ill! Ills writings.
Later, James suggests a comparison of the Hegelian doctrine to in­
toxication by nitrous oxide gas. Such "anaesthetic revelation," which 
James experimentally induced upon himself, exhibits a striking parallel 
with the Hegelian triadic movement. Based upon several documented cases, 
James contends:
. . . the togetherness of things in a common world, the law 
of sharing . . . may when perceived, engender a very power­
ful emotion; . . . Hegel was so unusually susceptible to this 
emotion throughout his life that its gratification became his 
supreme end, and made him tolerably unscrupulous as to the 
means he employed . . . .^0
Perry records that this action on the part of James and his ensuing com­
ments "scandalized ^his^ idealistic f r i e n d s . T h i s  incident seems to 
return in James' later life to haunt him. His comprehension of Hegel's 
work continued to grow, and in 1909, he affectionately termed it "one of 
the great types of cosmic v i s i o n , E m b r y o n i c  themes which started 
within this essay, "On Some Hegelisms," occur in others yet to follow. 
Emphasis on differing aspects already mentioned will foster James' grow­
ing appreciation of the finite and the pluralistic approach. We shall 
turn to a rather concise approach to these doctrinal positions. First, 
we shall look at James' view of determinism and how this problem
ZOlbid., p. 298.
ZlRalph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of WilHtm James. 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938), p. 161.
^^William James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 108.
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raises questions concerning absolutism as it issues into a basic immo­
rality.
The Problem of Determinism
As early as 1876, James had anticipated the dominant thrust of his 
1884 essay "The Dilemma of Determinism." He had insisted that the issue 
of freedom vs. determinism was virtually a checkmate. Determinism must 
always issue from some spring other than its own. James suggests that 
it could come from either a monistic position or it could be selected 
from some "extra-logical considerations."^2
James makes no claim to "coercive demonstration of free will," but 
he does hope to lure others in following his "own example in assuming 
it true, and acting as if it were true." Because "external evidence is 
strictly impossible to find" for deciding between freedom and determin­
ism, we must look at what the individual position suggests for the 
method of a practical decision. "Freedom" had come to mean about any­
thing; therefore, James suggests the word be changed to "chance." He 
says this will cause a "war-cry" because it is so "opprobrious"; yet, 
"chance" is really a bland notion. As a "purely negative and relative" 
term, it is useful as a step toward a "certain ultimate pluralism" of 
real possibilities. This term means only that a thing is "not control­
led, secured, or necessitated by other things in advance of its own 
actual presence." Look at the universe as a "joint-stock society" whose
23william James, Collected Essays and Reviews, (New York; Longmans, 
Green and Company, 1920), p. 35.
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share-holders have only "limited liabilities and limited powers." While 
this term might apply to the indeterminists' position, the determinists 
might be offended because of its revolting effects upon their rigidly 
structured universe which allows for no variation of possibilities. For 
those who prefer, the world "shall be a solid block, subject to one con­
trol," "nothing future can be ambiguous." But "indeterminate future vo­
litions do mean chance," and "the idea of chance is, at bottom, exactly 
the same thing as the idea of gift";^^
And whether the world be the better or the worse for having 
either chances or gifts in it will depend altogether on 
what these uncertain and unclaimable things turn out to 
be.25
James arrives at the core of his doctrine. While determinism ap­
pears theoretically irrefutable, what are its practical consequences?
The history of human beings is torn with "judgments of regret." Men are 
distraught because evil is in the world. Now, James raises his question. 
If the world is determined, and the determinist position states that 
evil had to be, why should we have regret? If regret is justifiable, 
then pessimism about the cosmos would be the only option available to 
the determinist. James believes the only salvation for the determinists 
is to abandon the "judgment of regret" in favor of a sentimental "judg­
ment of approval," , to develop an optimistic view within determin­
ism. However, if we follow the line of the deterministic approach, this
^^illiam James, Will to Believe, pp. 146-158.
25lbid.. p. 158.
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is not logically cogent because the "regret" was a necessary conclu­
sion. James recognizes this as the dilemma of determinism; therefore, 
moral values must count.
Determinism vs. Moral Subjectivity
Moral values cannot be contained solely within a "block universe"; 
therefore, James sees the only alternative to futility as the "subjec­
tive" point of view. Within this subjective approach, the acts of good 
and evil are secondary to knowing the criteria for good and evil deci­
sions. Every external good can be felt, or recognized, only by con­
trast with evil. In other words, evil is a necessary condition of the 
g o o d . 26 When faced by the pessimism of determinism, James states his 
preference for this theory of evil. The necessity of the approach of 
"subjectivism" underscored James' position of indeterminism, since the 
"only consistent way of representing a pluralism" and a cosmos where 
conduct counts, is the approach of "chance" or indeterminism. Within 
such a universe objective moral values are possible as a ground for 
"regret." Moral values presuppose a choice; thus, the possibility of 
regret entails choice. For James this view is a more cogent approach 
because:
The indeterminism I defend, the free-will theory of popular 
sense based on the judgment of regret, represents that 
world as vulnerable, and liable to be injured by certain of 
its parts if they act wrong as a matter of possibility or
26it should be noted that this position is similar to both that of 
Henry James and that of Joslah Royce's Idealism.
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accident, neither inevitable nor yet to be infallibly 
warded off. In all this, it is a theory devoid either of 
transparency or of stability. It gives us a pluralistic, 
restless universe, in which no single point of view can 
ever take in the whole scene; and to a mind possessed of the 
love of unity at any cost, it will, no doubt, remain forever 
unacceptable. A friend with such a mind once told me that 
the thought of my universe made him sick . . . .
But while I freely admit that the pluralism and rest­
lessness are repugnant and irrational in a certain way, I 
find that every alternative to them is irrational in a 
deeper w a y . 27
Addressing himself to his audience of Unitarians, James draws their 
attention to a seeming "irrationality” within his view. The presence of 
chance within his theory of pluralism seems to "preclude utterly the no­
tion of a Providence governing the world."
To this my answer must be very brief. The belief in free­
will is not in the least incompatible with the belief in 
Providence, provided you do not restrict the Providence to 
fulminating nothing but fatal decrees. If you allow him to 
provide possibilities as well as actualities to the universe, 
and to cariry on his own thinking in those two categories 
just as we do ours, chances may be there, uncontrolled even 
by him, and the course of the universe be really ambiguous; 
and yet the end of all things may be just what he intended 
it to be from all eternity . . . .
The creator's plan of the universe would be left blank as 
to many of its actual details, but all possibilities would 
be marked down. The realization of some of these would be 
left absolutely to chance; that is, would only be determined 
when the moment of realization came. Other possibilities 
would be contingently determined; that is, their decision 
would have to wait till it was seen how the matters of abso­
lute chance fell out. But the rest of the plan, including 
its final upshot, would be rigorously determined once for 
all. So the creator himself would not need to know all the 
details of actuality until they came; and at any time his own 
view of the world would be a view partly of facts and partly 
of possibilities, exactly as ours is now. Of one thing.
27lbid.. p. 177.
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however, he might be certain; and that is that his world was 
safe, and that no matter how much it might zig-zag he could 
surely bring it home at last.28
As though James were scouting difficulties in advance of his hear­
ers, he calls their attention to one of seemingly major import. His ap­
proach "leaves the creative mind subject to the law of time." If one is 
to "insist on the timelessness of that mind," James contends that he 
offers "no reply for this." He counters, "Is not the timeless mind ra­
ther a gratuitous fiction?"
And is not the notion of eternity being given at a stroke to 
omniscience only just another way of whacking upon us the 
block-universe, and of denying that possibilities exist? . . .
Admit plurality, and time may be its f o r m . 29
James later states:
I prefer to stick in the wooden finitude of an ultimate 
pluralism, because that at least gives me something definite 
to worship and fight f o r . 80
He has cast his die! His commitment is made— once and for all times— to 
an anti-Absolutistic, radically empirical and pluralistic theory of the 
universe. Later versions will become more subtle, and his ideas will 
become interwoven with facets of a metaphysical position. This initial 
approach is grounded in moral imperatives and directives which he sug­
gests man can place upon his world. Take note that James' pragmatic 
doctrine gains its original impetus from religious and moral
28ibid.. pp. 180-182.
29lbid.. p. 181n.
80william James, Letters, I, p. 238; (additional comments noted in 
Letters. I, pp. 243-247; 256-257; 304).
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considerations. Because they must be, the conditions prerequisite to 
•their accomplishment must be, too. Issuing on the plane of practical 
discourse we see his early position stated; later we will correlate his 
positions of radical empiricism and finitistic pluralism.
The Role of Freedom
Throughout these earlier years of James* preference for the inde- 
terminist position, he had remained unable to frame a theoretical solu­
tion to the problem of how this freedom is possible. His preference he 
states as his "belief" in freedom, and he urges others to accept it. He 
claims that he can muster a "demonstration" of freedom in terms of conse­
quences, due to the moral dimension and choice, as well as reminding his 
readers that the "judgment of regret" necessitates a realm of volitional 
possibilities. His claim to shatter determinism via the moral realm 
has become a major reason for rejection of the Absolutist position. The 
Absolutist, James holds, refuses to take hold of this actual world in 
preference to his "block-universe," where the direction of the past de­
lights the monlst more than the opportunity of the future. James sees 
this as removed from the scene of life as it is lived; moreover, he 
regards the position as being extremely immoral.
There is a pattern to the development of the thoughts of James. It 
will be of some explanatory help now and in the future of this research 
work, to make use of some of these trends. He sees determinism issuing 
into absolutism, which further issues into a basic immorality. At the 
same time, indeterminism serves as a base for pluralism, thus allowing
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for moral possibilities. There is no need to hold to the strangling 
tenets of absolutism, for Its result Is a death of philosophical sound­
ness for James. He opts for what he terms a "finitistic, loosely- 
structured, republlcal pluralism" In which all existent beings share. 
While James has made great effort to uncover the flaws of some choice 
Hegelisms, he also applies his approach to the spawning problems of 
absolutlstlc theism. His main point of contention with the traditional 
approach Is that of allowing God to be omniscient and superior to time. 
The eternallty of such a being does not seem to provoke James' judgment 
nearly as much as the absolutist's claim that God thinks above the tem­
porality to which all of us are subject. This places God above this 
level of "regret" to which we referred earlier, and It does not allow 
his Involvement with this world of "chance." Further, James views this 
as a stifling obstacle to the moral claim which he has urged. This 
"block-universe" approach appears as a mere pantomime, or Instant play­
back, of what has already happened In the mind of God.
James' Attitude Toward Metaphysical "Omniscience"
James' position on freedom and determinism Is Indispensable to 
James' formulation of his "natural theology." This naturalistic ap­
proach comes full-blown In the Varieties. One major trend becomes quite 
evident during these formative years: when James has the choice between
the metaphysical and the moral, he will Inevitably choose the latter.
The current discussion of working out the relationship between God and 
time, omniscience and freedom, ultimately Is decided by the moral fact
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of human freedom and personal responsibility. He terms the metaphysical 
postulate of omniscience a "gratuitous fiction," and "another way of 
whacking upon us the block-universe." James meets metaphysical specu­
lation with his own approach to the moral dimension. This new dynamic 
for James, the moral factor, coupled with his negative imposition of 
the "will-to-believe," have finitized the traditional position of an om­
nipotent, omniscient God.
When James writes the essay "Absolutism and Empiricism," he resur­
rects earlier remarks directed toward Hegel. He appears gleeful over 
the growing confrontation between "Empiricism and Transcendentalism," or 
"Irrationalism and Rationalism." His own "strong bias towards Irration­
alism" leads him to state that "the question 'Shall Fact be recognized 
as an ultimate principle?' is the whole issue between the Rationalists 
and Empiricists of vulgar thought":
Fact holds out blankly, brutally and blindly, against that 
universal deliquescence of everything into logical rela­
tions which the Absolutist Logic demands, and it is the only 
thing that does hold out.^^
James derides the Rationalists for not concurring that "likes and 
dislikes" are some of the "ultimate factors" of their philosophy. He 
suggests that they, too, recognize they are "avowedly making hypotheses, 
playing with ideals." Recognition on their part of the "motives for our 
several faiths" would settle much of the problem. "I frankly confess 
mine— I cannot but think that at bottom they are of an aesthetic and not
^William James, "Absolutism and Empiricism," Mind, IX, p. 283.
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of a logical sort."3% For James it seems poignant that the "one 
fundamental quarrel Empiricism has with Absolutism is over this repudi­
ation by Absolutism of the personal and aesthetic factor in the construc­
tion of p h i l o s o p h y ."33 James further chides, "All Hegelians are not 
prigs, but I somehow feel as if all prigs ought to end, if developed, by 
becoming H e g e l i a n s . "34 James suggests that understanding will be possi­
ble only when these two positions are open to Absolutism, and the Abso­
lutists become aware that
all philosophies are hypotheses, to which all our faculties, 
emotional as well as logical, help us, and the truest of 
which will at the final integration of things be found in 
possession of the men whose faculties on the whole had the 
best divining p o w e r . 35
The Clash of Value-S tructures
James develops his own finitistic theory in reaction to both tra­
ditional theism and the philosophy of the Absolute. His most lengthy 
attack is against the latter, and this is noted in our study of the 
reasons James offers for the shift to the finite God. The Absolutists 
adopted positions which James considered intolerable. We might do well 
to remember that the Absolutist position was popular at the time of his 
writing; therefore, it posed a formidable threat to the value structure 
which James espoused. Perhaps the outstanding advocate of this abso­
lutist position was James' colleague at Harvard University, Josiah Royce.
32 l b i d .. p. 285. ^^IbW. 
3 4 i b l d . 3 5 i b i d .. p. 286.
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whom James considered "the champion of absolute idealism for Anglo 
Saxondom . . . Royce became the epitome of the position which
James rejected.
The Case for the Efforts of Man
If God were infinite, James contends, and He had already created a 
world conditioned to His desires, then our lives would appear to be mean­
ingless. This inflnite-God theory would entail that man's efforts are 
not necessary or needed as a basic ingredient in world-building. If 
this deterministic direction were the case, man's efforts would not be 
an affective dynamic within the universe. Its life-blood would lie else­
where, and man's moral anemia would sound the death-knell to aspirations. 
James goes to great lengths to make clear his position in regard to one's 
acceptance of the orthodox position of the absolute, infinite and total 
forms of reality.
James levels his strongest criticism at the concept of the Absolute 
in his work entitled Pragmatism. This Absolute Being of orthodoxy would 
squeeze all the meaning out of living. It would become the great de­
moralizer to which man, as though a programmed automaton, would simply 
respond as directed. James sharpens the contrast between the finitist 
view, which he espouses, and the absolutist view, when he says:
Here all is process; that world is timeless. Possibilities 
obtain in our world; in the absolute world, where all that 
is not from eternity impossible, and all that ia is necessary, 
the category of possibility has no application. In this world
S^William James, Letters, II, p. 813.
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crimes and horrors are regretable. In that totalized world 
regret obtains not, for ’the existence of ill in the temporal
order is the very condition of the perfection of the eternal
order.’37
What real possibilities would there be in a world controlled by a 
timeless and all-inclusive being?^® We would be merely sand on the beach 
of this "block-universe," part of this "ready-made world," parcel of the
"eternally c o m p l e t e . T h a t  which is referred to as life would really
be sham. No meaning could be attached to our productive and creative 
attempts, since all the world’s destiny would be pre-decided. A world 
without thought and action would imprison us in the arena of stagnating 
results. This world-view William James rejects.
James’ alternative theistic world-view is that of a finite-God 
theory. This view conceives the deity as being somewhat less than all- 
inclusive and as being part of the temporal framework of the world. The 
existence of this type of divinity would allow our efforts some impact 
upon our world. James even suggests that this finite God may stand in 
need of man, just as man may have need of Him. From two different 
sources, we note James’ position on the finite-God;
I confess that I do not see why the very existence of an 
invisible world may not in part depend on the personal 
response which any one of us may make to the religious ap­
peal. God himself, in short, may draw vital strength and 
increase of very being from our fidelity. For my own part,
I do not know what the sweat and blood and tragedy of this
®^William James, Pragmatism, p. 266.
®®William James, The Will to Believe, p. 176f. 
39william James, Pragmatism, p. 261.
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life mean, if they mean anything short of this. If this 
life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally 
gained for the universe by success, it is no better than a 
game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at
will.40
Does our act then create the world's salvation so far as it 
makes room for itself, so far as it leaps into the gap?
Does it create, not the whole world's salvation of course, 
but just so much of this as itself covers of the world's ex­
tent?
Here I take the bull by the horns, and in spite of the 
whole crew of rationalists and monists, of whatever brand 
they be, I ask why not? Our acts, our tuming-places, where 
we seem to ourselves to make ourselves and grow, are the 
parts of the world to which we are closest, the parts of 
which our knowledge is the most intimate and complete. Why 
should we not take them at their face-value? Why may they 
not be the actual tuming-places and growing-places which 
they seem to be, of the world— why not the workshop of being, 
where we catch fact in the making, so that nowhere may the 
world grow in any other kind of way than this?41
James' doctrine seems to ring clear. As he suggests, if the world 
is hinged in indecision, our actions may help decide the verdict. Remove 
the a-temporal and omni-attributes of God, and you eradicate the prede­
termined concept of reality. Our actions become vital to the central 
heart-beat of reality. They cannot be viewed as superfluous campaign­
ing in a rigged and predestined election. Our actions do improve the 
status of the cosmos. This is the core of meaning for James' "melior­
ism."4^
Man: Robot or Co-Worker?
In addition to granting a place for human freedom, James wishes to 
make our actions co-creative with those of God. Both God and man decide
^%illiam James, The Will to Believe, p. 61.
^^William James, Pragmatism, pp. 287-288. .. p. 286.
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the course of the environment. Our human role is creative, not merely 
conformative. Herein lies a basic point in the finitistic approach of 
James.
As a reaction to the "poor-mindedness" of his early approach to the 
religious question, James emphasizes the finitistic position to be fit 
only for the "healthy-minded,and it necessitates the "strenuous 
mood." He contends the "morbid minded" prefer a world in which all de­
cisions have been cast for them. They are asked to contribute nothing 
by way of effort and they would simply acquiesce in their pre-cast 
world-conditions. Attempting to be as fair as possible with this posi­
tion, James says it "affords a kind of passive pleasantness within 
existence," and we supposedly have some need of this from time to time.
In Pragmatism, James provoked the antagonists of his position when 
he suggested that the value of the Absolute came by its providing for 
humans "a moral h o l i d a y . W h i l e  misinterpreted by some, James seems 
to be recommending this as a genuine value. He regarded his own philo­
sophical position as somewhat deficient in this respect.^5 "Despite 
this willingness to grant value to the theory of the Absolute, James' 
own gospel was predominantly one of an ultimate hardihood, zestful for 
the world of real gains and real l o s s e s . J a m e s  suggests a vigorous
43ibid.. p. 291. 44ibid.. p. 74.
43william James, The Meaning of Truth, pp. 238-239.
^^Bemard Brennan, The Ethics of William James (New York: Bookman
Associates, 1^61), p. 64; cf. William James, Pragmatism, pp. 290-297.
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attempt at living a full and meaningful life, "Pluralism is a view to 
which we all practically incline when in the full and successful exer­
cise of our moral energy."4?
The Problem of Intimacy
Intimacy is the missing ingredient from the orthodox attitude 
toward God. James advocates a finitistic divinity compatible with our 
actions, sharing in the total impact of the environment. This intimacy 
would allow us to be "substantially fused" with this Deity, and He must 
gain a similar vantage and perspective of the world as we have. As we 
noted earlier in James' view of the nature of the divine limitations, 
this "substantial fusing" with God is James' attempt to underwrite our 
intimacy with divine reality. James rejects both the traditional 
theistic God and the pantheistic absolute because God, on these views, 
has no intimacy with mankind. Note in the following paragraphs how 
this absence of intimacy differs with the nature of both theism and 
pantheism.
The basis of James' dissatisfaction with the traditional under­
standing of God is that the Deity is distinct from his creation.
The theistic conception, picturing God and his creation as 
entities distinct from each other, still leaves the human 
subject outside the deepest reality in the universe. God 
is from eternity complete, it says, and sufficient unto 
himself; he throws off the world by a free act and as an
47Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James. 
II (Boston; Little, Brown and Company, 1936), p. 265.
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extraneous substance, and he throws himself. Between them,
God says ’one,' the world says 'two,' and man says ’three,'
— that is the orthodox theistic view. And orthodox theism 
has been so jealous of God's glory and it's taken pains to 
exaggerate everything in the notion of him that could make 
for isolation and separateness. Page upon page in scholastic 
books go to prove that God is in no sense implicated by his 
creative act, or involved in his creation. That his relation 
to the creatures he has made should make any difference to him, 
carry any consequence, or qualify his being, is repudiated as 
a pantheistic slur upon His s e l f - s u f f i c i n g n e s s .48
When viewed closely, the theistic doctrine provokes two reactions. The 
first disillusion appears within the framework of theism itself: there
is no reciprocity between God and man (as quoted a b o v e ) . 49 It is quite 
apparent that James is not concerned to perpetuate a God who is insensi­
tive to our actions and who really has no need of us.
The Problem of Reciprocity
Secondly, this problem of reciprocity is not the only difficulty 
with orthodox theism. We must be "substantially fused" in the creativity 
of this God, not a mere external creation by him. For "to be like a 
thing is not as intimate a relation as to be substantially fused into 
it, to form one continuous soul and body with it."^^ Pantheism has 
achieved a greater degree of intimacy by identifying the world with God. 
We have come to a level of development in which humanity can dismiss the 
orthodox theistic doctrine as simply outmoded:
Our contemporary mind, having once for all grasped the 
possibility of a more intimate weltanschaung. the only opin­
ions quite worthy of arresting our attention will fall within
48william James, A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 25-26. 
4*lbid.. p. 26. SOlbid.. p. 25.
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the general scope of what may roughly be called the pantheistic 
field of vision, the vision of God as the indwelling divine 
rather than the external creator, and of human life as part 
and parcel of that deep reality.51
By this latter fact that God and the world are somewhat "fused," it ap­
pears that the reciprocity of relations between God and man would be 
assured.
This apparent satisfaction with the pantheistic approach is but par­
tial. James revelled in the fact that it made us tentatively "fused" 
with God. Yet, from another perspective, James points out that it ulti­
mately produced an incongruity with our relationship to God.
The orthodox perspective views the absolute as a-temporal. God sees 
all of reality, time-past, present, and future, in one fell-swoop. Since 
God’s perspective is a "one-glance-does-all" approach, it differs strik­
ingly from our own.
An absolute, then, or sub specie eternitatis, or quatenus 
infinites est, the world repels our sympathy because it has 
no history. As such, the absolute neither acts nor suffers, 
nor loves nor hates; it has no needs, desires, or aspira­
tions, no failures or successes, friends or enemies, victo­
ries or defeats. All such things pertain to the world qua 
relative, in which our finite experiences lie, and whose 
vicissitudes alone have power to arouse our interest.^2
The eternality of the orthodox theistic view, like that of pantheism, is 
foreign to James' own experiential view. Regardless of our identifica­
tion with the absolute in its non-historical aspect, in its a-temporality 
— it remains a foreign concept to us. James views this radical discrep­
ancy between the absolute and the relative points of view as a sizeable
Sllbid., p. 30. 52lbid.. pp. 47-48.
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barrier, like that of the lack of intimacy between God and his crea­
tion .
The Direction of James’ Pinitism
How can one overcome the discrepancy noted as a problem within the 
theistic infinitistic position? James really shines when he suggests 
the only answer is that of a finite God. Since this God cannot be super­
ficially or externally related to man, the only solution is for us to 
be internal parts of him, "substantially fused" with him. Further, God
must be a being like unto us, in a temporal continuum. The tenet that
God is less than all-inclusive will allow him to fulfill this require­
ment, because being in time will provide God a history and an environ­
ment. James pictures his finite-God theory as preserving some of the 
theistic attributes, as he says:
We are indeed internal parts of God and not external crea­
tions, on any possible reading of the panpsychic system.
Yet because God is not the absolute, but is himself a part
when the system is conceived pluralistically, his functions
can be taken as not wholly dissimilar to those of the other
smaller parts,— as similar to our functions consequently.
Having an environment, being in time, and working out 
a history just like ourselves, he escapes from the foreign­
ness from all that is human, of the static timeless perfect
a b s o l u t e . 5 4
Stressing the concern for intimacy, James reiterates his preference for 
a finite God.
Difficulties crop up during James' spasmodic and unsystematic de­
scription of God. One of those problems comes in James' discussion of
5 3 l b i d .. p p .  4 0 ,  4 4 .  5 4 i b i d .. p .  3 1 8 .
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his conception of God. While he maintains that we are "part and parcel" 
of God, "substantially fused" with God, the question arises as to how 
we regain any individuality. His peculiar pantheism has landed him in 
an apparent contradiction upon initial interpretation; however, James 
would not allow this compromise. Based upon further study, we will find 
individuality to be a fundamental concept of his entire philosophy. His 
solution to the problem comes in the form of pluralism. James asserts 
that God is to be like us, possessing an environment, a being within 
time, and continuously working out his destiny. We are alike in some 
respects, yet James speaks of God as "one of the eaches"; therefore, we 
are individuals of a pluralistic community. James' position is plural­
ism, somewhat clouded by this "substantial fusing" of God and man.
Reaction to Ins titutionalized Religion
James had explicitly rejected the doctrinaire and institutional
position of Christianity, along with its revelation of the God-man. He
claimed to give up those "theistic prejudices of infancy," and arrive
at the plateau where he could grasp that "all the special manifestations
of religion (I mean its creeds and theories) may have been absurd."^5 A
further piece of correspondence reveals his attitude:
I do not (and fear cannot) follow the gospel schemes as you 
do, and . . . the Bible itself, in both its testaments (omit­
ting parts of John and the Apocalypse) seems to me, by its 
intense naturalness and humanness, the most fatal document 
that one can read against the orthodox theology, in so far as
55William James, The Letters of William James. II, p. 127.
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the latter claims the words of the Bible to be its basis.
I myself believe the orthodox theology contains elements 
that are permanently true . . .  I believe that they will 
have to be expressed in any ultimately valid religious phi­
losophy; and I see . . .  a foretaste of the day when the 
abstract essentials of belief will be the basis of commun­
ion more than the particular forms and concrete doctrines 
in which they articulate themselves.56
In answer to the question whether he believed the Bible as the authority 
in religious matters, he replied, "No. It is so human a book that I 
don't see how belief in its divine authorship can survive the reading 
of it."57 It appears that James discounts the biblical record because 
of its claim for super-human authority.
The claim to be intellectually free of Christianity was strangely 
accompanied by the reference to himself as "protestant." Although James 
educated his family in Christian scriptures and attended the daily prayer 
sessions in Harvard Chapel, attracted by the "simplicity of the worship 
and the paucity of the congregation,"5® his disdain for organized reli­
gion was quite vocal. In one of his lectures he put it this way:
I must personally confess that my own training in natural 
science has completely disqualified me for sympathetic treat­
ment of the ecclesiastical universe . . . • It Is impossible 
to believe that the same God who established nature should 
also feel a special pride at being more immediately repre­
sented by clergymen than by laymen, or find a sweet sound in 
church-phraseology and intonation, or a sweet savor in the 
distinction between deacons, archdeacons and bishops. He 
is not of the prim temper.59
56Ibid.. pp. 196-197. 57ibid.. p. 215.




Further, in a letter to Schiller he lashes out at the superficial ex- 
trinsicality of the automated ecclesiastics. "Just been to Church1—  
automatisms throughoutJ Let us beware of the day when pragmatism be­
comes automatism in our mouths I A c c o m p a n y i n g  his dislike of auto­
matism and its parallel association with prayer, James declared that he 
could not "possibly pray— I feel foolish and a r t i f i c i a l . H e  left 
little untouched in his scathing attack upon the automated Christians 
and what appeared to him a life of artificiality. However, this "auto­
mated church" probably served as one of the strong antitheses which 
caused James to formulate his finitistic position.
A New Solution to the Old Problem of Evil
James sees a problem with the classic interpretation of the prob­
lem of evil. His Gifford Lectures, later published as The Varieties of 
Religious Experience, and also A Pluralistic Universe, present a com­
pendium of his view concerning the problem. Opposing the theory of the 
absolute, James states:
It introduces a speculative 'problem of evil' namely, and 
leaves us wondering why the perfection of the absolute should 
require just such particular hideous forms of life as darken 
the day for our human imaginations. If they were forced on 
it by something alien and to 'overcome' them the absolute 
had still to keep hold of them, we could understand its feel­
ing of triumph, though we, so far as we were ourselves among 
the elements overcome, could acquiesce but sullenly in the 
resultant situation, and would never Just have chosen it as 
the most rational one conceivable. But the absolute is
GOlbid.. p. 359.
61william James, The Letters of William James. II, p. 214.
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represented as a being without environment, upon which 
nothing alien can be forced, and which has spontaneously 
chosen from within to give itself the spectacle of all that 
evil rather than a spectacle with less evil in it.62
A Restatement of the Absolutist Position
Basic to the problem is the abiding question, how can a perfect
being, spontaneously and out of the resources of its own perfect self,
allow or permit the imperfections and evils seen within the world? Does
it not seem irrational to assert that perfection demands imperfection?
It appears that the "ideally perfect whole" would be a whole whose parts
were likewise perfect, (or at least perfect in their own way).
The absolute is defined as the ideally perfect whole, yet 
most of its parts, if not all, are admittedly imperfect.
Evidently the conception lacks internal consistency, and 
yields us a problem rather than a solution.63
James pays particular attention to the facet of the problem in 
which imperfection characterizes all the finite and fragmentary views 
of the world. If you are given a situation in which the cosmos is 
viewed as perfect by the absolute, what is to be gained by adding in­
numerable imperfect views of the same c o s m o s ? H o w  could the absolute 
"have lapsed from the perfection of its own integral experience of 
things, and refracted itself into all our finite e x p e r i e n c e s ? " * ^  James 
sees this as a reversion to the pluralistic ap p r o a c h .66 Note James'
*^William James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 117. 
6 3 l b i d .. pp. 123-124. *^Ihid., pp. 118-119. 
6 5 l b i d .. p. 120. 66 i b i d .. pp. 122-123.
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argument when he contends that to make the being of the absolute de­
pendent upon its constituent parts within the universe is to allow the 
latter to develop selfhoods on their own accounts, and this would be 
contrary to typical absolutistic theism. "The absolute as such has 
objects, not constituents," says J a m e s . 67 it appears that James means 
that, in keeping with the theory of the absolutist, the finite experi­
ences we are discussing must be accounted for as derived from this 
absolute— as its objects. The absolute qua absolute is its own inte­
gral experience of things, and cannot be thought of as dependent on any 
finite experiences of the world.
James' View of the Problem of Evil
The absolutistic position on the problem of evil is rejected by 
James. In its place, James puts forth his own finitistic theory as 
being able to handle the problem with little difficulty. The solution 
comes when we
allow the world to have existed from its origin in pluralis­
tic form, as an aggregate or collection of higher and lower 
things and principles, rather than an absolute, unitary fact.
For then evil would not need be essential; it might be, and 
may always have been, an independent portion that had no 
rational or absolute right to live with the rest, and which 
we might conceivably hope to see got rid of at last.68
If we do not insist on injecting rationality at the very basis of all
reality as the monist does, if we will allow even the slightest something
67xbid.. p. 123.
68william James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 132.
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to escape that all-inclusive ultimate, then the responsibility for 
evil in the universe can be excised from the forces of goodness. Fur­
ther, we would not be forced into the irrational approach of showing 
how the goodness requires evil as the necessary condition of its good­
ness. James' finitistic theism escapes this latter difficulty.
The approach which James makes to the problem of evil is unlike 
his previous affirmative solutions. His consideration of the problem 
from a speculative viewpoint suggests a different approach from the 
"practical value" approach heretofore considered. How could it be 
otherwise than a speculative problem? Yet he does attempt to qualify 
his position.
James was not unaware that there would be practical implications,
as well as speculative ones, with regard to the problem of evil. In
the Varieties, immediately following his solution through the finitistic
approach, James states:
Now the gospel of healthy-mindedness, as we have described 
it, casts its vote distinctly for this pluralistic view.
Whereas the monistic philosopher finds himself more or less 
bound to say, as Hegel said, that everything actual is ra­
tional, and that evil, as an element dialectically required,. 
must be pinned in and kept and consecrated and have a function 
awarded to it in the final system of truth, healthy-mindedness 
refuses to say anything of the sort.^B
Likewise in A Pluralistic Universe, he continues:
In any pluralistic metaphysics, the problems that evil pre­
sents are practical, not speculative. Not why evil should 
exist at all, but how we can lessen the actual amount of it, 
is the sole question we need there c o n s i d e r .70
G^ibid., p. 132. 70wiiiiain James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 124.
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Note how James regards both the practical and the speculative ap­
proaches within his gospel of healthy-mindedness. Evil, as something 
we must actively combat rather than to submit to, serves as an incen­
tive for those who act. As James puts it, evil becomes a practical 
problem, and it beckons forth our moral activities.
It appears that the cardinal reason for James* taking the position 
toward evil which he does was the practical value it could contribute 
to one's life. An authority on James, Julius Seelye Bixler, prefers 
the priority of practicality on the problem of evil.
James does, it is true, refer in the Varieties to the specu­
lative difficulty of finding the origin of evil in a God 
who is wholly good. And in a certain limited sense it may 
be said to be the logic of the situation which drives him 
to postulate a finite God. But surely the logical sense 
is most limited. The problem was logical only as every 
problem can be expressed in logical terms. The issues as 
they presented themselves in James' mind were living issues 
first and logically arranged afterwards. His interest, em­
phatically, was not in describing how evil can come from good. 
Rather it was a 'melioristic' interest in what can be done 
about it.71
We concur with Bixler that the prevalent intent of James in solving the 
problem of evil from the finitistic viewpoint was its ability to demon­
strate that practical interests are operative.
Evil and the Natural Situation
Evil presents a problem of how to interpret the natural world. 
Within the finitistic approach to God, evil is a datum which must be
71Julius S. Bixler, Religion in the Philosophy of William James 
(Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1926), p. 36.
understood basically from our finite position. Therefore, it must be 
understood as though God, who coexists with these evils, is subject to 
the same standards of goodness as we are. From this approach, this God 
will be a knower and a power which might far surpass our own human 
standards within the universe, but He is not to be considered as a being 
completely outside our own value standards. Judgments which we use con­
cerning God will parallel those we use to judge other persons. Since 
this is viewed as the condition of the world, evil could scarcely be 
considered as less than a distasteful dilemma which we are forced to 
confront. To the observer and/or participant of a universe filled with 
innumerable tragedies, who recognizes no level of certainty about an 
infinite God, the world simply cannot be recognized as the handiwork of 
an all-good and all-powerful God.
The finitistic position is that the world with all its evil simply 
cannot be the effort of an all-powerful and benevolent God. Evil, as 
we said, is judged from our finite perspective. Our term "finite 
perspective" indicates that evil is adjudicated upon the standards of 
human goodness. By human values "good" indicates man's efforts to do 
his best to restrict evil to a minimum and do all within his capabili­
ties to improve the conditions of human existence. This pictures man 
as striving toward overcoming the meaninglessness in the human predica­
ment. Since God is judged by our standards, then his task will be simi­
lar to ours. God will be expected to cooperate in this campaign, to 
put forth efforts to produce the best world possible. Since the stand­
ards of human goodness are applicable to God, then He must be considered
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finite, too. If this deficiency were not to be found in God, then 
there would be no explanation for an Imperfect natural existence.
There is a further comment on James' discussions of evil over
what he calls the lack of intimacy expressed by an Absolute Being. The
foreignness of such an Absolute makes its perspective on Issues time­
less, quite unlike ours. This not only applies to the Absolute's under­
standing of daily events, it is quite important to a discussion of evil. 
This would pose a real threat to that which we hold valuable. Urgency 
and comradeship will not allow one to take a seat of disinterest and 
disengagement, and an Absolute would have virtually no identity with our 
human predicament.
Evil Requires the Finitude of God
From the finite point of view, it is impossible to understand how
an all-good and all-powerful God could produce a world superior to this, 
particularly one that is without evil. This would imply that God did 
less than his best on this one, or that he could not do any better at 
any given time. Either case points up the finitude of God, either in 
power or in goodness. A rational explanation of evil seems to come 
short of satisfaction. Perhaps the tack which James takes is to be 
preferred, for he limits the powers of goodness which are at work in the 
universe. Since the question of God's nature cannot be determined by 
rational principle alone, the finitistic God seems to be James' practi­
cal conclusion.
51
When we have finished stating all the arguments for it, evil will 
still remain a bleak mystery, understandable only through warranted 
assumption. The assumption that it has been redeemed, that it is now 
under control, that it will ultimately serve some humane purpose— these 
are the assumptive bases which are refused by James. He rejects this 
kind of argument concerning evil because of the magnitude of evil. Is 
the universe such a forlorn spot as James sometimes suggests? He said, 
"there is no problem of good," but then he seems to reverse himself when 
he contends that good justifies the inference of evil.^2 If evil is no 
big problem in the deficiency of the world, why make so much of the prob­
lem? The problem of good in relation to evil remains within James.
What can be said of moral evil within the general discussion of the 
problem of evil? James seems to indicate that this moral dimension is 
the only unquestioned kind of evil in our experience. This would appear 
to be the only really obvious point of individual connection to the 
problem of evil. James makes little attempt to differentiate the various 
kinds of evil. It would appear that his solution might have taken the 
problem of evil too lightly.
Granting evil its biggest blight, does this entitle James to de- 
absolutize God in light of the problem of evil? There appears to be 
slight inconsistency. James has argued in Human Immortality against any 
attempt to curtail the divine imagination and intelligence by human and 
"comfortable standards." "The Deity that suffers us" may have plans
7^William James, Dilemma of Determinism, p. 23.
52
for others like us which go beyond our present prognostications. He 
has warned us not to measure God by human standards alone, and one might 
wonder why this could not equally apply to the question of evil. "The 
scale of the evil actually in sight defies all human tolerance." For 
James, the worth of the philosophical argument weighed on the object 
in question, however imperfect and distant that object appeared. This 
is the concern with the question of a finite God.
Approaching God imperfectly and anthropocentrically, James states 
that his belief in God's presence is structured: "I need it so that
it 'must' be true." This "need" is met in God as "a more powerful ally 
of my own ideals."^3 This finite God has the characteristic of "use- 
value," which makes God unquestionably attractive from James' pragmatic 
point of view. There is another facet to this charm, for to constitute 
the divine, this God must transcend the level of mere utility. The 
problem of evil is an area in which this more-than-utility factor of 
James' finitistic God could be demonstrated. Taking note of evil in 
his own experience, and following it on the horrendous scale of the 
cosmos as detailed by Darwin, James admits to no place for this "God 
of nature":
We see indeed that certain evils minister to ulterior goods.
. . .  We can vaguely generalize this into the doctrine that 
all the evil in the universe is but instrumental to its 
greater perfection. But the scale of the evil actually in 
sight defies all human tolerance; and transcendental ideal­
ism, in the pages of a Bradley or a Royce, brings us no far­
ther than the book of Job did— God's ways are not our ways.
^^illiam James, Letters. II, pp. 213-214.
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so let us put our hands upon our mouth. A God who can relish 
such superfluities of horror is no God for human beings to 
appeal to. His animal spirits are too high. In other words 
the 'Absolute' with his one purpose is not the man-like God 
of common people.74
The God of traditional theology and secular idealism cannot meet the 
demands of human necessities, according to James. Man needs a "man­
like God," who will join him in his campaign against our "common 
enemy."
James' reaction to the moral phase of evil is not too unlike that 
of the traditional Christian response. Like James, the responsive 
Christian is militant against evil by refusing to bring it into his own 
person and by neutralizing its effects wherever found. There appears 
to be a correlation between the pluralistic insistence upon man's con­
tribution within a world process and that of the classic saintly hero 
who does battle with evil.
Summary;
The infinite-God theories discussed in the preceding pages have 
called into question for James the problem of their basic doctrines.
The infinite-God theories accept the existence of God as necessarily 
true; probability does not enter the picture because truth is necessarily 
demonstrated. A philosophical position which holds that we can know 
with certainty that God exists as an infinite being has read a great 
deal into human experience. The problem arises in showing any connec­
tion between the infinite and the world of nature. As James sees it.
^^William James, Pragmatism, pp. 142-143.
54
what is accepted by the infinite-God theorists will have to stand 
the attack of the finitistic approach.
The finite-God approach calls attention to the fact that the prob­
lems of the natural world appear to be of a different sort than those 
of the infinite. For example, evil for the Absolutists would have to 
be explained in reference to an already established God as infinite.
It would have no purpose nor demonstrate any worth for the finite posi­
tion. The meaning of evil must be controlled by that which has already 
been accepted as necessarily true within the Absolutist's view.
When the subjectivity of the individual is the point of departure 
in building one's theory of God, objective certainty seems to be of 
little significance. As a result, the facts of evil, as well as other 
data, are viewed from a different perspective within the finitistic 
positions. They become data viewed as disclosing the essential limita­
tions of the divine. This lack of objective certitude, noted in the 
method of James, presents the possibilities of interpreting certain 
data as possible evidence for the finitude of God. We will be able to 
see this in the following chapter as we study the motives, the dimen­
sions, and the preference which James has for the pluralistic.
CHAPTER TWO: PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES
OF JAMES' FINITE THEISM
Chapter Two
PHILOSOPHICAL MOTIVES OF JAMES» FINITE THEISM
For William James, God must be finite. The evidence which he offers 
for the finite-God theory is viewed as positive evidence for the finitis­
tic, and enables us to piece together his unorthodox views. The general 
nature of the evidence we have viewed leads us to suggest that it is­
sues basically from practical concerns. One can note a trend develop­
ing in the mind of James that certain life values, or practical values, 
need to be defended at all costs. Since these seem to be best preserved 
if God is finite, then God is finite.
Intellectual considerations come to the scene when James feels the 
necessity to construct a theory consistent with the values he is uphold­
ing. As in the case of the problem of evil, when the contradiction be­
tween positions of practical fact and the absolutist viewpoint clash, so 
much the better. Give the contradiction emphasis in order to gain favor 
for your own point of view. Basic to all the evidence which we have 
viewed, James is concerned with pointing out how the absolute contra­
dicts the values he defends. James recommends the finite-God theory in 
order to preserve the values which make life worth living.
James' finitistic theory of God is discovered in three of his major 
works, all written in the last decade of his life. As a result of the 
Gifford lectures of 1901-1902, he published The Varieties of Religious
55
56
Experience. In this particular volume, James is intent upon attacking 
philosophical theology for its inability to direct man's thinking about 
God.l His attack is levelled at the more traditional theisms based upon 
natural arguments, and his rejection of Newman's works will serve as an 
example. He does not seem too concerned about developing his own theory 
of finitism at this point; rather, his criticism is directed against the 
intellectual approach to the problem of God's existence.
A later work. Pragmatism, and his last official volume, A Pluralistic 
Universe, contain James' own theory of the finite God. In Pragmatism. 
James reacts more against the Absolutists' position within Idealism than 
he does against the traditional theistic position.% His last work dis­
misses the antiquated traditionalist position and attempts to excise the
Ophilosophy of the Absolute.
In an attempt to understand the finite characteristics of God as 
held by William James, we have taken note of James' development. Initi­
ally, James was viewed as reacting to the theistic position of his fa­
ther; later, he made a systematic approach to the theistic questions. 
Within the last thirty years of his life, James did not produce any over­
whelmingly revolutionary additions to his original theistic approach.
With the exception of his brief flirtation with pantheism, and his later 
analysis of that problem, James maintains his view that finitism is the 
human response to a contingent world.
^William James, Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 329-347. 
^William James, Pragmatism, pp. 165-193.
William James, Pluralistic Universe, pp. 23-30.
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The value of theism, as James conceived it, was seen pragmatically 
in its anthropocentric "workings," , for the "healthy-minded ap­
proach," and the "powerful ally of my own ideals." Since the pragmatic 
maxim demands that "faith make a differenceJames is fixing theistic 
merit by the difference it makes in human action, and by that "differ­
ence" it either stands or falls. With this criterion in mind, it seems 
that the case has been stated that for James, God is inconceivable in 
any terms other than the finitistic. Man's relation to God proceeds on 
the basis that God is social and interacting with this common world.
It has been noted in the last chapter that the "Absolute" God of 
the traditional theists and the "Creator-God" of the scholastics are not 
permissible for James, for these earlier approaches see God as aloof, 
distant, and of no pragmatic value. James held that these absolutistic 
approaches were not viable because their truth could hot be verified 
through significant consequences. This brings us to the development 
of this chapter, in which we will first consider the motives for the 
finite nature of God as maintained by James; later, we will note James' 
pragmatic and empirical approach to our knowledge of God.
Motives for the Finite Nature of God
The Moral Incentive
As a prelude to understanding the "moral incentive" of James finite- 
God theory, one needs to gain insight into James' ultimate reasons for 
using the God concept. Contrary to the typical Christian, James did not
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look upon this world as preparatory to another, or as a temporal span 
provided one to align his activities to God's eternal will. Instead, 
James' theism pictures man in a position of cooperating with God, where 
both man's and God's efforts will improve the conditions needed by both. 
This moral goad spurs us on to sharing in the creating of a desirable 
situation in our everyday world. It seems to carry little, if any, of 
the eternal-reward doctrine of orthodoxy. There is need for this incen­
tive to moral activity, for it, in a sense, conditions the kind of world 
in which we live.
If God were infinite, James contends, and He had already created a 
world conditioned to His desires, then our lives would appear to be 
meaningless. This infinite-God theory would entail that man's efforts 
are not necessary or needed as a basic ingredient in world-building. If 
this deterministic theory were the case, man's efforts would not be an 
affective dynamic within the universe. Its life-blood would lie else­
where, and man's moral anemia would curtain his hopes and aspirations. 
James' criticism is directed to the lack of intimacy with the absolute, 
and he returns to the old theme of moral incentive.
But the world that each of us feels most intimately at home 
with is that of beings with histories that play into our 
history, whom we can help in their vicissitudes even as they 
help us in ours. This satisfaction the absolute denies us; 
we can neither help nor hinder it, for it stands outside of
history.4
What greater incentive could one have than a God who needs man? What 
greater response could be requested than from one who cannot accomplish
4lbid.. p. 49.
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his purposes without our cooperation? Man and God share in the same 
task— that of fashioning the shape of reality. Here is the hardcore 
issue for James' desire for God to be finite— the moral incentive of 
interacting needs betwixt God and man; we need each other. Man must be 
a co-creator of the moral fibre of the universe, not simply find it 
ready for his approving nod when he arrives.
The method by which James seeks to preserve the moral incentive 
value is that of finitizing God. Both man and God become co-creators in 
securing a real meaning for existence. James runs a gallant campaign to 
preserve the creative role which man will play in the universe. Man and 
God, both, become central to the meaning of the universe; and man must 
have some role in determining the destinies of life. His rejection of 
the "block universe" of the absolute comes as a result of his insistence 
upon the volitional basis of man. Only then can man's life have integ­
rity and not be deprived of real meaning.
Although James gives man a central place in his consortium, he 
feels an equal need for some sort of God for man; otherwise there would
5be little justification for the moral incentive man experiences. If 
the world were totally indifferent to the ideals of man, there would be 
no need or reason for the moral incentive. Either atheism or traditional 
theism can fall victim to the world-view just described. The God which 
William James espouses would fit the pattern of neither position.
William James, The Will To Believe, pp. 212-213,
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The Pluralistic Moral Dimension
The moral incentive as related to the problem of a finite God can
be traced in James’ writing as early as the "Dilemma of Determinism,"
but its shaping into a systematic facet of his radical finitistic
pluralism came during the final phase of life— the metaphysical period.
Within the Literary Remains. James states that the kind of monism his
father advocated ought to raise no quarrel from the "half-practical
pluralism" hardened by reflection, and deliberate," which was wrangled
over the "old mystery of the One and the Many"— only to conclude "by
taking sides against the One." Note James’ pluralistic moral dimension:
It seems to me that the deepest of all philosophic differ­
ences is that between this pluralism and all forms of monism
whatever. Apart from analytic and intellectual arguments, 
pluralism is a view to which we all practically incline when 
in the full and successful exercise of our moral energy.
The life we then feel tingling through us vouches sufficiently 
for itself, and nothing tempts us to refer it to a higher 
source . . . (In such euphoria we are inclined to no monistic 
transcendence). The feeling of action, in short, makes us 
turn a deaf ear to the thought of being; and this deafness 
and insensibility may be said to form an integral part of what 
in popular phrase is known as healthy-mindedness. Any abso­
lute moralism must needs be such a healthy-minded pluralism; 
and in a pluralistic philosophy the healthy-minded moralist 
will always feel at home.6
From this pluralistic background, James continues with the "moral
business." His ambition, as the advocate of the "healthy-minded," is
to direct adherents to recognize that "healthy-mindedness is not the
whole of life";
and the morbid view, as one by contrast may call it, asks 
for a philosophy very different from that of absolute moralism.
^William James, Literary Remains of Henry James, Sr., (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1884), p. 186.
To suggest personal will and effort to one all sicklled o’er 
with the sense of weakness, of helpless failure, and of fear, 
is to suggest the most horrible of things to him. What he 
craves is to be consoled in his very impotence, to feel that 
the Powers of the Universe recognize and secure him, all 
passive and failing as he is. Well, we are all potentially 
such sick men. The safest and best of us are of one clay 
with lunatics and prison-inmates. And whenever we feel 
this . . . our morality appears but as a plaster hiding a 
sore it can never cure, and all our well-doing as the hol- 
lowest substitute for that well-being that our lives ought 
to be grounded in, but, alas I are not. This well-being 
is the object of the religious demand,— a demand so pene­
trating and unassuageable that no consciousness of such oc­
casional and outward well-doing as befalls the human lot can 
ever give it satisfaction.?
James raises the point that men cannot have it both ways;
to satisfy the religious demand is to deny the demands of 
the moralist. The latter wishes to feel the empirical goods 
and evils, on the recognition of which his activity proceeds, 
to be real goods and evils, with their distinction absolutely 
preserved. So that of religion and moralism, the morbid and 
the healthy view, it may be said that what is meat to the one 
is the other’s poison. Any absolute moralism is a pluralism; 
and absolute religion is a monism.^
James seems to sense a practicality in this position:
The accord of moralism and religion is superficial, their 
discord radical. Only the deepest thinkers on both sides see 
that one must go. Popular opinion gets over the difficulty 
by compromise and contradiction . . . .  Such inconsistency 
cannot be called a solution of the matter, though it prac­
tically seems to work with most men well enough.^
Something vital comes from this practical order. It is the modus
vivendi by which ordinary man seems to face the problem of life.
Must not the more radical ways of thinking, after all, appeal 
to the same umpire of practice for corroboration of their 
more consistent views? Is the religious tendency or the 
moralistic tendency on the whole the most serviceable to man’s
?Ibid. Bibid.. pp. 186-187. 9ibld.. p. 187.
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life, taking the latter in the largest way? By their fruits 
ye shall know them. Solvltur ambulando; for the decision we 
must perhaps await the day of Judgment. Meanwhile, the battle 
is about us, and we are its combatants, steadfast or vacillat­
ing, as the case may be.10
In the theistic context, James uses the pragmatic test to question 
the "fruitful results." He continues his case for that finitistic plural­
ism based upon the moralistic claim as the more rewarding and "fruitful 
approach" to life.
The ethical dimension becomes crucial when James states that his 
"main purpose" for a study in religion is to show that "there is no such 
thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made up in advance." 
Our everyday action gives content to ethics, and "there can be no final 
truth in ethics any more than in physics, until the last man has had 
his experience and said his say." If the ethicist is actually studying 
the existing ideals found in the world, he will discover that moral 
ideals presuppose persons, and that beyond the "de facto constitution of 
existing consciousness" there is no more ultimate ground of obligation.
It becomes the work of this "consciousness" to determine which ideas are 
right and which are wrong. This is accomplished by "feeling" the one to 
be right, the other wrong. James does not accept any "over-reaching 
system of moral relations" which are claimed as valid in themselves. 
Instead, James is of the opinion that obligation for ethical claims can
ultimately be traced to a claim made by a specific p e r s o n . T h i s  becomes
10̂ bid. llwilliam James, Will to Believe, pp. 193-194.
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especially true if there is a God, says James, whose demands "carry the 
most of obligation simply because they are the greatest in amount." 
Further, he claims that it would be true even if there were no God, 
since "we form at any rate an ethical republic here below.
Ethics' "most valuable principle" is that the "essence of good is 
simply to satisfy demand," which James suggests might be "anything under 
the sun." The pluralistic notion of James is underscored as he says, 
"The elementary forces in ethics are probably as plural as those of 
physics." "Those ideals must be written highest which prevail at the 
least cost," or which nullify the fewest number of other ideals. Fur­
ther, there can be no "absolute" philosophy of ethics:
There is but one unconditional commandment, which is that we 
should seek incessantly, with fear and trembling, so to vote 
and to act as to bring about the very largest total universe 
of good which we can see.13
James reminds us that history is viewed from the perspective of
The anarchists, nihilists, and free-loversj prohibitionists 
and . . . radical Darwinians with their idea of the suppres­
sion of the weak,— these and all the conservative sentiments 
of society arrayed against them, are simply deciding through 
actual experiment by what sort of conduct the maximum amount 
of good can be gained and kept in this world. These experi­
ments are to be judged, not à priori, but by actually finding, 
after the fact of their making, how much more outcry or how 
much appeasement comes about.i4
While "abstract rules can help" in the practical decisions of ethical
questions, they are less helpful "in proportion as our intuitions are
more piercing, and our vocation is the stronger for the moral life."15
IZlbid.. pp. 195-198. 13lbid.. p. 209.
14lbid.. p. 207. l^Ibid.. p. 209.
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The "chief of all reasons why concrete ethics cannot be final is
that they have to wait on metaphysical and theological beliefs," James
contends. The practical power of belief comes to the fore. Humans are
capable of the "easy-going mood" or the "strenuous" mood, and belief in
.God greatly widens man’s capacity for the latter. James claims that
the man who possesses the "strenuous mood" is the morally-productive
man, and he suggests that
the strenuous type of character will in the battle-field of 
history always outwear the easy-going type, and religion 
will drive irréligion to the wall.l&
Now comes the "divine thinker," who puts together the pieces of our
moral productivity:
In the interests of our own ideal of systematically unified 
moral truth, therefore, we, as would-be philosophers, must 
postulate a divine thinker, and pray for the victory of the
religious cause. Meanwhile, exactly what the thought of the
infinite thinker may be is hidden from us even were we sure 
of his existence; so that our postulation of him after all 
serves only to let loose in us the strenuous mood.l?
James' ethical view, as well as that of his religious finitism, indicates
that he is grounded in sentiment, pluralistic possibility, and pragmatic
tests of truth. James has merely mentioned the special intuition of the
"morally strong," but this will blossom after his acquaintance with
Bergson. The theological problem remains shifting, as though in flux.
His latest decree concerning God suggests a Divinity who is open to the
possibilities which lie before man.
16Ibid.. p. 213. ^7ibid.. p. 214.
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The Religious Dimension
James was nearing the sixty-year mark in life when he began his 
preparation for the Gifford Lectures. Much of the early emotional and 
spiritual crisis of his youth had continued to ferment through the 
developmental years, and a glimpse of his broadening spiritual aware­
ness is attested by a letter he wrote in 1899.
I have managed to read a good deal about religion, and re­
ligious people, and care less for accomplishments, except 
where . . . they go with a sanctified heart. Abundance of 
accomplishments, in an unsanctified heart, only make one a 
more accomplished devil.
This renewal of effort to face the theistic question, as well as
James' approach to the pragmatic future, is suggested in another letter
of late December, 1899:
Since July . . .  my only companions have been saints, most 
excellent, though sometimes rather lop-sided company. In 
a general manner I can see my way to a perfectly bully pair 
of volumes, the first an objective study of the 'Varieties 
of Religious Experience,' the second, my own last will and 
testament, setting forth the philosophy best adapted to 
normal religious needs.19
James stated his intent was to write a two-volume work. The first of 
these finally appeared under the title of the Varieties, but his "last 
will and testament" in the field of religious philosophy never came off. 
While most of the content of the Varieties is psychological, there are 
threads of theism interspersed. His later life, after 1900, will convey 
some theistic provisions which might compose this "last will and testa­
ment." These begin with his idea of "religious acts."
l®William James, Letters. II, p. 106. 19lbid.. pp. 111-112.
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The Place of Religious Acts
In April, 1900, James had completed the first three of his lectures 
for the Gifford Foundation. His purpose Is stated In some personal 
correspondence:
The problem I have set myself Is a hard one: first, to defend
(against all the prejudices of my ’class’) ’experience’ against 
’philosophy’ as being the real backbone of the world’s reli­
gious life— I mean prayer, guidance, and all that sort of 
thing Immediately and privately felt, as against high and 
noble general views of our destiny and the world’s meaning; 
and second, to make the hearer or reader believe, what I 
myself Invincibly do believe, that although all the special 
manifestations of religion may have been absurd (I mean Its 
creeds and theories), yet the life of It as a whole Is man­
kind’s most Important function. A task well-nigh Impossible,
I fear, and In which I shall fall; but to attempt It Is my 
religious a c t .20
Continuing the pursuit of his "religious acts," and by mld-1901, when he
had completed his first group of lectures, James began to delineate both
the personal and Intellectual facets of the Issue. A further bit of
correspondence puts In precise form what James will attempt throughout
the whole of the Varieties. In a letter to Henry Rankin, James said:
Now, at the end of this first course, I feel my ’matter’ 
taking firmer shape, and It will please you less to hear me 
say that I believe myself to be (probably) permanently In­
capable of believing the Christian scheme of vicarious 
salvation, and wedded to a more continuously evolutionary 
mode of thought. The reasons you from time to time have 
given me . . . have somehow failed to convince. In these 
lectures the ground I am taking Is this: The mother sea 
and fountalnhead of all religions lie In the mystical ex­
periences of the individual, taking the word mystical In a 
very wide sense. All theologies and all eccleslasticlsms are 
secondary growths superimposed; and the experiences make such 
flexible combinations with the Intellectual prepossessions of
ZOlbld., p. 127.
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their subjects, that one may almost say that the have no 
proper intellectual deliverance of their own, but belong to 
a region deeper, and more vital and practical, than that 
which the intellect inhabits. For this they are also in­
destructible by intellectual arguments and criticism. I at­
tach the mystical or religious consciousness to the posses­
sion of an extended subliminal self, with a thin partition 
through which messages make irruption. We are thus made 
convincingly aware of the presence of a sphere of life larger 
and more powerful than our usual consciousness, with which 
the latter is nevertheless continuous. The impressions and 
impulsions and emotions and excitements which we thence re­
ceive help us to live, they found invincible assurance of a 
world beyond the sense, they melt our hearts and communicate 
significance and value to everything and make us happy. They 
do this for the individual who has them and other individuals 
follow him. Religion in this way is absolutely indestructible. 
Philosophy and theology give their conceptual interpretations 
of this experiential life. The farther margin of the sub­
liminal field being unknown, it can be treated as by Tran­
scendental Idealism, as an Absolute mind with a part of which 
we coalesce, or by Christian theology, as a distinct deity 
acting on us. Something, not our immediate self, does act 
on our life! So I seem doubtless to my audience to be blowing 
hot and cold, explaining away Christianity, yet defending the 
more general basis from which I say it proceeds.
Religion cannot be destroyed, for it "must necessarily play an eternal 
part in human history." It starts with the individual, and this is 
"founded in feeling"; thus we note its transcendence of rational dimen­
sions .
The Claim for Mysticism
It has been our attempt to show how James' finitistic theism has 
been developing. Within the Varieties. the pragmatic criterion has been 
applied repeatedly within the framework of empirical content. Within 
James' view, we summarize the intent of this writing:
Zllbid.. pp. 149-150.
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1. The basis of all religion lies in Individual mystical experience, 
which, being more primitive than intellectual experience, is un­
assailable by reason.
2. Mystical experience is the manifestation of a larger sphere of life 
with which we are continuous.
3. Mystical experience grounds life, yields value, produces happiness.
4. Philosophy and theology are conceptual Interpretations of the experi­
ential religious life.
5. The ground of mystical experience can be Interpreted In Idealistic or 
Christian categories.
Within this pragmatic approach perceptual experience Is preferred to con­
ceptual. "Percept" now has the added dimension of Intuition with Its 
special religious significance (since James' reading of Bergson). Feel­
ing, which comes from deeper Inner resources, Is preferred to rationalis­
tic explanations. The mystical dimension has opened up a "wider sphere 
of consciousness," and there appears an energy conveyed by the mystical 
condition which could be advantageous "In case the Inspiration were a 
true one."
Pushing his contention for the mystical dimension of life, James 
states what kind of truth-factor he sees In mysticism:
(1) Mÿstlcal states, when well developed, usually are, and 
have the right to be, absolutely authoritative over the In­
dividual to whom they come.
(2) No authority emanates from them which should make It a 
duty for those who stand outside of them to accept their reve­
lations uncritically.
(3) They break down the authority of the non-nystlcal or 
rationalistic consciousness, based upon the understanding and
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the senses alone. They show It to be only one kind of con­
sciousness. They open out the possibility of other orders 
of truth, in which, so far as anything in us vitally responds 
to them, we may freely continue to have faith.22
The first of these conclusions states the mystic's case as "invulner­
able," and the mystic remains in "undisturbed enjoyment of his creed." 
The second summary statement shows the mystic in a position to ask of 
us that we view his experiences as "establishing a presumption," or 
"forming a consensus" and having "unequivocal outcome." The mystic's 
third statement is a rejection of both the reductionist and the ration­
alist approaches, because there can "never be a state of facts to 
which new meaning may not truthfully be added, provided the mind ascend 
to a more enveloping point of view." Therefore, mysticism provides us 
with
hypotheses which we may voluntarily ignore, but which as 
thinkers we cannot possibly upset. The supernaturalism 
and optimism to which they would persuade us may . . .  be 
after all the truest of insights into the meaning of this
life.23
"Feeling is the deeper source of religion," James contends, and
further holds that if feeling did not exist, he doubts "whether any
philosophic theology could ever have been framed."
I doubt if dispassionate intellectual contemplation of the 
universe, apart from inner unhappiness and need of deliver­
ance on the one hand and mystical emotion on the other would 
ever have resulted in religious philosophies such as we nowpossess.24
^^William James, Varieties of Religious Experience, pp. 422-423. 
23lbid.. p. 428. p. 431.
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Speculative schemes of the theistic variety are "secondary products," and 
they should be "classed as over-beliefs, buildings-out performed by the 
intellect into directions of which feeling originally supplied the
hint."25
Intellectualism in Religious Perspective
Philosophy possibly could become the impartial court of theological
notions, and allow some intelligent interpretation from our "immediate
experiences," thus allowing for a finitistic development to take place.
James challenges another kind of philosophy when he states:
The intellectualism in religion which I wish to discredit 
pretends to be something altogether different from this.
It assumes to construct religious objects out of the re­
sources of logical reason alone, or of logical reason draw­
ing rigorous inference from non-subjective facts. It calls 
its conclusions dogmatic theology, or philosophy of the abso­
lute . . .  It reaches them in an a priori way, and warrants 
their veracity.26
James questions why advocates of the "warranted systems" can possibly 
look with disapproval upon the "merely possible or probably truth" 
theories. Why must they disavow any "results that only private assur­
ance can grasp?" The dogmatic positions within theology are vulner­
able at the point where they claim triumph when "feeling . . . valid 
only for the individual . . .  is pitted against reason (which is) valid 
universally."
The test is a perfectly plain one of fact. Theology based 
on pure reason must in point of fact convince men universally.
If it did not, wherein would its superiority consist? If 
it only formed sects and schools, even as sentiment and
25lbid. 26ibid.. p. 433.
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mysticism form them, how would it fulfill its programme of 
freeing us from personal caprice and waywardness? This 
perfectly definite practical test of the pretensions of 
philosophy to found religion on universal reason simplifies 
my procedure . . .  I need not discredit philosophy by labori­
ous criticism of its arguments. It will suffice if I show 
that as a matter of history it fails to prove its pretension 
to be 'objectively' convincing. In fact, philosophy does so 
fail. It does not banish differences; it founds schools 
and sects Just as feeling does. I believe, in fact, that the 
logical reason of man operates in this field of divinity
exactly as it has always operated in love, or in patriotism,
or in politics, or in any other of the wider affairs of life, 
in which our passions or our mystical Intuitions fix our be­
liefs beforehand. It finds arguments for our convictions,
£  faith] ; . . .  it cannot now secure it.27
Here is James' most precise criticism of natural theology. Appeals 
to the natural world as indisputable are too obscure in principle to 
bear the weight of the whole structure of a theology. "The fact is that
these arguments do but follow the combined suggestions of the facts and
of our feeling. They prove nothing rigorously. They only corroborate 
our preexistent partialities."^®
The nature of religion as suggested by James' epistemology and 
descriptive psychology is found in the Varieties. So many trends, defi­
nitions, and works on the subject of religion, James states, prove that 
the word "religion" cannot stand for any single principle or essence, but 
is rather a collective name.
Perhaps part of the confusion lies in how James conceives "religion." 
To summarize briefly, James seems to be using the term "religion" in sev­
eral different senses. His early usage of the term seems to imply his
27lbid.. pp. 435-436. 2®Ibid.. p. 439.
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theological hang-over from his ancestral Calvinistic orthodoxy. Fur­
ther, he uses "religion" to spell out the criteria of transcendence in 
relation to their human counterparts. (Cf. "Reflex Action and Theism.") 
Again, James uses "religion" as the equivalent of the liberal, 
scientifically-oriented doctrines of the Unitarians. Vet again, James 
approaches "religion" as an option for the spiritual, a transcendent- 
yet-immanent personal God conceived within the existential framework.
His development of the usage of the word began within the structure of 
orthodoxy, then progressed through a scientific (factual) renovation, 
and finally included the moral and existential dimensions. His quest 
was to be a pluralist without losing the available religious values.
James proposed to bypass institutional religion and to cleave "as 
far as ^he] can to personal religion pure and simple." His concise 
view attempts to define religion as
. . . the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men 
in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to 9̂ 
stand in relation to whatever they may consider to be divine.
But the objective meaning of "divine" seems just as hard to define.
James attempts to clarify its meaning by saying
that the word 'divine' . . . shall mean for us not merely 
the primal and enveloping and real . . (but) such a primal 
reality as the individual feels impelled to respond to sol­
emnly and gravely, and neither by a curse nor a jest.^
The question of objective truth in theism concerns primarily the
reality of that "more," with which the believer feels conterminous.
While attempting to construct a philosophical hypothesis about the
29Ibid.. p. 31. 30ibid.. p. 38.
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"more" James still holds closely to those relevant psychological data
and renounces the ambition to be "coercive in his arguments." The
"subconscious self" is a "well-accredited psychological entity," and
James feels this to be the "exactly . . . mediating term required" to
join the human and the transcendent. For this reason, James proposes
that the "more," whatever might be its own nature, "is on its hither side
the subconscious continuation of our conscious life." Lived religious
experiences lead us to the "common and generic" conclusion:
we have in the fact that the conscious person is continuous 
with a wider self through which saving experiences come, a 
positive content of religious experience which . . . is liter­
ally and objectively true as far as it goes.^^
The Utility of "Over-beliefs"
Another factor in the pluralistic dimensions of religion is that 
of "over-belief." Over-beliefs develop when a person begins to ask how 
far his own transmarginal consciousness can carry him. The over-belief 
is an identification of the finite self as it relates to the absolute 
self, and it claims to have always been one with God and identical with 
the soul of the world.3%
Working toward his concept of "over-belief," James attempts to 
clarify the "farther limits of this extension of our personality." It 
becomes an "altogether other dimension of existence from the sensible and 
merely 'understandable' world," and as no mere ideal, since "when we 
commune with it, work is actually done upon our finite personality, for
Sllbid., p. 515. 32lbid.. p. 513.
74
we are turned into new men," and practical consequences in the order of 
conduct are sure to follow. We call this supreme reality "God" because 
this is the "natural appellation, for us Christians at least." James 
hastens to point out the proximity of his notion to that of the "instinc­
tive belief" of mankind: "God is real since he produces real e f f e c t s ."^3
The God of Everyday Worship
James occasionally suggests a further consideration in favor of 
the finite-God theory: religious interest neither demands nor attests
to an infinite God.^^ He recounts that the God of everyday worship is 
finite in n a t u r e . O u r  religious interests do not demand an absolute, 
but rather prefer something adequate to meet our needs. Apparently, any­
thing larger than our needs will be sufficient if it answers our demands. 
Some might wish to object that this approach puts our salvation in jeop­
ardy, but James suggests that common sense can live with the notion of 
this world being partly saved and partly lost. Further, the ordinary 
moralistic state of mind acknowledges that the salvation of the world is 
conditional upon the success with which each unit succeeds in doing its 
part.^° In addition, some men may not object to being the unsaved rem­
nant, so long as their cause prevails. (James uses the expression "sal­
vation of the world" often in accord with his finitistic position. This
33lbid.. pp. 515-516. ^^JMd., p. 525.
^^illiam James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 124.
^^illiam James, Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 526.
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salvation is a phenomenon occurring in this world; , it is the 
realization of certain ideals one might hold. We do not suggest that 
immortality become the issue at present; rather, we note that "salva­
tion of the world" is basically a "this-worldly" notion.)
The religious life of the ordinary j^common^ man does not generally 
underwrite the infinite-God theory. The God of the common man calls man 
to cooperate in His purposes; such a God possesses enemies and has an 
environment.^^ James suggests that a God who wants our help is surely 
finite. If we were to accept him as infinite, it would be a result of 
some unthinking, lazy acceptance of an authoritative theology.
James is drawing attention to that "pragmatic view of religion," 
which has generally "been taken as a matter of course by common men":
I believe the pragmatic way of taking religion to be the
deeper way. It gives it body as well as soul, it makes it
claim, as everything real must claim, some characteristic 
realm of facts as its very own.^®
James reminds us that God is to the religious mind a rock of sta­
bility, a guarantee that "tragedy is only provisional" and that ultimate 
sanity is achievable:
The world interpreted religiously is not the materialistic 
world over again, with an altered expression . . .  it is 
something more, namely, a postulator of new facts as well,
. . .  It must be such that different events can be expected 
in it, different conduct must be required.39
God, for James, then, must be real and active, that dynamic of difference
3^William James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 124.
38william James, Varieties of Religious Expérience, pp. 518-519. 
39lbid.. p. 518.
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which shifts the balance, the object of the "over-belief," which seems 
to "keep j^James^ more sane and true." "Who knows whether the faithful­
ness of individuals here below to their own poor over-beliefs may not 
actually help God in turn to be more effectively faithful to his own 
greater tasks?"^® This reference to the divine nature led James to 
claim that there is a "crasser and [ a ] more refined supernaturalism." 
This "crasser" or "piecemeal" theism proposes no monistic lack of ans­
wers. It "admits miracles and providential leadings," and mixes the 
"ideal and real worlds together." This is James* position:
Notwithstanding my own inability to accept either popular 
Christianity or scholastic theism, I suppose that my belief 
that in communion with the Ideal, new force comes into the 
world, and new departures are made here below, subject me to 
being classed among the supernaturalists of the piecemeal or 
crasser type. Universalistic supernaturalism surrenders . . . 
too easily to naturalism . . . Both instinctively and for logi­
cal reasons, I find it hard to beliefe that principles can 
exist which make no difference in facts. But all facts are 
particular facts, and the whole interest of the question of 
God's existence seems to me to lie in the consequences for 
particulars which that existence may be expected to en? 
tail . . . .
. . .  I believe that a candid consideration of piecemeal 
supernaturalism and a complete discussion of all its meta­
physical bearings will show it to be the hypothesis by which 
the largest number of legitimate requirements are met. That 
of course would be a program for other books than this; what 
I now say sufficiently indicates to the philosophic reader 
the place where I belong.41
James has given the basic tenets of a pluralistic and finitistic 
conception of God. He continually repudiates every form of monistic 
theism which emphasizes the "other-worldly" in preference to the con­
crete and particular. Early in thé Varieties. he identifies himself
40lbid.. p. 519. 41ibid.. pp. 520-523.
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with that pluralistic view of the "religion of healthy-mindedness," 
as well as with the repudiation of the rationalistic defense of evil.
On both pragmatic-rational and moral grounds, James has been led to a 
finitistic pluralism. We must turn our attention to the preference 
which James has for the pluralistic and the empirical within his finite- 
God concept.
Preference for the Pluralistic
From his exposure to the philosophy of Gustave Fechner, James 
developed a doctrine which he entitled the "compounding of conscious­
ness."^^ James states that "the more inclusive forms of consciousness 
are in part constituted by the more limited f o r m s . T h i s  inclusive 
form of consciousness is not a base totality of limited forms, just as 
our mind "is not the bare sum of our sights, plus our sounds, plus our 
pains, but in adding these terms together |̂ oneJ also finds relations 
among them and weaves them into schemes and forms and objects of which no 
one sense in its separate estate knows anything.Inclusion within 
this "compounding of consciousness" does not entail a loss of identity 
for a lesser state or single form of consciousness, for "states of con­
sciousness, so-called, can separate and combine themselves freely, and keep 
their own identity unchanged while forming parts of simultaneous fields
42lbid.. pp. 129-131"
^^illiam James, A Pluralistic Universe, cf. chapters 4 and 5. 
44ibid.. p. 168. pp. 168-169.
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of experience of wider s c o p e . " ^ 6  hqw does this "compounding of conscious­
ness" influence the claim of Pluralism?
A Broader View of Experience
It would appear that many minds know many sets of facts, and that
there is no median performance by any singular mind. Further, it would
seem that each knowing process is singular, not merely the sum of less
inclusive consciousnesses. James faces the trilemma of restoring the
scholastic approach with its emphasis on the soul; or recognizing the
impossibility of the logic of identity in order to adopt some higher
form of rationality; or facing the fact that life is logically irrational.
He rejects the approach of the scholastic and gives up the logic of self-
identity "fairly, squarely, and irrevocably." The logic of self-identity
cannot acquaint us with the essential nature of reality.
Reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what 
word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it.
. . .  X prefer bluntly to call reality if not irrational then 
at least nonrational in its constitution,— and by reality here 
I mean reality where things happen, all temporal reality with­
out exception. I nyself find no good warrant for even sus­
pecting the existence of any reality of a higher denomination 
than that distributed and strung-along and flowing sort of 
reality which we finite beings swim in. That is the sort of 
reality given us. and that is the sort with which logic is so 
incommensurable.47
James has attempted to state the impact of pluralism— that reality 
is richer than that which could be grasped conceptually. Influenced by 
Bergson's critique of intellectualism, James shared the view that "mental
4Glbid.. p. 181. 47ibid,, p. 212.
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facts do function both singly and together, at once, and we finite 
minds may simultaneously be co-conscious of one another in a superhuman 
i n t e l l i g e n c e . "48 James sees us as individuals, yet as persons immersed 
in the life of God, who in turn, is literally our life and more. While
we are cognate parts of God, yet we are, at the same time, our individ­
ual selves.49 James' theory of "compounding of consciousness" attempts 
to provide a definite plurality of selves in the face of this identity 
with God. It is one of the problems that forces James to define his 
position with more clarity. The problem of the divine intimacy is cor­
related within the finite-God theory.
The more intense the study becomes of the intimate relation be­
tween man and God, the clearer it seems that the "intimacy between" is 
cognate to the "moral incentive." When James is quizzed as to the re­
sults of the "dualism in the theistic view," he answers:
Man being an outsider and a mere subject to God, not his 
intimate partner, a character of externality invades the 
field. God is not heart of our heart and reason of our
reason, but our magistrate, rather; and mechanically to
obey his commands, however strange they may be, remains our 
only moral duty.50
James indicates his perturbation at the theistic consequences when he
insists that we are to be God's "intimate partners" who have a role in
directing the course of the world. We are more than programmed obedients.
48lbid.. p. 292.
4^James Collins, God In Modem Philosophy, p. 314.
^^illiam James, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 27.
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Man is to be an "intimate partner" with God and to fulfill God's need 
of lis, just as we fill some of His needs. The consortium is formed, both 
God and man providing that of which each is capable. Need and inter­
action between God and man is indispensable, and such possibilities 
seem to be best fulfilled by our actually being parts of divine reality, 
wherein our actions immediately have effect upon its total dynamic.
Under the title "The Dilemma in Philosophy," James states the the­
istic dilemma as he sees it. The problem arises in the sensitive thinker 
when he notes a passion for the facts while at the same time feeling a 
deep need for a spiritual commitment; "He wants facts; he wants science; 
but he also wants a religion." Casting around for support, James en­
counters another seeming paradox: "an empirical philosophy that is not
religious enough, and a religious philosophy that is not empirical 
enough . . . ." Either it is a "Rocky Mountain tough" like Spencer, 
spelling out the world's meaning through matter, or a "tender-minded" 
religious thinker of the Idealistic or Scholastic section like Bradley 
or Newman. He has disdain for their idealistic systems because over 
them the "trail of the serpent of rationalism" has caused them to "lose 
contact with the concrete parts of life.
The God of the theistic writers lives on as purely abstract 
heights as does the Absolute. Absolutism has a certain 
sweep and dash about it, while the usual theism is more in­
sipid, but both are equally remote and vacuous. What you 
want is a philosophy tiiat will not only exercise your powers 
of intellectual abstraction, but that will make some positive 
connection with this actual world of finite human l i v e s .52
51william James, Pragmatism, pp. 15-19. 52%bid.. pp. 19-20.
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While posing this dilemma of materialism's quest for facts as opposed
to the rationalist's systems which must be closed,^3 James wonders if
the only alternatives are a nihilistic empiricism and a persistently
optimistic rationalism. James is convinced that they are not the only
alternatives to futility:
It is at this point that my own solution begins to appear.
I offer the oddly-named thing pragmatism as a philosophy 
that can satisfy both kinds of demand. It can remain re­
ligious like the rationalisms, but at the same time, like the 
empiricisms, it can preserve the richest intimacy with facts.54
Values of Belief in God
In his work Pragmatism. James quotes and paraphrases his earlier
"Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results," with the purpose of
dealing with the "Prospective" values of belief in God as opposed to
other theisms, which appear as a cul de sac. He concludes :
spiritualistic faith in all its forms deals with a world of 
promise, while materialism's sum sets in a sea of disap­
pointment . . . .  The exact features of the saving future 
facts that our belief in God insures, will have to be ciphered 
out by the interminable methods of science: we can studv our
God only by studying his Creation. But we can enjoy our 
God, if we have one, in advance of all that labor. I myself 
believe that the evidence for God lies primarily to inner
personal experiences.53
Given these "inner personal experiences," one has his God to declare for 
him "moral holidays," to underscore his "joyous, careless, trustful 
moments." However legitimate this subjective use of God may be, we are 
not to confound it with an objective demonstration of his existence.
33lbid.. pp. 23-27. 54ibid.. pp. 32-33. 55ibjd.. pp. 108-109.
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Here the process doctrine shines as a continuing, collective effort in 
verification;
The truth of 'God’ has to run the gauntlet of all our other 
truths. It is on trial by them and they on trial by it. Our 
final opinion about God can be settled only after all the 
truths have straightened themselves out together. Let us hope 
that they shall find a modus v i v e n d i !56
Returning to the days of his "Will to Believe," James renews his conten­
tion that the legitimacy of religious belief can be grounded only in sub­
jective craving and need. Verification that such religious commitment 
is not in vain can, and must, await the adjudication of history. An ex­
ample of this verification within the historical context can be noted 
by a closer look at some of the classic natural arguments for the exist­
ence of God, ^.JJ., the design argument.
When the pragmatic criterion is applied to the question of "design 
in nature" (and more specifically to the teleological grounds on which 
God's existence is projected), James maintains that any claim of "design" 
represents a subjective interpolation into the given particulars of 
experience. Reviewing the impact of Darwinism upon the argument from 
design, James reiterates the "stupendous laws and counter-forces," which 
have for us "grown so vast as to be incomprehensible to us humans." If 
one looks more closely, James implies that "design" becomes synonymous 
with what the historical process has actually achieved.
No matter what nature may have produced or may be producing, 
the means must necessarily have been adequate, must have been 
fitted to that production . . . .  When we look at what has 
actually come, the conditions must always appear perfectly
56lbid.. p. 109.
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designed to ensure it. We can always say, therefore, in any 
conceivable world, of any conceivable character, that the 
whole cosmic machinery may have been designed to produce it. 
Pragmatically, then, the abstract word 'design' is a blank 
cartridge. It carries no consequences, it does no execution.5'
Rather than depending, as the design argument does, upon the past to 
explain the "now" and the "future," the pragmatic approach to God is a 
way to "arm this cartridge" by converting it into a "term of promise." 
Against the opaque future it will creatively yield the same "pragmatic 
benefit" as the "terms God, Spirit, or the Absolute, yield us." As 
stated earlier, much of James' finitistic theism developed and was con­
ditioned by his youthful repudiation of his father's "monistic" varia­
tion of the Calvinist orthodoxy.
James' View on the Nature of God
James had opted for a pluralistic morality which was rooted in 
subjective demand. He experimented with religion in a new sense, that 
of moral self-sufficiency and of the aggressive attack on evil based 
upon active prerogatives and the dignity of human nature. The only 
grounds which seemed to operate on the basis of general probability 
were the pragmatic, which tentatively identified origins by appeal to 
their consequences in experience here and now. Based upon these 
grounds, James finds his theistic inclinations capable of alignment 
with his moralistic outlook. God, who in the rationalistic tradition 
is an absolute point of departure, becomes for James' pragmatic ap­
proach a finite being like ourselves, "superhuman" enough to salve our
S^Ibid., pp. 113-114; cf.. Varieties. pp. 437-439.
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fears, but sufficiently de-absolutized to acquit God of the responsi­
bility for evil.
In Pragmatism, James recommends finite theism as the theory best 
calculated to respond to normal human needs. He invokes the support of 
the religious tradition of "mankind,” at first "polytheistic," and only 
"imperfectly sublimated even now into monotheism." Within this develop­
ing position, God is "but one helper, primus inter pares." in the great 
task of shaping the world. In this unique role, God shares in our joys 
as well as our disappointments, and he is as blameless and innocent of 
the world's evil as we are.^®
James does not continue his analysis of God's nature in Pragmatism. 
In some of his later writings, notably Pluralistic Universe, he does 
pursue this theme. We shall address ourselves to those shortly. Writ­
ing to Charles A. Strong, who had figuratively slapped the hands of 
James for his "superstitious tendencies," James defends himself against 
the indictment by stressing the slight demands his system made on the 
divinity:
Ify 'God of things as they are,' being part of a pluralistic 
system, is responsible for only such of them as he knows 
enough and has enough power to have accomplished . . . .
The 'omniscient' and 'omnipotent' God of theology I regard 
as a disease of the philosophy-shop. But, having thrown away 
so much of the philosophy-'shop, you may ask me why I don't 
throw away the whole? That would mean too strong a negative 
will-tO"'believe for me. It would mean a dogmatic disbelief 
in any extant consciousness higher than that of the 'normal' 
human mind; and this in the teeth of the extraordinary vivac­
ity of man's psychological commerce with something ideal that
58ibid.. pp. 142-143.
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feels as if ̂  were also actual (I have no such commerce—
I wish I had, but I can’t close my eyes to its vitality in 
others); . . . .  It’s a will-to^'believe on both sides; why 
should you not be tolerantly interested in the spectacle of 
ny belief? What harm does the little residuum or germ of 
actuality that I leave in God do? If ideal, why . . . may he 
not have got himself at least partly real by this time? . . .
I doubt whether you will find any great harm in the God I 
patronize— the poor thing is so largely an ideal possibility. 
Meanwhile I take delight, or shall take delight, in any ef­
forts you may make to negate all superhuman consciousness, 
for only by these counter-attempts can a finally satisfactory 
modus vivendi be reached.59
After this defensive reaction, we can enumerate some of James' 
deepest concerns on the God-question. What he has termed the "extra­
ordinary vivacity" of the theistic experience of other people, conjoined 
with his own statement of the need-to-believe, has given a basis for 
his will-to-believe. James hastens to point out how the traditional 
deity is boxed in by metaphysical restrictions. James’ God must be 
good, in order to fulfill creative desire, but he cannot be all-good, 
for this would negate James’ account of evil. This God must be per­
sonal, since He identifies with human need. He cannot be supra- 
personal, for this would remove Him from the realm of human need. In 
fact, James explains, this God does not have to be a "he," but perhaps 
a "they," in order to fit the anthropological and pluralistic impera­
tives of the pragmatic method. This God is an "ideal," but qualified 
with that actuality given him by human moral effort. God is a "hypoth­
esis," validated by each counter-blow and option. Further, James 
argues, this God must be classed with all other philosophical problems
S^William James. Letters. II, pp. 269-270.
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of great dimension; He is to be verified ambulando. and this is where
the human dimension shares responsibility.
James* concept of God develops rapidly in the area of pluralistic
metaphysics. Any private religious dimensions will be relegated to a
secondary position behind the demands of moral comradeship in which God
represents a "more powerful ally of my own i d e a l s . T h i s  comradeship
James tells us, is "the social appeal for corroboration, consolation,
etc."^^ As Perry suggests:
Since man is not always hardy, the gospel of pluralism does 
not always meet his needs. But James was, on the whole and 
in the long run, spiritually hardy, hence his gospel was 
pluralism. Furthermore, since he uses the term 'healthy* 
for pluralism, and "sick" for monism it is impossible to 
avoid the inference that a proper spiritual hygiene would 
bring man to that better state in which pluralism is palat­
able— that the strong man eager for battle and enjoying the 
risk is the more ideal type . . . . It is the felt need of 
God and of religion as a reenforcement of the moral will that 
is the chief cause of his personal belief.
When asked what he meant by "God," James replied: "A combination 
of Ideality and (final) efficacity."^^ As a position of philosophic 
pluralism, this statement offers a creative challenge to the healthy- 
minded .
The pragmatism or pluralism which I defend has to fall back 
on a certain ultimate hardihood, a certain willingness to 
live without assurances or guarantees. To minds thus willing
60Ibid . ... 214. Glibid., p. 213.
^^Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James,
p. 266.
^^illiam James, Letters. II, p. 213.
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to live on possibilities that are not certainties, quietistic 
religion, sure of salvation anyhow, has a slight flavor of 
fatty degeneration about it which has caused it to be looked 
askance on, even in the church. Which side is right here, 
who can say? Within religion, emotion is apt to be tyranni­
cal; but philosophy must favor the emotion that allies itself 
best with the whole body and drift of all the truths in sight,
I conceive this to be the more strenuous type of emotion.
The final five lines of the above quotation give a birdseye' view of 
James' theistic position during the last years of his life. Religion, 
he states, takes its structure from its alignment "with the whole body 
and drift of all the truths in sight."
The Hibbert Lectures, delivered by James in 1908, began with his 
favorite lifelong topic, the theistic problem. James suggests that 
this problem results from the conflict between spiritualistic and mate­
rialistic philosophies. We cannot, at this point, benefit by minimizing 
this issue. In 1908, caught up in the onslaught of his "metaphysical 
period," his pragmatic method has been expanded almost to the point of 
serving as an ontology. Not only does James begin the lectures on the 
point of theism; it becomes his point of destination via an extended 
discussion showing its relevance to the cosmos. This appears to under­
write our contention, made earlier, that at the very heart of James' 
writings was the theistic problem.
The Empirical Emphasis
All people desire to have a satisfactory outlook upon the world. 
James notes that some gain satisfaction empiricistically, some
G^William James, The Meaning of Truth, p. 229.
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ratlonalistically; "empiricism means the habit of explaining whole by 
parts, and rationalism means the habit of explaining parts by wholes. 
Granted either approach, intimacy with the real is the test of a philos­
ophy's worth. "Cynical materialism" fails because it deteriorates man's 
deepest hopes. "Spiritualism" builds hope of two different kinds: the
"more intimate" or monistic variety, as well as the "less intimate" or 
dualistic kind. James regards pantheisfn as one of the most intimate 
views of all because it contends that mankind is "entitatively one with 
God."
It becomes apparent that James has been wrestling with the theistic 
question for a great number of years. His encounter with materialism 
has led him to opt for the religious experiences of mankind based upon 
man's own needs and his hopes. As noted earlier, James' kind of divin­
ity has remained largely amorphous, both in nature and in number. In 
these final years of philosophical development, James' radical empiri­
cism combines with his pluralistic interpretation into a metaphysical 
scheme. As a result, he can now give a clearer, more "intimate" view 
of things in general, and of the divine in particular. This quasi­
metaphysical view will attempt to rid his final position of the exclu­
siveness or divisiveness that causes humans to remain strangers. His 
universe harbors no strangers, least of all God, whom James welcomes 
into the community of being as experientially conceived. James has ar­
rived at that tertium quid, the middleground between monistic absorption
^^illiam James, Pluralistic Universe, pp. 7-8.
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and dualistic Irrelevance, by means of his pluralistic community of 
being. The theistic position has far too long pictured God as Creator 
removed and distinct from his creation. This position leaves the human 
subject separated and outside of the deepest reality in the universe. 
James says:
God and his creatures are toto genere distinct in the 
scholastic, theology, they have absolutely nothing in com­
mon; . . . There is a sense, then, in which philosophic 
theism makes us outsiders and keeps us foreigners in rela­
tion to God . . . .  His action can affect us, but he can 
never be affected by our reaction. Our relation, in short, 
is not a strictly social relation. Of course in common 
men's religion the relation is believed to be social, but 
that is only one of the many differences between religion
and theology.
James' theistic position remains tinged slightly with the implica­
tions of his past exposure to Absolutism. The dualistic concept of God 
presents us with a God who appears as a stranger: "God is not heart
of our heart and reason of our reason, but our magistrate." Even the 
conceptions of criminal law have resulted from our experiences with 
this kind of God. "Scientific evolutionism" and the "rising tide of 
social democratic ideals" have rendered the "older monarchical theism 
. . . obsolete or obsolescent."6?
The theological machinery that spoke so livingly to our an­
cestors, with its finite age of the world, its creation out 
of nothing, its judicial morality and eschatology, its relish 
for rewards and punishments . . ., sounds as odd to most of 
us as if it were some outlandish savage r e l i g i o n .68
66ibid., pp. 23-25. ^^Ibid.. pp. 25-30.
68ibid.. p. 29.
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James continues that the "place of the divine in the world must be more 
organic and intimate"; and since "cynical materialism" may be over­
looked,
. . . the only opinions quite worthy of arresting our attempt 
will fall within the general scope of what may roughly be 
called the pantheistic field of vision, the vision of God 
as the indwelling divine rather than the external creator, 
and of human life as part and parcel of that deep reality.
What James has referred to as "the more intimate" kind of spiritu­
alism can be further subdivided into monistic and pluralistic sub­
phases. To this "monistic subspecies the name of philosophy of the 
absolute," may be given, while that "of radical empiricism ̂ can be 
given^ to its pluralistic rival." Under closer scrutiny, the monistic 
subspecies shows a gross defect, for it allows "almost as great a bar to 
intimacy between the divine and the human . . .  as that which we found 
in monarchial theism."
We humans are incurably rooted in the temporal point of 
view. The eternal's ways are utterly unlike our ways . . . .
We are invincibly parts, let us talk as we will, and must al­
ways apprehend the absolute as if it were a foreign being.
James prefers the empirical because "radical empiricism . . . holding to
the each-form [and emphasizing the concreteness and individuality of
facts J and making of God only one of the eaches, affords the higher
degree of intimacy."^! By way of summarizing this point, we offer the
following;
The philosophy of the absolute agrees with the pluralistic 
philosophy . . .  in that both identify human substance with
G^Ibid.. p. 30. 70lbid.. p. 40. ^^Ibid.. p. 44.
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the divine substance. But whereas absolutism thinks that 
the said substance becomes fully divine only in the form of 
totality, and is not its real self in any form but the all- 
form, the pluralistic view which I prefer to adopt is willing 
to believe that there may ultimately never be an all-form at 
all, that the substance of reality may never get totally col­
lected, . . . and that a distinctive form of reality, the each- 
form, is logically as acceptable and empirically as probable 
as the all-form commonly acquiesced in as so obviously the 
self-evident thing.
By 1908, William James had developed a finitistic theism which al­
lowed him to explain his "spontaneous pantheistic impulse" while at the 
same time not requiring him to compromise the freedom and novelty of 
the universe he defended. This radical pluralistic universe, in which 
"God îs]| only one of the eaches," and in which God is "responsible for 
only such of [the others] as he knows enough and has enough power to 
have accomplished," will make possible the intimacy required of a deity.
Favoring the Finite
This finite-God concept, an integral part of James' pluralistic
metaphysics, finds its relation to experience through religious data.
In "abnormal or supernormal facts the strongest suggestions in favor of
a superior co-consciousness are possible,"73 and the "sick-soul" regains
a healthful perspective by commitment to the transcendent.74 Note the
breadth of this suggestion:
The analogies with ordinary psychology and with the facts 
of pathology, with those of psychical research, so called, 
and with those of religious experience, establish, when 
taken together, a decidedly formidable probability in favor 
of a spiritual view of the world . . . .75
72lbid.. p. 34. ^^Ibid.. p. 299. ^^Ibid.. pp. 303-307.
75lbid.. p. 310.
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It appears that the transcendence for which James is arguing must be 
qualified by his modifiers, for it does not carry the regimen of the 
traditional scholastic form. These available data are not to be inviol­
able decretals, but may rather be "polytheistically or monotheistically 
conceived of." Regardless of the number involved, divinity is to be 
conceived as finite;
Only one thing is certain, and that is the result of our 
criticism of the absolute: the only way to escape from the
paradoxes and perplexities that a consistently thought-out 
monistic universe suffers from . . . — the nystery of evil, 
in short; the mystery of the block-universe eternal and 
without a history, etc.;— the only way of escape, I say, 
from all this is to be frankly pluralistic and assume that 
the superhuman consciousness, however vast it may be, has 
itself an external environment, and consequently is f i n i t e .76
One of the concluding passages from the Pluralistic Universe states suc­
cinctly the mature theistic position of James:
The line of least resistance, then, . . . both in theology 
and in philosophy, is to accept . . . that there is a God, 
but that he is finite, either in power or in knowledge, or 
in both at once.77
James comes off as the champion of the common man; hot the "hollow unreal
god of scholastic theology," nor even the "unintelligible pantheistic
monster," but an alignment with the finitistic approach.
The God of our popular Christianity is but one member of a 
pluralistic system. He and we stand outside of each other, 
just as the devil, the saints, and the angels stand outside 
of both of us. I can hardly conceive of anything more dif­
ferent from the absolute than the God, say, of David or of 
Isaiah. That God is an essentially finite being in the cosmos, 
not with the cosmos in him . . .  I hold to the finite 
God . . . .78
7*Ibid.. p. 299. T̂ i^id.. p. 311. ^®I^., pp. 110-111.
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Both from the position of the moral and the metaphysical our needs indi­
cate something other than the infinite God. As James writes;
When John Mill said that the notion of God’s omnipotence 
must be given up, if God is to be kept as a religious ob­
ject, he was surely accurately right; . . . God, it was 
said, could not bè finite. I believe that the only God 
worthy of the name must be finite . . . .79
What was previously noted as a metaphysical deficiency in James,
^.je., his lack of a metaphysics of being, has been overcome by a plural­
istic world fused by intimate relations. To remove God from His crea­
tion would make God totally unreal to James. He adopts John Stuart 
Mill’s approach that the only God that can be an object of worship is 
finite. It was not James’ intent to develop a metaphysics of tran­
scendence ,for this would play havoc with the forceful subjectivity of his 
approach. He showed disdain for the "block-universe" "whacked down upon 
us" with its rigid determinism. One can note his preference for "becom­
ing" over "being" in this summary quotation:
I think the centre of my whole Anschauung. since years ago 
I read Renouvier, has been the belief that something is doing 
in the universe, and that novelty is real. But so long as I 
was held by the intellectualistic logic of identity, the only 
form I could give to novelty was tychistic . . . .  But Berg­
son’s synechism has shown me another way of saving novelty 
and keeping all the concrete facts of law-in-change. Giving 
up the logic of identity as the means of understanding the 
essences of concrete things, we justify the Hegelian tendency 
without Hegel’s own abominations; we put the world of con­
cepts in its definite and indispensable place; we allow 
novelty to be, and join hands again with life.®®
79lbid.. pp. 124-125.
®®Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, 
p. 656.
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James accomplished what many merely dream about when he succeeded in 
"joining hands with life." James was moving in the direction of an 
existential metaphysic which placed stress upon creative participation 
and genuine freedom within the man-God relationship.
Although James has proved his openness to many varieties of reli­
gious experience, these somehow remain outside his personal realm— that 
of probability. For him, probability is achievable and is ançle to 
ground the "will-to-believe," and to let him who will take the faith- 
option, **take it. Acconq>anying this position is the "moral satisfaction" 
angle of knowing that one has opted for the nobler view. Within the 
"Pluralistic republic of beings," our faith-option might be sufficient to 
provide the finite deity a share in our struggle toward a new dimension 
in living.
Summary:
In writing this chapter, I have had several purposes in mind. I 
have attempted to show how James develops philosophical motives for the 
finite nature of God. The traditional theistic view of the infinite 
nature of God is inaccessible to man. James prefers a God who is re­
lated to man's value structure. In James' opinion, only a finite God 
can relate to man's needs, for finitism is the human response to a 
contingent world.
Since James has no concise systematic statement of his finitistic 
theory, I have tried to show how James' theistic position first devel­
oped as a negative reaction to the infinite-God theories. His basic
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point of departure came as a response to the problem of evil. Since 
evil affects man and God, then God must be viewed as in social inter­
action with the world.
James suggests that the moral Incentive shows the social inter­
dependence between God and man. This moral Incentive emphasizes not 
only the need of the "eaches," but holds that the interaction between 
God and man can create a better world for both parties involved. The 
moral incentive somewhat conditions the world in which we live. Ac­
cording to this co-creationist perspective, man and God need each other. 
The moral destiny of the universe depends upon both God and man. The 
creative dimension of man, as well as God, adds a sense of integrity to 
James' position. The point is that James insists on man's volitional
nature as primary to, or more basic than, his intellectual nature.
James' advocacy of the struggle for "healthy-minded" morality 
stresses the activity of the productive life. From the broad spectrum 
of experience, man must actively pursue the best in life as he sees it.
I have attempted to show that James' ethics are really of the relativis- 
tic type. The dynamic of James' ethics seems to be built upon the norm 
of satisfaction. His ethical approach is based upon pragmatic tests—
its workability. Just as man's moral dimension must be open to possi­
bilities, James' concept of God requires a God who is involved in plu­
ralistic moral possibilities.
James was not a passivist in religious questions. He put great em­
phasis on the place of religious acts in the life of the individual be­
liever. The religious acts are grounded in feeling prior to rational
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explanation. Mysticism is a prime example of a religious act which 
precedes conceptual interpretation. The possibility of zystical ex­
perience enhances the pluralistic phase of finitism by opening a wider 
arena of consciousness.
It has been my intention to explore some of the pluralistic dimen­
sions in James’ approach, je.^., over-beliefs. James has claimed that 
over-belief is a kind of self-transcendence and identity with a greater 
source of conscious communion. Practical consequences give the prag­
matic criterion of satisfaction an added boost, for we are turned into 
new men. God is real since île produces real effects.
Another facet of the philosophical motives can be noted in James’ 
position that the common man in his everyday worship sees God as finite. 
From this perspective, man and God cooperate in Divine purposes, possess 
common enemies, and respond to their environments. In brief, the com­
mon man sees God as finite, and this God really needs the help of man.
"Experientialism," a term James prefers to "experimentalism," is 
set in the broad framework of a pluralistic world. From his broad view 
of experience, James sees a finite God as a reality richer than mere 
conceptualization. The intimacy between God and man is indicative of a 
creative partnership between them. Mutual need and interaction are ex­
perienced with this finite God. Pragmatism is James’ answer which 
mediates both the idealistic approach of the rationalist and the factual 
intimacy approach expected by the empiricist.
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One can recognize the Impression which Pascal made upon James when 
the observer takes account of the values of belief in God as James 
states them. Certain inner personal experiences are coupled with prag­
matic guarantees. Ultimately, subjective craving and need become the 
aspects by which one gains the meaning of the "wager" or will-to-believe.
A finite God is the only one, according to James, who responds to 
normal human needs. He makes use of a (modified) theory of probability 
to relate man's temporal predicament to the unique role of an inter­
ested finite God. God is personal since He identifies with human need.
In addition to enumerating the characteristics of God's nature, James 
holds that God is verified ambulando— by the lived-experiences which man 
has with God.
Based upon his pluralistic universe, James contends that the en­
counter with a community of feeling is an empirical datum. James' uni­
verse will allow no strangers, least of all God. James' radical enq>iri- 
cism postulates a high degree of intimacy between God and man. The in­
fluence of John Stuart Hill's finite-God concept is apparent. James 
holds to a pluralistic universe, shot through with emotions, and fused 
with intimate relations. James has conjoined an existential metaphysic 
with the forceful subjectivity of his process approach. Only a finite 
God could meet the demands of man in such an existential predicament.
CHAPTER THREE: THE PRIMORDIAL
NATURE OF GOD
CHAPTER THREE
THE PRIMORDIAL NATURE OF GOD: The Progress of the World
is Partially Dependent upon God
Alfred North Whitehead’s doctrine of God is a speculative notion 
based upon the systematic implications of his doctrine of process. By 
following the logical implications of his process doctrine, Whitehead at­
tempts to furnish his reader an explanation of experience which is ade­
quate, coherent and consistent with our own experience. Because specu­
lative conclusions inevitably are based upon hypotheses, they are in­
capable of iron-clad proof. This is where we take up Whitehead's doc­
trine of God in his speculative system. He is not seeking to construct 
an independent proof of his theistic doctrine. However, he does state 
that if his other views of the actual world are true, then due considera­
tion must be given his development of a doctrine of God.^
If Whitehead's doctrine is to become clear, we must view the realm 
of pure possibilities, , eternal objects as yet unrealized in the
temporal process. According to Whitehead's own ontological principle, to
2be is to be either an actual entity or some facet of an actual entity. 
Therefore, in some sense these possibilities must be real. Whitehead has
^Alfred North Whitehead, Science and thé Modem World, p. 249. 
^Alfred North Whitehead. Process and Reality, p. 73.
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told us that eternal objects are not actual entitles, but they may be 
some facet of those actual entities. Eternal objects, temporally unac­
tualized, non-temporal, are facets of an actual entity which pres-
3ently is in part non-temporal itself.
Based upon some correlation with this speculative doctrine of God, 
hypothetically, if we follow Whitehead in his ontological principle, and 
if we accept the notion that pure potentiality has some kind of reality, 
it seems feasible to postulate the existence of a non-temporal actual 
entity which is inclusive of all possible eternal objects, thereby es­
tablishing their reality ontologically.
When we raise the ensuing problem of how eternal objects are fused 
into temporal occasions of experience, Whitehead contends that we must 
posit some kind of a God. It is part of the nature of temporal occa­
sions to receive the ingression of eternal objects; however, nothing in 
an immediate actual entity can account for the availability of the realm 
of eternal objects for ingression in actual occasions. To put it another 
way, that which is finitely actual cannot account for the general re­
latedness of actuality and potentiality. Although this relationship is 
not easily demonstrable, Whitehead states that it does exist. We must 
assume that the "two sets are mediated by a thing which combines the ac­
tuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential."^ 
Returning to the ontological principle, we note that only actual entities 
are efficacious; therefore, that which mediates must be an actual entity
hh±d., pp. 73, 530. ^Ibid.. p. 64.
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which couples actuality and non-temporality in its own nature.^ Re­
turning to our speculative hypotheses, if we accept the ontological 
principle, and if we allow that potentiality is in some manner related 
to actuality, then it follows that we must accept the reality of an 
actual entity which shares both potentiality and actuality in order to 
make that conjunction possible.
With this argument in mind, we note that Whitehead's doctrine of 
God arises out of his notion of temporal process. Whitehead must de­
velop an adequate doctrine to account for an actual entity which is in­
clusive of both potentiality and actuality. Accompanying this develop­
ment will be Whitehead's concern to maintain philosophical coherence 
through his doctrine of the generic similarity of all actual entities. 
Therefore, we will note how Whitehead develops a theory of God as dual 
in nature,® how he points out the similarities of God to other actual 
entities,^ and finally holds that God is ultimate in the sense of being 
the primordial actuality while creativity is the ultimate metaphysical
Qprinciple.
Our approach to Whitehead's doctrine of God will begin with the 
primordial nature for several reasons. First, it was the initial view 
to take shape in Whitehead's thinking. Further, this primordial nature 
of God is logically prior in God's own being.^ Quite unlike the finite 
entities, God originates from his mental polef i.£., his primordial
Sibid.. p. 48. 6ibid.. p. 54. ^Ibid.. p. 116.
Gibid.. p. 31. 9lbid.. p. 521.
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aspect is conceptual. The mental pole of God's nature is constituted 
by God's conceptual experience. As primordial fact in the world, this 
experience is limited by no actuality which it presupposes. This mental 
polar aspect of God is infinite, devoid of all negative prehensions.
This primordial nature of God is free, complete, eternal, actual defi­
cient, and unconscious. "God is to be conceived as originated by con­
ceptual experience with his process of completion motivated by conse­
quent, physical experience, initially derived from the temporal world.
In fact, this is one of the major reasons Whitehead develops this aspect 
of primordiality.
God as the Primordial Instantiation of Creativity
Whitehead's explication of the primordial nature of God reveals two 
descriptive statements which will provide a basis for a study of this 
doctrine. "The primordial created fact is the unconditioned conceptual 
valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects. This is the 
'primordial nature' of God."^^ An additional attempt is made a few pages 
later in the same text to clarify that nature: "God's 'primordial nature'
is abstracted from His commerce with 'particulars' . . . .  It is God in
abstraction, alone with Himself. As such it is a mere factor in God, de-
12ficient in actuality." Since Whitehead has claimed this phase of God's 
nature to be an abstraction he further indicates that God cannot be iden­
tified with the abstract part alone. God as a concrete actual entity is 
more than either of his aspects (natures) taken by themselves.
l°Ibid.. p. 524. lllbid.. p. 46. ^^Ibid.. p. 50.
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God as Primordial Created Fact
It will be of great help If we can ferret out what Whitehead means 
by the primordial nature of God. In the first of the definitions pre­
sented above, the primordial nature Is said to be the "primordial created 
fact." While these three words deserve considerable thought, perhaps 
this could best be accomplished by viewing each separately. In reference
to "fact," Whitehead says, "this divine ordering Is Itself matter of
1 ̂fact, thereby conditioning creativity." The physical feeling Is feel­
ing a real fact; the conceptual feeling Is valuing an abstract possibil­
ity."^^ A simple physical feeling Is one feeling which feels another 
feeling. (The feeling felt has a subject diverse from the subject of 
the feeling which feels It.) A multiplicity of simple physical feelings 
constitutes the first phase In the concrescence of the actual entity 
which Is the common subject of all these feelings. This simple physical 
feeling has the dual character of being the cause's feeling re-enacted 
for the effect as subject. This primary aspect of simple physical feel­
ings constitutes the machinery by reason of which the creativity tran­
scends the world already actual, and yet remains conditioned by that 
actual world. Slnq>le physical feelings embody the reproductive character 
of nature and also the objective Immortality of the past.
From each physical feeling there Is the derivation of a purely con­
ceptual feeling whose datum Is the eternal object exençllfled In the 
definiteness of the actual entity, or the nexus, physically felt. This
l^Ibld.. p. 46. l^Ibld., p. 421.
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category of conceptual valuation maintains the old principle that men­
tality originates from sensitive experience. It lays down the ^new] 
principle that all sensitive experience originates mental operations.
The mental pole originates as the conceptual counterpart of operations 
in the physical pole. The two poles are inseparable in the origination. 
The mental pole starts with the conceptual registration of the physical 
poles in every actual entity, that is, except God.^^
It appears that "fact" is about on a par with "actual entity," at 
least in this context. This is in apparent contrast with eternal ob­
jects. This abstraction, which is in itself deficiently actual, is God's 
primordial nature, which Whitehead views as one actual entity among many 
others. "God is the primordial creature; but the description of His 
nature is not exhausted by this conceptual side of it. His 'consequent 
nature' results from his physical prehensions of the derivative actual 
e n t i t i e s . I t  is worthy of note that Whitehead does not mean that God 
in His primordial nature, as a fact, must be viewed in the sense of an 
event in the physical or material order. He has warned us that there 
are other facts besides physical ones. While God in His primordial na­
ture is a fact, that does not mean to Whitehead that He is something 
material. In Whitehead's terminology, God is a "conceptual" fact.
We have seen what Whitehead means by "fact"; now let us try to see 
what he means by "created fact." "Created" means that God in His
^^Donald W. Sherburne, A Key to W hitehead's Process and Reality 
(Bloomington; Indiana University Press, 1966), pp. 22-23; 40-47.
^^Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 46.
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primordial nature is part of, ox belongs to, the process and shares some 
likenesses with all other actual entities in this cosmic process. To 
say that God is created is simply to say that he is a particular (though 
primordial) instance of the general principle of creativity. The pri­
mordial nature of God serves a significant place in the order of created 
things.
In the phrase "primordial created fact," "primordial" refers to 
that which is first in the order of cosmic process, that which is with 
all creation. As primordial, this nature is prior in the process, or in 
that there is nothing before it. Further, the idea of logical priority 
is involved, demonstrating the absolute necessity of its place in the 
process. As primordial, God is the prototype in the process, as well as 
the necessary condition for it.
Primordial Nature Conditions Other Actual Entities
Since the primordial nature is the initial part of the process, 
this primordial created fact conditions all other actual entities which 
follow it in a manner different from their qualifying it. (Note that 
other actual entities do qualify the experience of God as concrete.) 
Because of the priority of the primordial nature of Çod, the relationship 
between it and other actual entities could not be equal. It remains ex­
ternal and absolute.
As this "primordial created fact" God structures a necessary part 
of world process. Without God there would be no process, for God becomes 
the indigenous start of it. The primordial nature is God’s unconditioned
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conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects. We 
have analyzed all three words, "primordial created fact," in order to 
draw out Whitehead's meaning. Whitehead shows that to place emphasis on 
the idea of that primordial at the expense of created fact would ulti­
mately reduce God to a static, aloof something, which would have no inter­
action with what is happening in the cosmic process. However, to neglect 
the "primordial" in favor of the "created fact" would prescribe for God 
the plight of the perpetually perishing entities. To avoid such miscon­
ceptions, Whitehead reinforced the first definition with a second.
This second characterization is that "God's 'primordial nature' is 
abstracted from His commerce with 'particulars' . . . .  It is God in 
abstraction, alone with Himself. As such it is a mere factor in God,
deficient in a c t u a l i t y . T h e  primordial nature "is not before all
18creation, but with all creation." Further, "He is the unconditioned
19actuality of conceptual feeling at the base of things." Again, God
20is the "acquirement by creativity of a primordial character." (White­
head's philosophy of creativity will come under consideration later in 
this chapter.) The quotations seem to emphasize the absoluteness of 
God's primordial nature. The primordial nature is inseparable from 
creativity.
l?Ibid.. p. 50. ^^Ibld.. p. 521.
l^Ibid.. p. 522. ^Qlbid.
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As Rational Superstructure
This latter definition does not intend "primordial" to Indicate 
priority in time. Quite the contrary, for the concept of time is not 
part of the structure at this point. Instead, time and process are seen 
in relation to the eternal and the teleological. Process is suggested 
as the channel, the material, or the body in which the eternal and formal 
show themselves. As Whitehead indicates, the primordial nature becomes 
the rational superstructure of the process, the intelligible underpinning 
of actualities, and the logical explanation of the real world when ac­
companied by the consequent nature of God and the complex of finite oc­
casions. Since form must have its content, the primordial must have its 
actual world.
When one views the primordial nature of God from this perspective,
he gains a slightly altered view of the relation of God to the world.
The flux of a world in process and its relation to God must be viewed as
interrelated and interacting. If God can be described as primordial for
the world, the same may be said about the world as being primordial for
God. As Whitehead states.
The final summary can only be expressed in terms of a group 
of antitheses, whose apparent self-contradiction depend on 
neglect of the diverse categories of existence. In each 
antithesis there is a shift of meaning which converts the 
opposition into a contrast. It is as true to say that God 
is permanent and the world fluent, as that the world is 
permanent and God is fluent.




Whitehead has given us two complementary views of the primordial na­
ture: first, one conception that God is not before, but with all crea­
tion; secondly, the conception that God’s primordial nature is logically 
prior, thus making God inseparable from the actual world. This approach 
seems to avert some of the traditional problems concerning the nature 
of God. If we were to accept only the first notion of God’s being with 
all creation, this would allow God, like all other actual entities, to 
be finite and perishing. This raises a question concerning traditional 
theism; for if God is nothing but an actual entity, why must He be 
viewed as God? How can a finite God present a solution for the lasting 
problem of evil? If He is subject to evil, then how could He be God—  
for God is supposed to resolve evil. By the second approach, that of 
God’s inseparability from the world based upon His logical priority, 
the primordial nature of God is a logically necessary condition of 
any finite actual world. But it is independent of any particular finite 
world. God and the intelligible cosmos are united, and this presents a 
monism— which is what Whitehead tries diligently to exclude from his 
system. Whitehead attempts to synthesize the apparently conflicting 
elements in such a manner as to present a new idea of God.
As a basic rule of thumb, Whitehead sees a possible working rela­
tionship between antithetical approaches, from his statement about ac­
tual entities, we see that the actual entity is positively somewhere and 
potentially everywhere. God is an actual entity, first in the ordering 
of process, but at the same time potentially everywhere within the
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process. There exist no actual entities where God is not potentially. 
Viewed as actual, God transcends all other entities; viewed as potential, 
God is everywhere immanent. (Note that it is also true that actual en­
tities transcend God.)
Necessary Condition of Concrescence
Since God is viewed as being first in the process, God cannot per­
ish; instead he is unique in transcendence and immanence. The primordial 
nature of God is a perpetually necessary condition of concrescence. No­
thing exists without God. The primordial significance shows God as being 
positively in the primordial created fact and potentially everywhere in 
the mushrooming process. While God is logically prior, he is also indis- 
pendable to the whole order of the process. In His primordial nature,
God constitutes the world's substructure. From this perspective, God is 
complete but not perfect; eternal, but not everlasting. The consequent 
nature of God is necessary for the perfection of God. By use of the 
dual concept of the primordial and the consequent, Whitehead has avoided 
traditional theistic pitfalls. He has shown the value of the interact­
ing natures of God which allow for the finite and the infinite, the 
transcendent and the immanent.
The Primordial Nature of God and Eternal Ob.1 ects
The primordial nature of God underwrites the relevance of eternal 
objects to the actual world. In the primordial nature of God, eternal 
objects relate to each other, as well as to actual entities. In eternal 
objects we find the meaning of the potentiality of the process.
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This primordial created fact, heretofore discussed, is the "uncon­
ditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal ob­
j e c t s . " A p a r t  from God, eternal objects unrealized in the actual
world would be relatively non-existent for the concrescence in ques^
23tion." In Process and Reality, Whitehead endorses the inseparability 
of God and eternal objects. However, in Science and the Modern World, 
Whitehead takes a different tack with regard to the nature of eternal 
objects. In this volume there is little mention of God as having any 
relation to eternal objects. This might indicate, as some critics claim, 
that Whitehead's system can be fully consummated without reference to 
God. Let us turn to a closer examination of eternal objects; we will 
then attempt to show the relation they have to the primordial nature of 
God.
In Science and the Modern World, Whitehead states that eternal ob­
jects are the ingredients which constitute the qualities and the internal 
relations of the organism. Some of the eternal objects are the essence 
of the event. Whitehead does not use the term "eternal" to suggest con­
tinuance throughout time; thus he can claim, "the mountain endures . . . 
when after ages it has been worn away, it has gone."^^ By "eternal" is 
meant something other than time and continuance.
A colour is eternal. It haunts time like a spirit. It comes 
and it goes. But where it comes, it is the same colour. It 
neither survives nor does it live. It appears when it is
22lbid.. p. 46.
2^Alfred North Whitehead. Science and thé Modern World, pp. 126-127.
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wanted. The mountain hag to time and space a different re­
lation from that which colour has.25
"Eternal" means that it is other than temporal, yet it enters, or may en­
ter, into time. The eternal cannot be defined as temporal, but it is 
found within time. Whitehead claims that this characteristic of the 
eternal cannot be defined, but it cannot be denied to give depth to ex­
perience. An eternal object is an entity that does not require, for its 
conceptual recognition, any reference to any particular time or place. 
Events could not exist without eternal objects, for eternal objects are 
among the necessary conditions of actual existence. Whitehead's point 
about the eternal objects is that man recognizes real things as they 
actually evolve within the process of the actual world.
The eternal objects are basic ingredients in the events into which 
they enter or ingress. Eternal objects provide possibilities to events; 
and without them no knowledge would be forthcoming. Events or organisms 
have meaning and are related, because they realize what was originally 
only a potentiality in the realm of eternal objects.
The primordial nature of God is the togetherness of the entire 
realm of eternal objects within God's conceptual realization, "together­
ness in the formal constitution of a non-temporal a c t u a l i t y . W h i t e ­
head uses this basic springboard widely as he takes the primordial na­
ture of God to be complete "envlsagement" of eternal objects;and the
25ibid.. pp. 126-127.
^^Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 48. 
27lbid., p. 70.
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"unity of relevance of the many potential forms'';^® further, It Is 
termed God's "Ideal"^^ and His "conceptual realization of the absolute 
wealth of potentiality."^®
As Indicated, the primordial nature of God Initially provides for 
the conjoining of eternal objects in an actual entity In several ways.
This primordial nature underwrites the ontological status of posslblll-
31ties since they are eternal facets of an eternal actual entity. Fur­
ther, this primordial nature makes eternal objects open to temporal occa­
sions, as facets of an actual entity, namely God. These facets may pos-
32slbly be objectified when the temporal occasion relates to God.
As Realm of Possibility
Eternal objects constitute the realm of possibility. Eternal ob-
qojects are similar to Platonic Forms. Eternal objects emerge as a
necessary element In the analysis of the actual world. Eternal objects 
compose the locus for possibilities, and the actual world becomes the 
realization of these possibilities. Eternal objects are made available 
In a particular form. Whitehead suggests that an occasion of experience 
may actualize any one of the possible modes of synthesis provided to It 
by God; If this were not so, these modes would not really be possibili­
ties. However, Whitehead will not permit this to become a complete 
Indeterminism, for then the novel entity would run directly counter to
28lbld.. p. 529. 29lbld.. p. 64. % b l d .. p. 521.
^̂ Ibld.. p. 73. ^^Ibld.. pp. 46, 73. p. 70.
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our daily experience. Based upon observations of natural order, physi­
cal laws, and our volitional activity, we are aware of strong influences 
at work and we recognize only degrees of freedom. As Whitehead sees it, 
occasions of experience in similar circumstances tend to actualize their 
data in similar ways.
These eternal objects are not to be viewed merely as qualities, for 
they are also the relations which unite eternal objects. Eternal objects 
noted in this actual world have come about by selection from the realm 
of possibility. An eternal object can be described only in terms of 
its potentiality for "ingression" into the becoming of actual entities; 
and its analysis further discloses other eternal objects. We note it as 
pure potential. "Ingression" refers to the particular mode in which the 
potentiality of an eternal object is realized in a particular actual en­
tity, contributing to the definiteness of that actual entity. This in­
gression of the eternal objects into actual entities or events is an
indeterminate relation. This indétermination, rendered determinate in
the real concrescence, is the meaning of real potentiality, or a condi­
tioned indetermination. However, all relations in the realm of possi­
bility are determinate. An illustration of this determinate relation
could be symbolized by the capital "A" (eternal object). "A" is related 
systematically to all eternal objects; therefore, it would seem that I 
cannot know anything about anything, unless I know everything about 
everything else. Whitehead delivers us from an apparent difficulty at 
this point. He says "the status of any eternal object 'A* in this realm
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is capable of analysis into an indefinite number of subordinate relation­
ships of a limited s c o p e . V i e w e d  from the realm of eternal objects, 
three simple eternal objects (A, B, and C) have a relationship (R). 
Whitehead points out that a conçlex of eternal objects (say R(A,B,C)) is 
such that many particular eternal objects can satisfy, or fit into, the 
pattern R(A,B,C). Thus, if R(A,B,C) is a triangular shape, the indivi­
dual eternal objects A,B,C can be anything capable of being parts of a 
triangular shape— colors, stones, galaxies, etc. This new relationship 
involves no other definite eternal objects in the capacity of relata. It 
may involve subordinate relationships, and there can be other relation­
ships of A,B,C other than that of R. There remains the problem of de­
termination of this relationship as completed and independent of further 
relata and relationships. For Whitehead, "the relationships of these
objects among themselves are entirely unselective, and are systematically 
35complete." These relationships do not involve
the individual essences of eternal objects; they involve 
any eternal objects as relata, subject to the proviso that 
these relata have the requisite relational essences . . . .
This is the principle of the Isolation of Eternal Objects 
in the realm of possibility . . . .  The eternal objects are 
isolated, because their relationships as possibilities are 
expressible without reference to their respective individual 
essences.
Whitehead has told us that eternal objects are internally related and at 
the same time independent and mutually exclusive. There remains a need 
for a satisfactory explanation of the realm of possibility.
^^Alfred North Whitehead. Science and thé Modem World, p. 236. 
35lbid. 36lbid.. pp. 237-238.
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Another difficulty arises in Whitehead's conception of eternal ob­
jects. "Actualization is a selection among possibilities . . . .  It is
a selection issuing in a graduation of possibilities in respect to their
3 7realization in that occasion." The actual entity selects eternal ob­
jects; yet if the actuality is an integration of eternal objects, what 
can selection mean? How can an actual entity select? Who does the se­
lecting? From what has just been stated, it would seem that the realm of 
possibility contains the essence of each individual actual entity. The 
essential feature of an actual entity to which I refer, is that it acts, 
and no eternal object can act. Does the realm of possibility contain 
the eternal forms of which the events in the process are the temporal 
images? Whitehead fails to give a satisfactory explanation of this re­
lationship of eternal objects to actual occasions, or of possibility to 
actuality. How do the eternal forms and the actual entities get to­
gether? No satisfactory answer is precisely stated, but at this juncture 
we suggest that it might be that of God.
However unsatisfactory this solution of the problem might appear, 
a further note is given by the introduction of God's primordial nature as 
the final explanation of this problem in Process and Reality. God is 
pictured as resembling the Roman god Janus, the god of gates and doors. 
Presented as having two opposite faces, like the opposing sides of a 
door, this god could look backward upon the past and forward to the 
future. This is similar to God's primordial nature, with one face
37lbid.. p. 229.
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looking upon the possible and eternal, the other face upon the temporal 
and actual. God's primordial nature provides the explanation which the 
eternal objects in themselves could not provide.
Eternal objects are not actual; however, they structure the realm 
of possibility. Eternal objects have reality as possibility determining 
the form of the actual. How can we refer to them as real? Whitehead 
claims they have reality as the data of the primordial nature of God. 
Eternal objects have real relevance to the actual world because God is 
actual. Note that this "unfettered conceptual valuation . . .  is only 
possible once in the universe; since the creative act is objectively im­
mortal as an inescapable condition characterizing creative a c t i o n . I t  
appears then that the realm of possibility is realized in the primordial 
nature of God as the primordial created fact. This new conception of 
possibility plays a sizeable role in the idea of God as one of the ef­
ficient causes of all that actually was, is, and will be.
Conceptual Valuation
When discussing the relation of the primordial nature of God to 
eternal objects, Whitehead states that the primordial nature is the "un­
conditional conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal 
objects." "Valuation" denotes a species of subjective forms, as do 
certain other terms; , "purpose," "adversion," "emotion," and "con­
sciousness." Valuation is the subject valuing, prehending, assimilating 
the actual and the potential world into itself, so that it itself may
38Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 378.
39jbid., p. 46.
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become the creature it Intended to be. Valuation is the process by 
which the subject comes of age (so to speak) and as such is objectively 
immortalized in the creative advance.
In conceptual valuation, the entity feels the eternal objects 
which constitute its subjective form and aim. In the primordial nature 
of God the conceptual valuation prehends, integrates, and assimilates 
all the eternal objects into its own nature. This indicates that the 
realm of possibility must be in and only in the primordial nature of 
God.
There is an element of God’s conceptual envlsagement which deals 
with an occasion’s possible modes of unification. From its prehensions 
of past occasions, a becoming actual entity gains the data, the unifica­
tion of which constitutes that entity in its becoming. Now this con- 
crescing occasion may not be just any random version of unity; it is 
directed by its past and its own subjective aim to a synthesis of its 
own feelings and no others. How these feelings, once they are given, 
will be synthesized, i,.̂ ., which of the possible unifications of the 
given data the occasion will become, is not and cannot be determined 
solely by past temporal occasions.^® The very manner by which an actual 
entity unifies its various feelings of past entities is a complex pos­
sibility which has not been actualized in the past. An occasion’s pos­
sible modes of unification cannot be derived from an objectification of
^^Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York; The Mac­
millan Co., 1933), p. 327.
117
the temporal past. Whitehead rejects the view that pure possibilities 
are created; therefore, possibilities for an occasion's synthesis of its 
given data are supplied by God for the occasion's subjective aim, which 
is derived from a hybrid physical prehension of God's primordial nature.
This subjective aim, in its successive modifications, remains the uni­
fying factor governing the successive phases of interplay between physi­
cal and conceptual feelings. A "physical feeling" is defined as the 
feeling of another actuality.
If the other actuality be objectified by its conceptual 
feelings, the physical feeling of the subject in question
is called 'hybrid.' Thus the primary phase is a hybrid
physical feeling of God, in respect to God's conceptual 
feeling which is immediately relevant to the universe
'given' for that concrescence.41
The realm of possibility, including every possible relationship which 
may be realized sometime, finds its locus in God's primordial nature. Ac­
tual entities of a higher order of experience, , our own conscious ex­
perience, in prehending the realm of possibilities, are rooted in God's 
primordial nature. Our personal conceptual valuations have their origin 
in God. Our normal mental and spiritual growth is in harmony with the 
realm of possibility already realized (only as possible) in God as primor­
dial.
When viewed from this perspective, God's primordial nature explains 
how the multiplicity of eternal objects are internally and determinately 
related to each other. No one can understand one eternal object com­
pletely unless he grasps all eternal objects. Herein, we find the term
^^Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 343.
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"selection" gaining an intelligible function related to God's primordial 
nature. God, as primordial, is responsible for the initial stages of 
an occasion's subjective aim, but part of its explanation lies in its 
own self-causation. In God's primordial nature, the realm of possibility 
has its reality.
As Unconditioned Primordial Nature
As stated in the quotation above, "unconditioned" and "unfettered" 
are used to denote God's primordial distinction from other actual enti­
ties. The valuations of ordinary actual entities are conditioned by 
their original subjective forms, their actual worlds, and God. These ac­
tual entities are temporal. They have both a beginning and an ending in 
time; they are partially dependent upon God's valuations. They are lim­
ited by their environment. It Is different in the case of God's primor­
dial nature, for God's valuation is unconditioned, unlimited, and unchang­
ing. (One might say that God as primordial has no environment.) God's 
valuation Is eternal like the eternal objects themselves. God's primor­
dial nature and the eternal objects belong together eternally; and In 
this Interrelation we find their reality. God's valuation Is the first 
In the process and necessary in the world of the finally real things, 
which are actual entitles.
When discussing the nature of God, numerous questions arise con­
cerning the relation of God's primordial nature to eternal objects. Ques­
tions such as: What are eternal objects, essences, qualities? What Is
the realm of possibility? What Is God? Whitehead says a great deal about
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what God Is; in fact, it is like raising a question "where does color 
come from?" He refers to.the impossibility of answering an unintelligi­
ble question, and suggests that philosophers would do well to take note 
that this in no way disproves the reality of things asked. For White­
head, it is most inq>ortant to know what God and the eternal objects are 
before attempting to categorize them. This realm of possibility, the 
object of the "unconditioned conceptual valuation of God as the primor­
dial created fact," raises additional problems; £•£., the meaning of 
process, creativity, originality and the structure of actuality. These 
will be pursued in the context of God's primordial nature.
The Primordial Nature of God and Creativity
An analysis of Whitehead's use of the term "creativity" as it is 
related to the primordial nature of God will uncover a new facet of the 
meaning of "primordial." Creativity and the several related concepts, 
e.jr., creative advance, creature, and creation, are Inseparable from the 
concept of the primordial nature of God. "There is no meaning to cre­
ativity apart from its creatures, and no meaning to God apart from the 
creativity and the tenq>oral creatures, and no meaning to the temporal 
creatures apart from creativity and God."^^
Creativity as Ultimate Metaphysical Principle
Nowhere does Whitehead give a precise definition of creativity, 
since creativity is the ultimate and cannot be defined in any ordinary
^^Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 344.
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way. Creativity is the "ultimate which is actual in virtue of its acci­
dents."^^ By "accident," Whitehead means a characteristic which is always 
found to qualify the subject, but which is not essential to its nature. 
"Creativity is the ultimate behind all forms, inexplicable by forms, and 
conditioned by its creatures. Creativity is "the universal of uni­
versels characterizing the ultimate matter of fact."^^ Whitehead sug­
gests his terms show similarities with such ancient philosophical no­
tions as Aristotelian "matter" and such recent concepts as "Neutral 
Stuff"— but also important differences.
Whitehead's concept of creativity is divested of the notion of pas­
sive receptivity, either of "form" or of external relations. It is his 
pure notion of the activity conditioned by the objective immortality of 
the actual world— a world which is never the same twice through always 
with the stable element of divine ordering. Creativity, like matter, is 
without character of its own; it is the ultimate notion of the highest 
generality at the base of actuality. Creativity cannot be characterized 
because all characters are more special than itself. Further, credtivity 
is always found under conditions, as well as described as conditioned.
The "double character" that God shares with all actual entities is that 
of (1) being a creature of creativity and (2) being a condition for 
(subsequent) creativity. By reason of its character as a creature, always 
in concrescence .and, nuver in the past, it receives a reaction from the 
world— the reaction of its consequent nature. The consequent nature is
43lbid., p. 10. 44ibid.. p. 30. 45ibid.. p. 31.
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here termed "God"; because the contençlation of our natures— as enjoying 
real feelings derived from the timeless source of all order— acquires 
that "subjective form" of renewal and togetherness at which religions
aim.46
Whitehead states that we are all aware that creativity is, but we 
are at a loss for words as to what it is. As an ultimate, it is the 
basis of all which is; and if we are to deny it, it must still be assumed 
within the denial. It appears to be close to Aristotle's concept of mat­
ter which was subject to form and telos. In an updated approach it has 
striking similarities with the physicist's concept of energy. It is 
that about which one thinks, has ideas, yet cannot define in terms of 
something more absolute or universal. Creativity is known via intuition; 
therefore, it is outside the bounds of scientific inquiry.
Process for its intelligibility involves the notion of a 
creative activity belonging to the very essence of each 
occasion. It is the process of eliciting into actual being 
factors in the universe, which antecedently to that purpose, 
exist only in the mode of unrealized potentialities. The 
process of self-creation is the transformation of the po­
tential into the actual.4?
Again, Whitehead says; "Creativity is the actualization of potenti­
ality and the process of actualization in an occasion of experiencing."4^ 
Creativity, then, must be viewed as an intelligible activity; it becomes 
the basis for actuality. It is "the throbbing emotion of the past hurling
46lbid.. pp. 46-47.
4^Alfred North Whitehead. Nature and Life, p. 26. 
^^Alfred North Whitehead. Adventures of Ideas. p. 230.
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itself into a new transcendent fact."** "Each creative act is the uni­
verse incarnating Itself as one."^* Creativity performs the task of 
putting the pieces together, of conjoining multiplicity into concrescent 
u n i t y . I t  produces an intelligible process within the actual world, 
ê .jg., constant change, process, and novelty.
Creativity, according to Whitehead, is always conditioned. There 
is no such thing as creativity in the abstract. Creativity exists only 
in its creatures. The "divine ordering . . . itself matter of fact . . . 
conditions creativity."5% It is further conditioned by the subjective 
form of individual actual occasions. "The subject objectively conditions
C *1the creativity transcendent beyond itself." Since there seems to be 
an interdependency structured into creativity, due consideration must 
be given the relation of creativity to the primordial nature of God. In 
a definite sense, every Instance of creativity (that is, every actual en­
tity) is fully complete and determinate. It is indeterminate only in 
its role as a datum for subsequent occasions. That is, just how it will 
function as an element in the concrescence of future occasions is inde­
terminate. Creativity, or more precisely "creative advance," signifies 
the process as of yet incomplete. The past and present are working to 
structure a meaningful future; therefore, this creative advance is in­
telligible.
**Ibid., p. 227.
5^Alfred North Whitehead. Process and Reality, p. 375.
5^Ibid., p. 528. SZlbid.. p. 41. P* 399.
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When qualifying his usage of the term "creature," Whitehead reit­
erates his basic view of the world as one and also as a multiplicity.
In this line he proceeds to show that an actual entity is a creature, 
which is likewise a creator. The creature is busy creating a new world 
out of the past one. In this frame of reference, God, too, is a creator. 
God
can be termed the creator of each temporal actual entity.
But the phrase is apt to be misleading by its suggestion 
that the ultimate creativity of the universe is to be as­
cribed to God's volition. The true metaphysical position 
is that God is the aboriginal instance of c r e a t i v i t y .54
This allows Whitehead a novel tack by providing that God remain open be­
cause creativity is the ultimate, and God is an instance of its activity. 
Repeatedly in his discussion of creativity, Whitehead attempts to relate 
God to creativity. There appears no easy answer,to creativity, and par­
ticularly without bringing God into the picture. God seems to share 
some responsibility for the nature and direction of creativity. "God is 
its primordial, non-temporal a c c i d e n t . G o d  seems to give direction to 
creativity, thus preventing chaos within creativity.
Perhaps some effort should be given to clarifying what is meant by 
"accident," particularly when one claims that God is an accident. Refer­
ring to a certain event as an accident does not mean that it has already 
occurred, or that it had to occur in some specific manner, or that it 
might happen otherwise. This conception is based upon the usual experi­
ence of having things occur in many different ways, without any particular
54lbid.. pp. 343-344. ^% i d .. p. 11.
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reason for one occurrence rather than another. In this manner of 
speaking, God is not an accident. Could actuality occur without God? No 
evidence within our experience warrants the idea that creativity possi­
bly could be actual without God being a part of it. Whitehead may have 
something slightly different in mind. He may have had in mind that the 
actual world as a process might have come about in a different way; how­
ever, it has already been constructed in a particular way. To the extent 
of ny present knowledge of the world, I am not aware of the actual world, 
presently or at any stage of the process, having existed without the 
characteristic described as God's primordial nature. One might conceive 
of the world without God, but does experience justify the assertion that 
God is an accident in the usual meaning of the term? To the contrary, 
according to Whitehead, the primordial instance of creativity is God;
^.e^., God is the first "accident" of creativity.
God as Non-temporal Accident
The primordial nature of God is creativity's non-temporal accident. 
"Non-temporal" suggests the eternal, yet it differs from the eternal in 
that it characterizes what is temporal. "Non-temporal accident," with 
reference to creativity, indicates that creativity never was, nor can it 
ever become, without God as its accident or aboriginal condition. God 
is not to be viewed as something prehended or created in time or as 
something dissolved by time. His is the very essence of creativity; thus 
God is a blending of both accident and the essence of creativity. It is
1?5
in this sense that God is viewed as creativity’s non-temporal accident. 
Creativity, as activity, will perpetually have this stable, non-temporal, 
and eternal character.
It might appear that the statement that the temporal has non­
temporal as a - characteristic is just so much babble. But for Whitehead, 
the non-temp oral is not the same as the not-temporal. The non-temporal 
is like the color of a petal or the odor of a flower. These qualities 
belong to the object, but they do not vanish with the changes which oc­
cur in the object. These non-temporal qualities are eternal, and they 
abide amidst change in the objects. Just as the non-temporal qualities 
abide during periods of change in the objects, so God’s primordial na­
ture abides as creativity’s non-temporal accident in spite of the change 
in the creative advance.
We have heretofore mentioned that "primordial" refers to both that 
which is temporally first and logically prior. This we have shown to be 
God, the first in the order of process and constituting the aboriginal 
instance of creativity. We have shown that God is creativity’s primor­
dial, non-temporal accident. From this perspective, God may be consid­
ered an accident of creativity. But this must be qualified by showing 
that God is not only to be considered the aboriginal instance, but 
also as the basic condition of creativity. Without God, creativity 
would be chaotic and the process would be rendered meaningless. This 
is similar to showing God as an efficient, as well as the final, cause.
As the alpha, God is the occasion and the inescapable condition of
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creativity; as the oiMga, God is the purpose of creativity. God holds a 
unique place as the primordial, non-temporal accident of creativity.
As Aboriginal Existence of Creativity
One of Whitehead's basic teachings, about the primordial nature of 
God is that it is the aboriginal instance of creativity. "The non­
temporal act of all-inclusive unfettered valuation is at once a creature 
of creativity and a condition for c r e a t i v i t y . A g a i n Whitehead 
states: "The true metaphysical position is that God is the aboriginal
instance of this creativity, and is therefore the aboriginal condition 
which qualifies its a c t i o n . T h i s  seems to substantiate the claim 
that Whitehead views God as more than mere accident. God is a condition 
because He is an actuality, and the only one of His kind. "His unity 
of conceptual operations is a free creative act, untrammelled by refer­
ence to any particular course of t h i n g s . G o d ' s  creativity becomes a 
condition for all other creativity, which receives part of its character 
from Him. While God might be claimed to be an accident, that it could 
have been otherwise, it does indeed happen to be this way— God is the 
aboriginal instance. This is quite important as Whitehead sees it, for 
this becomes the basis upon which the actual world is constructed. God 
is the source of possibility and the genesis of further creative advance. 
God is first in the order of process, and He has logical priority in the 
structure of the process.
56Ibid ., p. 47. ^% i d .. p. 344. ^^Ibid.. p. 522.
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An objection could be raised to this interpretation of the relation 
of God to creativity, for it seems, on the surface, to deny the White­
headian view of creativity as ultimate. Whitehead contends that crea­
tivity is characterized as activity, creative advance, and the changing 
potentiality into actuality. If one were to say that the primordial 
nature of God is a mere accident of creativity, then it would seem that 
God would be devalued to a characteristic of reality. This would be 
similar to what Whitehead has claimed for God— that God is an actual 
entity. If God is an actual entity— even a uniquely important one— he 
is, like other actual entities, only one instance of creativity. As 
the primordial actual entity, God not only realizes himself; he further 
constitutes the basis for the advance of the world as a creative process.
No creativity seems possible, unless God as the primordial created 
fact partially determines its course. With this limitation, the evolu­
tionary concept can continue to be used as a valuable scientific tool.
In this manner, creativity will be useful for the explanation of the 
actual world. It will be free of the unpredictable and irrational, and 
it can transcend monistic confines. God is aligned with creativity and 
gives a purposive direction to it.
The Primordial Nature and Actual Entities
Whitehead makes considerable reference in Process and Realitv to
both the primordial and the consequent natures of God. There are other
59references to God as an actual entity. Some Whiteheadian critics feel
59lbid.. pp. 28, 54, 116, 134, 135, 143, 168, 248, 374.
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that calling God an actual entity is merely a linguistic game. It ap­
pears that Whitehead meant it as no game, and that one finds it indeed 
difficult to understand his concept of God without reference to God as 
an actual entity. In fact, there would be rather strong support for 
viewing God initially as an actual entity, and later discussing his dual 
natures. (Every actual entity, God included, has a dual nature which is 
reflected in at least two sets of correlative terms, , formal/objec­
tive and physical/mental.)
God As Actual Entity
When viewing the initial concept of God as an actual entity, we see 
that it is consistent with Whitehead's doctrine of nature. This aspect 
of God's being provides the value structure of the combinations of possi­
bilities. (This raises the point that God values or grades the realm of 
possibilities. It seems apparent that this cannot be part of the con­
sequent nature, as we shall point out in the next chapter.) Relation­
ships of temporal occasions in God would not be an adequate gauge of 
possibilities because many of the possibilities are unrealized in tem­
poral sequence. Perhaps the only adequate answer to the problem is that 
God as actual entity sees all the possibilities. There is a gradation 
of possibilities as a result of, or because of, the actual entity, God, 
who eternally prehends the totality of eternal objects in a selective 
manner. Therefore, it appears that Whitehead's doctrine of the primor­
dial nature of Cod posits God as actual entity for the starting place.
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An attempt will be made in the next chapter to understand God as 
an actual entity in relationship to the consequent nature. We will note 
how the consequent nature is the reception, realization, and prehension 
by God of the temporal world. The question is briefly raised at this 
point as to what in the nature of the deity can claim to receive, real­
ize, and prehend. Since the consequent nature will be shown to be the 
relatedness of objectively immortal temporal occasions in God, let it 
suffice at this juncture to say this is a result of God as actual en­
tity prehending the world of perishing occasions.
The Ontological Principle
For both the primordial and the consequent natures of God to have 
meaning, it is necessary for God to be an actual entity. This is further 
suggested by Whitehead’s assumption of the ontological principle. As 
we have shown the primordial nature to be a valuation, we will show the 
consequent nature to involve the prehension of objectified temporal occa­
sions. This raises in Whitehead’s approach the question of causality. 
What does the valuing, and what accomplishes the objectification?
The typical "design argument" rests on a recognition of a tendency 
toward order within natural world events, or to use Whitehead’s terminol­
ogy, "preferential adaptation" of possibility to actuality. However, 
Whitehead states that few who accept the design argument are willing to 
proceed with further questioning as to "why" we recognize the order. He 
gives an example of the positivistic approach, that of calculating care­
fully the words to describe what has been seen, with little concern as to
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the assumptions or reasons for the view. This apparent positivistic 
indifference or intentional blindness toward basic assumptions is little 
more than a negligible device, a "self-denial of thought.Whitehead 
states it this way:
Suppose that a hundred thousand years ago our ancestors had 
been wise positivists. They sought for no reasons. What 
they had observed was sheer matter of fact. It was the de­
velopment of no necessity. They would have searched for no 
reasons underlying facts immediately observed. Civilization 
would never have developed. Our varied powers of detailed 
observation of the world would have remained dormant. For 
the peculiarity of a reason is that the intellectual develop­
ment of its consequences suggests consequences beyond the 
topics already observed. The extension of observation waits 
upon some dim apprehension of reasonable connection. For 
exanq>le, the observation of insects on flowers dimly sug­
gests some congruity between the natures of insects and of 
flowers, and thus leads to a wealth of observation from 
which whole branches of science have developed. But a con­
sistent positivist should be content with the observed facts, 
namely insects visiting flowers. It is a fact of charming 
simplicity. There is nothing further to be said upon the 
matter, according to the doctrine of the positivist. At 
present the scientific world is suffering from a bad attack 
of muddle-headed positivism, which arbitrarily applies its 
doctrine and arbitrarily escapes from it.^^
Whitehead claims that the positivist has grown apathetic toward tradi­
tional answers due to the supposed meaninglessness of traditional ques­
tions. Whitehead prefers to use the traditional questions as the basis 
for rational stimulation and growth.
While rejecting Plato's non-actual Forms as an appropriate solution 
to ultimacy, Whitehead's view is that only the actual can be the real 
(or the "really real"). Questions such as "What eternally sees all
Ibid.. 8.
Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Macmillan
Co., 1933), p. 203; Adventures of Ideas, pp. 157-164.
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possibilities in graded valuation?" or "What could prehend all temporal 
actual occasions within their objective Immortality?" point up the 
necessity of a metaphysical solution. If It Is possible for us to ac­
cept that reality Is divisible Into actuality and potentiality, and if 
we concur with Whitehead In his rejection of non-temporality as the ans­
wer to ultimacy, then It would.appear that we must accept Whitehead's 
ontological principle, that only that which Is actual can be an explan­
ation of anything.
Having Identified the actual entity as that which Is actual, White­
head, through his ontological principle, states that actual entitles are 
the only genuine solutions to the problem of reality. His definition of 
God as the foundation of value through the envlslonment of possibilities 
has brought him to state that God, then, must be an actual entity.
As previously stated, dividing God Into the primordial (or mental) 
and consequent (or physical) aspects of His nature Is similar to the 
division of other actual entitles Into mental and physical poles. An 
actual occasion Is termed a synthesis of "feelings" with a minimal 
amount being either solely physical or solely mental. If we take note 
of other feelings, _e.^., comparative feelings, prepositional feelings, 
physical purposes, or Intellectual feelings, we will recognize a weight^ 
Ing toward their basic characteristics. Few will be found that are 
either totally mental or totally physical; Instead, they tend to mingle 
within the synthesizing process. This applies to God, for Whitehead 
pictures God as more than the total of the primordial and consequent
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natures. As an actual entity> God has the dual natures of primordial
and consequent, but there appear to be other natures which synthesize
the mental and physical poles.
Whitehead can refer to God as an "Instance of experience," based
upon his notion of God as an actual entity. Christian's compilation of
God's likeness to actual entitles Is adequately stated In the following:
God Is a unity of conceptual and physical experience (PR 54).
He Is concrescence (PR 47, 54, 134), satisfaction (PR 48,
135), and superject (PR 135, 532; MT 128). He has subjec­
tive aim (RM 100; PR 134-4, 522, 524) and subjective forms 
of feeling (PR 50, 134, 522). He exists formally, as an 
Immediate actuality, and he exists objectively for other 
actual entitles (PR 47, 377-8).
Whitehead suggests that the primordial nature of God Is the basis 
of order, relevance, and novelty In the actual world. By claiming both 
order and novelty within this actual world, Whitehead Is attempting to 
synthesize and make possible both limited determinism and freedom for 
each actual entity. God's primordial nature Is the source of order 
within this world. It "Is the divine element In the world [and] consti­
tutes the metaphysical stability whereby the actual process exemplifies 
the general principles of metaphysics."^^ "The things which are tem­
poral arise by their participation In the things which are eternal.
The actual represents a selection from the plethora of possibilities, and
^^Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Realltv. p. 54.
G^Wllliam Christian, An Interprétation of Whitehead's Metaphysics 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 287.
^4lbld.. p. 64. 65ibld.
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the multiple possibilities find their basis in the primordial nature 
of God. This appears to indicate that the order of the world is somehow 
derived from God's primordial nature.
God as Basis of Order and Meaning
God's primordial nature saves the world from chaos by giving it or­
der and meaning. The order appears to be eternal, and this may be one 
of the fringe benefits of worship— the assurance man receives of living 
in an orderly world. "'God' is that actuality in the world, in virtue 
of which there is physical law."^^ Further, "by the recognition of 
God's characterization of the creative act, a more complete rational ex­
planation is attained.
Closely aligned with the concept of order in the system of Whitehead 
is that of relevance. Not all entities are equally related, but there 
is a hierarchy of importance among the entities. Relevance deals with 
the individual relations of one entity to other entities. Each entity 
is involved in the process, althou^ some have a purely negative rela­
tion. This rule of relevance attempts to preserve the individuality of 
each actual entity in the process. Gradation is illustrative of this 
concept of relevance, , important or trivial, warmer or cooler, more 
or less, etc. Since there is an interaction of entities, each contribu­
ting to the worth of the others, it is important to ferret out the mean­
ing of relevance. "The principle of relevance asserts that any item of
GGibid.. p. 434. ^^Ibid.. p. 382.
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the universe, however preposterous as an abstract thought, or however
remote as an actual entity, has its own gradation of relevance, as pre-
68handed, in the constitution of any one actual entity." Whitehead is 
contending that even the future has certain relevance to the structure 
of the present concrescence.
The relevance of interrelated things involves the realm of possi­
bility from which the forms are derived. Likewise, the realm of real 
possibility stems from the primordial nature of God, which furnishes 
the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the plethora of eternal ob­
jects. From this it follows that order and relevance within the uni­
verse are derivatives of God’s primordial nature. Thus, the place and 
importance of every entity is to be determined in context with the pri­
mordial nature of God. Whitehead seems to indicate that nothing ever 
enters this real world without God's primordial nature. Whitehead has 
insisted that each actual entity individually transcends its past, God 
included. Novelty is discovered in the individuality of each actual 
entity. Paradoxical as it may seem, Whitehead contends that an entity 
is both determined and free. Whitehead states that the concrescence of 
each individual actual entity is internally determined and is externally 
free. This category of freedom and determination can be condensed to 
hold that in each concrescence whatever is determinable is determined, 
but that there is always a remainder for the decision of the subject- 
superject is the universe in that synthesis.
68Ibid.. p. 224. ^^Ibid.. pp. 41-42.
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As Basis of Novelty
The basis of novelty in the actual entity is to be found in its 
subjective aim, which contains an element that cannot be found in any­
thing else from the actual world. Whitehead uses the illustration of 
an organism to make this point. The organism has life— its own— this is 
part of its individuated novelty. Its life is more than its constituent 
parts detailed by the scientific analysis of it. "This culmination of 
bodily life transmits itself as an element of novelty throughout the 
avenues of the body. Its sole use to the body is its vivid originality; 
it is the organ of n o v e l t y . C o n s i d e r  the place of novelty as it is 
stated by Whitehead: "The ultimate freedom of things, lying beyond all
determinations, was whispered by Galileo— B pur si muove— freedom for the 
inquisitor to think wrongly, for Galileo to think rightly, and for the 
world to move in despite of Galileo and inquisitors."^^
We have shown novelty to be a quality (or result) of subjective aim. 
Novelty has resulted from the ingression of eternal objects constituting 
the subjective aim of actual entities. The process is "constituted by 
the influx of eternal objects into a novel determinateness of feeling
79which absorbs the actual world into a novel actuality." "Eternal ob­
jects in any one of their modes of subjective ingression are then func­
tioning in the guise of subjective novelty meeting the objective datum 
from the past."^^ Eternal objects ingress into actual entities; novelty
7°Ibid.. p. 516. 71lbid.. p. 75.
^^Ibid.. p. 72. 73lbid.. p. 249.
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is the realization of a possibility. We have heretofore shown that pos­
sibility has its basis in God's primordial nature; therefore, God is 
the source of novelty. As Whitehead states, "this initial phase of the 
subjective aim is a direct derivate from God's primordial nature. In 
this function, as in every other, God is the organ of novelty, aiming 
at intensification."^^ Without God's primordial nature there would be 
no relevant eternal objects, no real possibilities, and no novelty. 
"Originality in the temporal world is conditioned, though not determined, 
by an initial subjective aim supplied by the ground of all order and of 
all originality."^^
If God has ordered both the data and the subjective aim of the 
actual entity, how would novelty have any bearing? According to White­
head, the data and subjective aim are not determined in the same way.
Data are determined by past actual occasions of the world, and there 
only indirectly by God. Data are to be viewed as occurring prior to 
the concrescence, as that which has already happened. Subjective aim 
appears almost miraculously as a direct resultant of God, , the in­
gression of eternal objects. The eternal breaks into the process; and 
once this ingression has been made into the process, it thereafter func­
tions according to the laws of the process. This emphasizes the earlier 
point that the difference between data and subjective aim has left the 
actual entity externally free but internally determined. Viewed from 
the natural perspective of the actual world, the entity is a novelty.
74ibid.. p. 104. 75lbid.. p. 164.
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Seen from divine purposivenesa, it is internally determined within the 
realm of possibility and actualized only within the process.
Novelty for Whitehead does not imply the unintelligibility of the 
actual entity. Instead, he contends that an entity is irrational from a 
certain perspective, , a datum in the process which is contributing 
to the concrescence of an actual entity. However, any one actual entity 
is constituted by its synthesis of other actual entities, and each actual 
entity develops from the primary dative phase into its own individual 
actual existence, involving its individual enjoyments and appetitions.
An actual entity is concrete because it is such a particular concrescence 
of the universe. Both order and originality stem from God's primordial 
nature.
Whitehead suggests that each entity is a novelty; in a sense, it 
has its own law. It has its own blueprint and develops it in relation to 
its essential character. In part, this is its freedom, and it is re­
sponsible for its achievements. Failing to achieve its goal, it is 
termed as evil. If it makes something of itself in the time for self­
development , it is regarded as good.
Novelty is not taken by Whitehead to be a synonym for chance. He 
is not suggesting that the indeterminist position would founder a world 
in unpredictability. Novelty is (or may be) a positive and constructive 
fact of the world. As Whitehead suggests, indeterminism has its best 
example within our own moral experience.
In the case of those actualities whose immediate experience 
is most completely open to us, namely, human beings, the final 
decision of the immediate subject-superject, constituting the
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ultimate modification of subjective aim. Is the foundation of our 
experience of responsibility, of approbation or of disapprobation, 
or self-approval or self-reproach, of freedom, of emphasis. This 
element in experience Is too large to be put aside merely as mis­
construction. It governs the whole tone of human llfe.^^
This freedom Is the line of demarcation of the new life from the old; It
proceeds to new realms of value and purposiveness at the perishing of the
old, thus producing freedom within the process.
Re cap1tulatlon
God as primordial stands Independent of history; however, history Is 
not Independent of God. The ultimate purpose of history Is Initiated by 
God as He Intervenes In the historical process. Whitehead seems to be con­
tending that God orders these movements which are Internally deterinlned, 
yet externally free. Novelty has significance within the organic and moral 
fields; likewise. It seems to be Whitehead's analysis of the purposiveness 
of human history.
The primordial nature of God seems to be at the very base of things 
within the universe. Whitehead suggests a purposiveness running through 
the process which exposes the observer to new vistas of his cosmos. It 
also reveals a God whose plans are only partially knowable to the observer. 
The scientist can study the process of the actual world, and this may lead 
him to claim contact with the eternal order of things. Whitehead holds 
this eternal order to be the source of potentiality, both ordered and novel, 
which is fulfilled by the complexity of the process. As primordial, God Is 
the beginning, the source, from which the process begins to flow and develop.
7*Ibid.. p. 74.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONSEQUENT
NATURE OF GOD
CHAPTER TOUR
THE CONSEQUENT NATURE OF QOD: The Progress of God is
Partially Dependent on the World
In the last chapter we discussed the primordial nature of God. For 
many who would embrace natural theological findings and correlate these 
with the natural sciences, God's primordial nature would appear to be 
quite sufficient for their interpretation of reality. Whitehead, how­
ever, is not willing to settle for this approach, nor does he accept the 
primordial nature as sufficient for a total explanation of God. White­
head’s God is not only involved in the structure of the cosmos; He pro­
vides the basis for objective immortality, religious purpose, and a 
teleological explanation of the universe. The Whiteheadian view of God 
makes room for changes in the actual world, and in addition, this God 
preserves the valuable things which arise during the process. Whitehead 
describes his cosmological vision as "the story of the dynamic effort of 
the world passing Into everlasting unity, and of the static majesty of 
God's vision, accomplishing its purpose of completion by absorption of 
the world’s multiplicity of effort."^
Traditional theologians have contented themselves through the years 
to consider the "other-worldly features" of God. Whitehead attempts to
^Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 530.
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point out the injustice of this view by calling the traditional theists 
to consider the damage they are performing against the "here-now." 
Whitehead’s God is rebuilding a world and purging it of evil in order 
that men can behold God at work to accomplish His teleological aim within 
the actuality of this world order. Whitehead does perform a considerable 
service to contemporary philosophical theology by suggesting that some­
one so bent on "other-worldly" things is probably of little earthly good 
either to God, his fellowman, or himself. More affirmatively, Whitehead 
presents us with a notion of the consequent nature of God which supple­
ments the primordial nature.
Attempt at Definition
At no single place in his writings does Whitehead give us a precise 
definition of the consequent nature of God. He does present the func­
tional equivalent of a definition of the consequent nature of God as "the 
physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe.
He characterizes the consequent nature in several ways. The consequent 
nature is "the reception into God’s nature" of "each actuality in the 
tençoral w o r l d . It is viewed as "the reaction of the temporal world 
on the nature of God."* Further, it can be described as the "representa­
tion in the divine nature of the organic actualities of the world.
God’s consequent nature is the "objectification" or "realization of the 
actual world in the unity of his nature.’’®
^Ibid., p. 134. ^Ibid., pp. 530-531. ^Ibid.. p. 19,
^Ibid.. p. 18. ®Ibid.. pp. 523-524.
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The previous chapter described God's primordial nature as an at­
tempt at philosophical consistency within Whitehead's philosophy of 
process. God's consequent nature is likewise important to this philoso­
phy of process. There are some basic notions that will clarify this 
point, namely, the ontological principle and the principle of relativity.
Whitehead claims that nothing "can float into the actual world out 
of non-entity . . . .  Everything must be somewhere; and 'somewhere' means 
'some actual entity.'"^ We have discussed this ontological principle, 
and we agreed tentatively that unrealized possibility, due to its link 
with reality, necessarily must be a facet of some actual entity. This 
actual entity we discussed as being at least partially non-temporal it­
self since it conceptually views the plethora of eternal objects. This 
actual entity, Whitehead refers to as "God." "It is . . . termed 'God'; 
because the contemplation of our natures, as enjoying real feelings de­
rived from the timeless source of all order, acquires that 'subjective
Q
form' of refreshment and companionship at which religions aim." So 
much for the ontological principle at present.
The principle of relativity requires an actual entity to influence 
and/or to be influenced by other occasions of experience. It is charac­
teristic of an actual entity "to be present in every other actual en­
tity."^ If this be the case, Whitehead contends that this actual entity, 
God, must have in addition to his primordial nature, that which is
^Ibid.. p. 73. ®IMd., p. 47. ^Ibid.. pp. 79, 43, 252.
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10consequent upon God’s connection to the world of temporality. If God 
is an actual entity, then, like other actual entities. He must be in 
part consequent.
Contrast in Natures of God
It should be noted that for Whitehead the contrasting natures of
God involve more than the primordial and the consequent. Whitehead
states that the primordial side of God is changeless and complete, while
12the consequent nature evolves and is incomplete. The primordial is
13eternal, but the consequent is everlasting. God’s primordial nature 
is unconditioned, but the consequent is conditioned by the nature of 
God’s subjective aim in the gradation of intensity (which ultimately 
comes from the primordial nature). The consequent nature is also con­
ditioned by finite actual entities. The data of God’s primordial en- 
visagement are eternal objects. The data of his consequent nature in­
clude (but are not limited to) finite actual occasions.
Whitehead has attempted to be philosophically consistent by trying 
to interpret the basic character of reality via the ontological and rela­
tivity doctrines. To summarize, we have found that God is an actual 
entity which prehends each past occasion of experience. Whitehead’s 
contention for the consequent nature seems consistent with other of his 
metaphysical principles.
% b i d .. p. 524. lllbid.. p. 532. % b i d .. pp. 19, 524.
l^Ibid.. pp. 524, 527. % b i d .. pp. 523-524. l^Ibid.. pp. 530-531.
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Just as actual occasions have objective immortality in God, so God 
has objective immortality in the world.^^ In this manner God's creative 
purpose is effected. "For the perfected actuality passes back into the 
temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality 
includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience.God's  super- 
jective nature is therefore a more complete expression of how subjective 
aims and novel eternal objects derived from God are relevant to the world 
in which they are prehended by particular occasions. This is the expres­
sion of God's love for the world in the form of "the particular providence 
for particular o c c a s i o n s . " I t  is God's conceptual realization perform­
ing an efficacious role in multiple unifications of the universe, which 
are free creations of actualities arising out of decided situations.
As remarked earlier, a once-for-all-time definition of the consequent 
nature of God is not to be found in Whitehead's writings. One must sal­
vage the bits and pieces of statements in order to arrive at the meaning 
of this notion. There do seem to arise some basic ideas which one becomes 
more aware of due to the repetition and restatement of them in Whitehead's 
works.
Basic Ideas of the Consequent Nature 
Recurring Complements
Completing the actual world.— One of these basic ideas of White­
headian repetition is that of the consequent nature of God viewed as
l*Ibid.. p. 47. 17lbid.. p. 532.
IGlbid. 19lbid.. p. 530.
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completing the actual world. "The fluent world becomes ’everlasting* by 
its objective immortality in God,*’̂ ® is one of Whitehead's statements of 
the consequent nature. "Fluent world" refers to a world of actual occa­
sions, and "objective immortality" emphasizes the superjactive character 
of the concrescing actual entities. "God" refers to the retention of 
all actual occasions of the past and the source of the evolving world of 
process. There is an elastic concept within the primordial nature refer­
red to as the "unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multi­
plicity of eternal objects." Separated from the primordial nature, eter­
nal objects have no significance, and removed from the consequent nature 
actual occasions perish.
The consequent nature's relation to the actual world is set out in 
fine fashion in the following passage:
In it Qsod's consequent natur^ the complete adjustment of 
the immediacy of joy and suffering reaches the final end of 
creation. This end is existence in the perfect unity of ad­
justment as means, and in the perfect multiplicity of the 
attainment of individual types of self-existence . . . .
The sense of worth beyond itself is immediately enjoyed as an 
overpowering element in the individual self-attainment. This 
is the notion of redemption through suffering which haunts 
the world.
The consequent nature becomes the teloa realized through the process.
The extremes of life, , pain and sorrow, joy and success, are seen 
pulled together by God to achieve a purpose beyond the individuality of 
actual occasions. The actual entity is caught up in the immortality of 
the consequent nature. Within the consequent nature transcendent purpose
2°Ibid ., p. 527. ^^Ibid., pp. 530-531.
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evolves through the natural processes of the world; therefore, the con­
sequent nature gives immortality to the actual entity and makes it sig­
nificant for actuality beyond itself,
A facet of Whitehead's notion of truth is exposed within the conse­
quent nature. He states:
The truth itself is nothing else than how the composite na­
tures of the organic actualities of the world obtain adequate 
representation in the derivative nature. Such representations 
compose the 'consequent nature' of God, which evolves in its 
relationships to the evolving world without derogation to the 
eternal completion of its primordial conceptual nature.2%
Whitehead holds a theory according to which the abstract, human- 
controlled world may not be the final one; there appears a purposive 
world within the consequent nature of God which is beyond man's abstrac­
tions. Likewise, there must be an alignment between the consequent na­
ture and the primordial nature of God. The progression is to this ef­
fect: the meaning of an actual occasion ultimately extends beyond it­
self to merge with God.
The consequent nature of God supposedly completes the fluent world. 
No lasting purpose is discoverable within this natural world without 
transcending the immediate world for a complete and ultimate expression 
of that purpose. Without the concept of God, Whitehead continues, the 
actual world could only be construed as a meaningless multiplicity of 
occasions without any purposive unity. Nothing is lost in Whitehead's 
process philosophy; therefore, individuated moments of defeat are ulti­
mately redeemed within God's consequent nature.
Z^Ibid.. pp. 18-19.
actualization."^^ God, as actual entity, is among other actual en-
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God as fulfilled by thé world.— Another finitistic aspect of the 
consequent nature is that God is continually fulfilled by the world.
The consequent nature is "the fulfil3jnent of God’s experience by His 
reception of the multiple freedom of actuality into the harmony of His 
own
tities; as such, God’s nature is dipolar just as every actual entity is 
dipolar. God’s subjective aim responds and reacts to other actual en­
tities of this actual world. This is God's actualization. According to 
Whitehead, without the actual world, God would be no more than potenti­
ality or, rather, the objects would be mere possibilities, unrealized 
eternal objects. Through interacting with the actual world, God real­
izes Himself as actual, and this realization is God’s consequent nature. 
As such, the progress of God is ĵ at least] partially dependent upon the 
world. The world continues to be instrumental in God’s evolution in re­
lation to the actual world.
As discussed in the previous chapter, God is an actual entity, but 
He does not share precisely like other actual entities. As consequent, 
God’s nature is
composed of a multiplicity of elements with individual self- 
realization. It is just as much a multiplicity as it is a 
unity; it is just as much immediate fact as it is an unrest­
ing advance beyond itself. Thus, the actuality of God must 
also be understood as a multiplicity of actual components in 
process of creation.
The gist of the consequent nature, thus stated, is that God really
evolves. His nature is expanding in complexity, and this progressive
23lbid.. p. 530. ^^Ibid.. p. 531.
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evolution of God enhances the whole world. As Whitehead says, "God’s
derivative nature is consequent upon the creative advance of the 
2 Sworld." God is (partly) what God becomes in this process philosophy, 
and He is being fulfilled by the actual world.
Valuation and Consciousness
In discussing the characteristics of the primordial nature, it was
stated that God has a conceptual phase. But that does not necessarily
entail that God is conscious at the primordial level. For Whitehead, con­
's
ceptual valuation is below the level of consciousness. This raises the 
problem of what Whitehead means by consciousness. He describes con­
sciousness as "the feeling of the contrast of theory, as mere theoiry,
with fact, as mere fact." "There is no consciousness without refer-
27ence to definiteness, affirmation, and negation." Further, he states 
that the most simple case of consciousness "is the negative perception,
OQnamely, ’perceiving this stone as not grey.’" Apparently, according
to Whitehead, there is consciousness only where there are alternatives—
or, more accurately, only where there is apprehension of alternatives.
Whitehead distinguishes between valuation and consciousness. "The
subjective forms of prepositional feelings are dominated by valuation,
rather than by consciousness.’’̂ ^
. . . conceptual feelings, apart from complex integration 
with physical feelings, are devoid of consciousness in their
ZSibid., p. 523. 2*Ibid.. p. 286. ^^Ibid.. p. 372.
28ibid., p. 245. p. 402.
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subjective forms . . . .  jjGodü is the unconditioned actu­
ality of conceptual feeling at the base of things; so that, 
by reason of this primordial actuality, there is an order 
in th^^relevance of eternal objects to the process of crea-
In His primordial nature, God is unconscious; however, in His actuality 
as consequent, He is conscious. God’s consciousness of the world, or 
His objectification of the world, is derivative from the actual world.
As consequent, God distinguishes between actuality and possibility, 
registers a difference between actual entities and eternal objects, and 
distinguishes between alternatives. Further, God distinguishes between 
the actual and the possible within His own being, as well as between the 
attained and the unattainable. Through His consequent nature God be­
comes like a person. God "is the realization of the actual world in the
31unity of his nature, and through the transformation of his wisdom."
As consequent, God is partially dependent upon the world, for He is 
fulfilled by the actual world; however, God is further distinguished 
from the actual world. "God is to be conceived as originated by concep­
tual experience with his process of completion motivated by consequent, 
physical experience, initially derived from the temporal w o r l d . T h e  
reaction of the world to God does make a difference.
God and the World Interact
God and the actual world interact upon each other. It is not a 
one-way relation in which God directs all toward the world; rather, there
30Ibid.. pp. 521-522. % b i d .. p. 524. ^hb±d.
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is a re-direct in which the world influences God. Whitehead suggests 
that the actual world attains its ultimate goal in God. At the same 
time, Whitehead insists that God is different as a result of the impact 
of the actual world upon Him. While the permanence and purpose of God 
are inseparable from the world, yet the flux of the world leaves its im­
print upon the character of God. As consequent, God is conscious of His 
relation to the world. As a result, God makes the distinction between 
the possible and actual for the purpose of realizing greater objectives 
within the actual world through greater depth and intensity of experience.
God as Dipolar
Another link of the finite with the infinite can be seen in White­
head's contention that the consequent nature of God is related to his 
primordial nature. Recall from an earlier section that every actual en­
tity is dipolar, physical and mental. By its physical pole, the actual 
entity prehends its own actual world. Through its conceptual pole the 
actual entity feels the eternal objects. It was stated that God is an 
actual entity. God's consciousness of the world is His awareness of the 
multiplicity of the world's physical objects in their concurrent "unison 
of becoming." His mental pole is His conceptual valuation of the set of 
eternal objects. The physical pole is his prehension of finite occa­
sions. Through the primordial nature, God reserves in unconditioned con­
ceptual valuation the whole multiplicity of eternal objects. Through His 
consequent nature, God prehends the whole actual world. The natures of 
God are only aspects of a concrete being.
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Possibility and Actuality
Viewed from a general point of vantage, the primordial nature of 
God is that of possibility and that of the consequent nature is actual­
ity. It is at this plane where the consequent nature becomes the reali­
zation of the primordial nature. The consequent nature "is God as really 
actual, completing the deficiency of his mere conceptual actuality.
"God's consequent nature is the weaving of God's physical feelings upon 
his primordial c o n c e p t s . " T h e  perfection of God's subjective aim, 
derived from the completeness of his primordial nature, issues into the 
character of his consequent nature.Therefore, it is an injustice to 
consider the two natures as completely separate, because they must syn- 
chromesh; they are interdependent. Anyone who forgets this fact is bound 
to misunderstand the Whiteheadian conception of God.
What God as Consequent Does
Perhaps the best way to understand what Whitehead means by the 
consequent nature is to demonstrate what it does. If God were only pri­
mordial, the traditional static God would be the outcome, and all the 
world would be fully determined by His programmed course of fixed laws.
If this were the case, the world would have no purpose nor be productive 
in and of its own ability. The consequent nature of God is necessary to 
account for the significant, purposive and everlasting world.
From comparison of the functions of the primordial and the conse­
quent natures, we may draw several brief conclusions. The primordial
33Ibid.. p. 530. 34ibid,, p. 524. ^hh±d.
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envlsagement may be characterized as aesthetic— but it is only poten­
tial. It is the consequent nature which adds the aesthetic character 
and objective immortality to the process. The primordial nature is the 
skeletal basis, and the consequent places sinew and flesh upon the bone. 
The primordial nature supplies the foundation of the actual world in the 
eternal, complete, primordial and unconscious character of God. The 
consequent nature introduces necessary goodness, the everlasting, God as 
conscious of His infinite possibilities and His actual achievements, and 
the assurance that God does the best he can— with our help. By this 
interacting supplementation of each contrasting nature, the full charac­
ter of God is made available to the actual world. God is (partly) what 
He becomes, just as an actual entity is what it becomes, and the temporal 
world has meaning and significance for God. God, w  has been suggested, 
is like a person by virtue of his consequent nature. But God is like a 
person in his primordial side, too— only in much greater degree. Just 
like any other person, God changes but remains the same. God is never 
to be identified with the world, yet He is different from the Absolute 
of the Idealistic systems. He also differs from the personalist's con­
ception of God as finite, for Whitehead's God is both finite and infi­
nite. He is not just a product of the world process, nor just a part 
of that actual world; but at the same time, God is the foundation for 
and the purpose within the temporal world. Along this same trend of 
thought, without the world, God is "deficient in actuality." He be­
comes greater because of this world.
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We conclude that God's consequent nature can best be described 
as purposive, conscious, and personal. His purposiveness posits the 
ultimate goal of the temporal world. This actual world obtains its 
objective immortality in God. The consequent nature of God gives di­
rection to the world, a decision amid the multiplicity of possibilities, 
and a purpose with God as consequent to its realization.
Further, we can conclude that God is conscious. This can be seen 
from dual perspectives: one, the distinction of the consequent nature
from the primordial, and, secondly, that the consequent nature is dis­
tinguished from the temporal world in order to bring to the fore the 
facet of God as an actual entity. As conscious, there is an awareness 
within God of what He has been and presently is, as well as the aware­
ness of what He may possibly become.
As consequent, God is analogous to a person; He is not to be con­
sidered as being less than the highest order of experience in humans. 
However, God is dissimilar to the analogate in that He is infinite and 
is the basis of all other experience. God is consequent because He is 
primordial*
The Notion of Transmutation
It has not been our intention to oversimplify the consequent nature 
of God as discovered in Whitehead's philosophy. In fact. Process and 
Reality discusses the conqplexity of this consequent nature within it­
self, as well as its relations to other of Whitehead's doctrines. 
Whitehead cooq>llcates the problem by contending that God's prehensions
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of each actual occasion produces a "transmutation" of that occasion, both
objectively and subjectively. This objective phase of transmutation of
temporal occasions in God Is presented In the following quotations:
The consequent nature of God . . .  Is the realization of 
the actual world . . . through the transformation of his 
wisdom.36
The perfection of God's subjective aim, derived from 
the completeness of his primordial nature. Issues Into the 
character of his consequent nature. In It there Is no loss, 
no obstruction . . . .
The wisdom of the subjective aim prehends every actu­
ality for what It can be In such a perfected system— Its 
sufferings. Its sorrows. Its failures. Its triumphs. Its 
Immediacies of joy— woven by rightness of feeling Into the 
harmony of the universal feeling, which Is . . . never per­
ishing. The revolts of destructive evil, purely self- 
regarding, are dismissed Into their triviality of merely 
Individual facts; and yet the good they did achieve In Indi­
vidual joy. In Individual sorrow. In the Introduction of 
needed contrast. Is yet saved by Its relation to the com­
pleted whole. The Image— and It Is but an Image— the Image 
under which this operative growth of God's nature Is best 
conceived. Is that of a tender care that nothing be lost.
The consequent nature of God Is his judgment on the 
world. He saves the world as It passes Into the Immediacy 
of his own life. It Is the judgment of a tenderness which 
loses nothing that can be saved. It Is also the judgment 
of a wisdom which uses what In the tenq>oral world Is mere
wreckage.37
The problems of the fluency of God and of the everlast­
ingness of passing experience are solved by the same factor 
In the universe. This factor Is the temporal world perfected 
by Its reception and Its reformation . . . .  In this way . . . 
the tenqioral occasions are completed by their everlasting 
union with their transformed selves, purged Into conformation 
with the eternal order which Is the final absolute 'wisdom.'38
In [the consequent nature] the complete adjustment of 
the Immediacy of joy and suffering reaches the final end of 
creation. This end Is the existence In the perfect unity of 
adjustment as means, and In the perfect multiplicity of the 
attainment of individual types of self-exlstence.39
36lbld.. p. 524. 37ibid.. pp. 524-525.
3Glbld.. p. 527. 39ibid,, pp. 530-531.
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Each actuality in the temporal world has its reception 
in God's nature. The corresponding element in God's nature 
is not temporal actuality, but is the transmutation of that 
temporal actuality into living, ever-present fact. An en­
during personality in the temporal world is a route of occa­
sions in which the successors with some peculiar conqjleteness 
sum up their predecessors. The correlate fact in God's na­
ture is an even more complete unity of life in a chain of 
elements for which succession does not mean the loss of im­
mediate unison.40
In [the consequent naturejj the many are one everlast­
ingly, without the qualification of any loss either of in­
dividual identity or of completeness of unity.41
The third of the four phases in which the universe accomplishes its 
actuality is the phase of perfected actuality, in which the many are 
one everlastingly.42 Whitehead is showing that "endurance" and "trans­
formation" are a couple of the characteristics which share in the trans­
mutation of each actual occasion.
Endurance
Every actual entity is "remembered" by God as a fact which cannot 
be changed or deleted. Likewise, each temporal occasion is transmuted 
into a "living, ever-present fact."^^ There seems to be an enduring 
quality to temporality. Whitehead is further intent upon showing that 
in tenq>oral succession an actual entity prehends a predecessor by objec­
tifying one of the eternal objects it (the predecessor) e x e n q ) l i f i e s . 4 4  
"There is no reason, of any ultimate metaphysical generality, why this 
[that process entails loss]should be the whole story,"45 says Whitehead
40lbid.. p. 531. 41ibid.. p. 532. ^^Ibid.. p. 531.
43lbid. ^*Ibid., p. 517. 45ibid.
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when he discusses an occasion's temporal existence evolving into its 
objectively immortal existence in God. God is aware of each occasion's 
complete "individual identity," as well as its "comple'-‘ness of unity. 
Moving from its becoming to objective immortality in God, Whitehead sees 
"no loss of immediate union" of the feeling which each actual occasion 
achieves in its satisfaction. The whole complexity of positive and 
negative feelings, elements of a temporal synthesis, endures in the 
consequent nature of God.^^ As William Christian says, "God conforms
/ O
to every feeling, and he conforms perfectly to each feeling."
Feeling and Subjective Immediacy
Whitehead has gone to great lengths to state clearly that every 
feeling within each temporal satisfaction endures in its completeness ; 
however, he is not so clear on each occasion's subjective immediacy and 
its endurance. Again, we turn to Christian for a solution to this prob­
lem.^9 Note how the following passages from Whitehead suggest a posi­
tive answer to the question of the preservation of subjective immediacy.
There is a unison of becoming among things in the present.
Why should there not be novelty without loss of this direct 
unison of Immediacy among things?
In it [the consequent nature of GodJ there is no loss, no 
obstruction. The world is felt in a unison of immediacy.
46lbid.. p. 532. ^^Ibid.. pp. 517, 524.




Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p . 517.
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The property of combining creative advance with the reten­
tion of mutual immediacy is what in the previous section 
is meant by the term "everlas ting."51
Thus the consequent nature of God is composed of a multi­
plicity of elements with individual self-realization.5%
Christian challenges the apparent position of Whitehead on the endurance 
of subjective immediacy. He says:
Several comments on these passages are in order, (a) The 
"unison of immediacy" referred to in the first two passages 
is God's own immediacy, as the second passage makes clear . . . .  
(c) In the third passage it might have been better to say 
the consequent nature of God "unifies" a multiplicity of 
elements. These elements, actual occasions, do have indi­
vidual self-realization in their own immediate experiences.
But God's own immediate experience is not a multiplicity but 
a unity, in which the multiplicity of occasions is objecti­
fied. (d) The suggestion that actual occasions retain their 
immediacy when objectified in God, which these passages might 
permit, is not consistent with some fundamental principles or 
with the plain meanings of other texts.53
The "other texts" suggested are:
Actual occasions "obtain adequate representation in the di­
vine nature. Such representations compose the 'consequent 
nature' of G o d . "54




53william Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics, 
p. 341.
^^Ibid.. pp. 18-19. (Emphasis added by and quoted In Christian, p.
341.)
^^Ibld.. p. 524. (Emphasis added by and quoted In Christian, p.
341.)
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The nature of God "receives Into its unity the scattered 
effectiveness of realized activities. transformed by the 
supremacy of its own ideals.
Each actuality in the temporal world has its reception into 
God's nature. The corresponding element in God's nature is 
not temporal actuality, but is the transmutation of that 
temporal actuality into a living, ever-present fact. An 
enduring personality in the temporal world is a route of 
occasions in which the successors with some peculiar com­
pleteness sum up their predecessors. The correlate fact in 
God's nature is an even more complete unity of life in a 
chain of elements for which succession does not mean loss 
of immediate unison. This element in God's nature inherits 
from the temporal counterpart according to the same prin­
ciple as in the temporal world the future inherits from 
the past. Thus in the sense in which the present occasion 
is the person now, and yet with his own past, so the counter­
part in God is that person in God.5?
From this, Christian states the following conclusions;
It appears from these passages that when actual occa^ 
sions are prehending into the consequent nature of God they 
do not retain their own immediacies. They obtain "adequate 
representation" in God's experience. They are "transmuted." 
The "living, ever-present fact," the "even more complete 
unity of life," is not the collective immediacies of the 
individual actual occasions. It is the everlasting subjec­
tively immediate experience of God. The "correlate fact" 
in God's nature "inherits from the temporal counterpart ac­
cording to the same principle as in the temporal world the 
future inherits from the past." This means . . . that actual 
occasions do not persist into God's experience with their own 
subjective immediacy. They are objectively immortal in God's 
own subjectively immediate experience.58
58Alfred North Whitehead, "Immortality," (Quoted from Paul Schilpp, 
Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, pp. 697-698; emphasis added by 
Christian, p. 341).
5^Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, pp. 531-532.
(Quoted in Christian, pp. 341-342.)
5®William Christian, Ail Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics, 
pp. 342-344.
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It might appear that Christian has produced the final word on 
Whitehead’s notion of God's objective immortality. However, if we fol­
low his commentary on the three initial quotations, it is not clear 
that the " ’unison of immediacy’ referred to in the first two passages is 
God’s own immediacy" and not that of objectively inmortal occasions. 
Again, Whitehead’s position that temporal process always involves loss 
is meant to be an empirical observation, as well as a consequence of 
his theory. One is hard put to discover a metaphysical principle in 
Whitehead’s system which entails that conclusion. However, it is 
strongly suggested by Whitehead’s account of concrescence as the appro­
priation by the living of the dead. Further, with regard to "other 
texts," it would appear that only the fourth of those mentioned (above) 
offers evidence negative to the endurance of subjective immediacy in 
God. The distinction between "temporal actuality" and the "transmuta­
tion of that temporal actuality" might possibly refer to a difference 
traceable to the disappearance of subjective immediacy; however, this 
appears to be inconclusive.
Perhaps more to the point is the example which. Whitehead uses be­
tween the person now and the person’s past, the "correlate fact in God" 
and the past "temporal counterpart" from which it stems. Our past mo­
ments of experience are deprived of the immediacy of the present. If 
Whitehead intends to equate the past temporal occasion with one’s per­
sonal past on the point of subjective immediacy, perhaps Christian’s 
approach is correct.
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Whitehead may be contending that the succession of occasion to occa­
sion (based on purely temporal succession), is quite different from the 
shift from occasion to God. The shift from occasion to God gives an 
even more complete unity of life, in which succession does not mean a loss 
of immediate unison.
One of the major hindrances in gaining the proper interpretation on 
this problem is the fact that Whitehead suggests no final notion on the 
matter. It does seem possible that Whitehead considered the endurance 
and the non-endurance of subjective immediacy to be open metaphysical 
possibilities; and if so, the only method of deciding the issue is the 
empirical way. There is a quotation from Whitehead which seems to indi­
cate the possibility; "The doctrine here developed is entirely neutral 
on the question of immortality [̂ the ordinary sense of "immortality" ]. 
There is no reason why such a question should not be decided on more 
special evidence, religious or otherwise, provided that it is trust­
worthy."^^
Transformation
Along with the idea of endurance, transmutation in its objective 
phase includes what Whitehead refers to as "transformation." Whitehead 
states that through each occasion's objectification in God, the value 
acquired in that occasion is infused with the growing whole of value to 
which each actual occasion in objective Immortality contributes. Similar
^^Alfred North Whitehead. Religion in thé Making, p. 110.
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to the unification of the past by each becoming occasion, God synthesizes 
the sum of given data In the most perfect form of experiential unifica­
tion possible. Although the past determines what Is to be synthesized 
In temporal succession. It Is the prerogative of the present Immediate 
moment of experience to choose which possible mode will be synthesized. 
This Is analogous to God, In that God Is conditioned by the fact that He 
must prehend this actual world; however, God Is unconditioned or free to 
Infuse It experlentlally In the manner He chooses. God Is free from ex­
ternal determination In his decision as to how the given shall be felt. 
His decision ̂  conditioned by the fact that the outcome Is an Inevitable 
expression of His own primordial v i s i o n . T h e  consequent nature of 
God produces this experiential unification via transformation, and It 
allows through this unification the greatest possible Intensity of aes­
thetic feeling. Even If we were to view the "mere wreckage" In the tem­
poral world, Whitehead contends that It Is salvaged for the purpose of 
enriching the quality of God's feeling by adding to the ordered contrast 
present In the consequent nature.
Objective In Character
Both from the level of endurance and from that of transformation, 
we note that transmutation is objective in character. Transmutation Is 
produced by God's own enjoyment regardless of the partial "awareness" of
^^Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Rèàlltv. p. 523.
Gllbid.. p. 517.
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that enjoyment on the part of that which is transmuted. But there is 
also a subjective side of transmutation. "The sense of worth beyond 
itself is immediately enjoyed as an overpowering element in the indi­
vidual self-attainment. It is in this way that the immediacy of sorrow
62and pain is transformed into an element of triumph."
From the last quotation, it might be argued that it is within the 
scope of actual occasions to realize their worth beyond the immediacy of 
momentary experience. As Whitehead states, "The immediacy of defeat 
might be subjectively transmuted into triumph.Whitehead does not 
make it clear as to whether this actual occasion's transmutation adds to 
the consequent nature of God and/or to the future of the temporal world. 
Apparently, Whitehead is suggesting that actual occasions make differing 
additions to the value of the temporal world. What does seem inevitable 
is that Whitehead contends for a subjective kind of transmutation, a 
projection of hope, which is, in part, produced by an occasion's alert­
ness to its own potential contribution to God's vision of the whole of 
actuality.
Religious Intuition
The question of the place of transmutation within Whitehead's doc­
trine of the consequent nature of God must be raised. Are there reasons 
of metaphysical necessity which require Whitehead to consider this re­
demptive aspect of the consequent nature? Why must the notion of trans­
mutation hold such a key position in his thought? There seems to be no
62lbid.. p. 531. ^^Ibid.
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experiential necessity for the concept of transmutation. Rather, it ap­
pears that this is a particular kind of experience, which Whitehead 
calls "religious intuition."
. . . objective immortality within the temporal world does 
not solve the problem set by the penetration of the finer 
religious intuition. 'Everlastingness' has been lost; and 
'everlastingness' is the content of that vision upon which 
the finer religions are built-"the 'many' absorbed everlast­
ingly in the final unity. The problems of the fluency of 
God and of the everlastingness of passing experience are 
solved by the same factor in the universe. This factor is 
the temporal world perfected by its reception and its ref­
ormation, as a fulfillment of the primordial appetition 
which is the basis of all order. In this way God is com­
pleted by the individual, fluent satisfactions of finite
fact, and the temporal occasions are completed by their
everlasting union with their transformed selves . . . .
As a Metaphysical Necessity
Let us restate our contention, that if we are open to Whitehead's 
ontological principle, then we must accept his notion that eternal ob­
jects are included in a partially non-temporal actual entity. Based upon 
the principle of relativity, we agree that this actual entity objectifies 
all past occasions to the degree that every occasion prehends its past.
Depending upon the foregoing dual premises, Whitehead's doctrine of the
consequent nature of God is viewed as the relatedness of tençoral occa­
sions in God's nature, thus making the consequent nature a metaphysical 
necessity.
That each temporal occasion is transmuted in God's nature does not 
appear to be required by Whitehead's position. The important question
^^Ibid.. p. 527.
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seems to be whether that which is logically necessary "Imposes the be­
lief that It [the temporal world conceived as a self-sufficient comple­
tion of creative actj Is the whole t r u t h . W h i t e h e a d  contends that 
It does not, for considerably more than the necessary may be presented, 
and the doctrine of transmutation Is but one such possibility. Based 
upon this religious concern or Intuition, Whitehead adopts this meta­
physical possibility. He states:
There Is nothing here In the nature of proof. There Is 
merely the confrontation of the theoretic system with a 
certain rendering of the facts. But the unsystematized re­
port upon the facts Is Itself highly controversial, and the 
system is confessedly Inadequate . . . .  Any cogency of 
argument entirely depends upon elucidation of somewhat ex­
ceptional elements In our conscious experience— those ele­
ments which may roughly be classed together as religious 
and moral Intuitions.6°
It would seem that one would share Whitehead's notion of the transmuta­
tion of the temporal world In God only If he accepted Whitehead's reli­
gious Intuition.
The prehension of the actual world In the consequent nature of God 
Involves the reformation of the world defined In terms of His subjective 
aim. The world as prehended In the consequent nature of God "is the 
temporal world perfected by Its reception and Its reformation, as a ful­
fillment of the primordial appetltlon which is the basis of all order. 
Therefore, the consequent nature of God can be said to be a metaphysical 
truth about the actual world. However, this prehension of the world, 
while It clearly Involves the valuation of the world from the standpoint
*5lbld.. p. 519. ^^Ibld.. p. 521. ^^^^Id.. p. 527,
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of God’s subjective aim, is not an arbitrary valuation. It is a valua­
tion of the world informed by a complete primordial envisagement of
eternal objects and the inclusion of all physical data. It is therefore
68a prehension which is both impartial, adequate, and truthful.
God and Satisfaction
This introduces the problem of God's concrescence in its later 
phases. God’s eternality precludes the possibility of his concrescence 
attaining "satisfaction" In the same sense in which actual occasions do. 
Satisfaction, Whitehead asserts, is the final phase of concrescence in 
which an actual entity becomes fully determinate. "It is determinate 
(a) as to its genesis, (b) as to its objective character for the tran­
scendent creativity, and (c) as to its prehension— positive or nega­
tive— of every item in its universe.
On several occasions Whitehead suggests that God experiences satis­
faction.^^ The question arises as to what degree this phase of con­
crescence can be applicable to God. God attains satisfaction in the 
sense that his consequent nature involves "the realization of the actual 
world in the unity of his nature, and through the transformation of his 
wisdom."71 This unity of satisfaction, however, must hot be considered 
a static perfection, but rather a unity of satisfaction Involving the 
harmony of his primordial valuation with the world as It Is at any stage
GGlbld.. p. 525. 69lbld.. p. 38.
7Qlbld.. pp. 48, 135. 7% l d .. p. 524.
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in its process. This is a satisfaction relative to any given state of 
the world. Furthermore, insofar as this harmony of conceptual appeti- 
tion and physical prehension is an integration of every datum in the 
universe, God's satisfaction is determinate relative to the temporal 
world. But the satisfaction of God is forever incomplete, in the sense 
that it is relative to the present state of the world. God's satis’- 
faction is not complete in the sense that it is a final phase beyond 
which no further perfection is possible. The "finality" of God's satis­
faction is therefore relative to the data given in his concrescence; it 
is not "final" in the sense of a chronological termination of God. God's 
everlastingness precludes that kind of finality of satisfaction.^2 
Whitehead can assert that God's consequent nature "originates with phys­
ical experience derived from the temporal world, and then acquires inte­
gration with the primordial side. It is determined, incomplete, conse­
quent, everlasting, fully actual, and c o n s c i o u s . G o d ' s  satisfaction, 
therefore, is unified, determinate, and relatively perfect, but it is in­
complete. It is incomplete both because it contains unrealized potenti­
alities relative to his primordial nature, and because it is relative in 
physical prehension to the creative advance of nature. As a result,
God's consequent nature is dynamic and in process.
William Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Hetaphvsics. 
p. 299. ^ ----
f^Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 524.
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Relativity of God's Perfection
The relativity of God's perfection in the sense of its incomplete­
ness is precisely what motivates his continual action in the world. He 
seeks the "fulfillment of his own b e i n g . B u t  his own becoming re­
quires reference to the world of actual entities in which his primordial 
ordering of eternal objects finds finite realization. His purpose of 
self-realization is not merely the evocation of actual occasions, but 
also "the evocation of intensities."^^ God seeks creative advance in 
the world. This suggests that his relative perfections or satisfactions 
have a superjective aspect. "God is to be conceived as originated by 
conceptual experience with his process of completion motivated by con­
sequent, physical experience, initially derived from the temporal 
world."76 The superjective nature of God "is the character of the 
pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent 
creativity in the various temporal instances."77
As Ground of Adequate Representation
Another metaphysical reason for introducing the consequent nature 
of God is the need for an "impartial nexus" or a "ground of adequate 
representation" of the creatures.78 We have noted that the metaphysical 
method of empirical generalization rested upon the presupposition of a 
real ground of analogy in the world, , the ontological principle. It
74ibid.. p. 161. 75ibid. 76ibid.. p. 524.
77ibid.. p. 135. 78ibid.. pp. 19, 352.
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appears impossible to speak of the "truth" of a metaphysical interpre­
tation apart from its relevance to actual entities, past, present, and 
future. But questions do arise with this approach. How can the actu­
ality of occasions of the past be adequately given in the present? Even 
the possibility of metaphysical truth itself would appear to rest upon 
an "adequate representation in the divine nature" of the organic actu­
alities of the world. For, "there can be no determinate truth, cor­
relating impartially the partial experiences of many actual entities, 
apart from one entity to which it can be referred.Metaphysical 
truth in connection with the method of empirical generalization requires 
a consequent nature of God for its full intelligibility.
Within the exposition of the relation between God and the actual 
occasions we have raised the question of how any nexus could have the 
status of an "unalterable fact." This is unintelligible apart from a 
consequent nature of God. No other actual entity can have the breadth 
of conceptual vision or everlastingness of duration to perform such a 
metaphysical role. If there are unalterable facts which function as 
realized elements in the world's actual constitution, they must find 
their ultimate ontological status in a consequent nature of God. The 
argument that a consequent nature of God is necessary to account for 
adequate representation of actual occasions as achieved facts or an 
impartial nexus, pertains to the unity of occasions as such and not 
necessarily to those occasions of unique achievement of value. This
7*Ibid.. p. 19.
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Illustrates a basic metaphysical function of the consequent nature of 
God in connection with which God's preservation of the higher values 
is a special instance.
Preservation of Higher Values
God's consequent and superjective nature gives metaphysical ex­
pression to how God may be said to preserve the higher values achieved 
in the world's advance. God's consequent nature as a comprehensive 
transmutation of the world whereby the world "is felt in unison of im-
mediacy"®® means that he "prehends every actuality for what it can be
81in such a perfected system." This prehension of the world is unified 
by a "wisdom of subjective aim" which judges occasions destructive of 
intense harmony as "triviality of mere individual facts" and even "uses 
what in the temporal world is mere wreckage." His conceptual nature is 
a judgment of love "which loses nothing that can be saved" and redeems 
"the turmoil of the intermediate world by the completion of his own
on
nature." This valuation of the realizations of the occasions of the 
world is the way God in his consequent nature preserves values. God's 
consequent nature is thus a beloved community, the multiplicity of par­
ticular occasions woven into the immediacy and harmony of the universal 
feeling. The values of the world are objectively immortal in the im­
mediacy of God's consequent nature.
80 
-Ibid.
Ibid.. p. 524. S^Ibid.. p. 525.
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God's superjective-nature further means that the valuation of God's 
consequent nature is effective with respect to the creative advance of 
the world. "What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in
OOheaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world." In 
this way the values achieved in the world are not merely preserved in 
God's consequent nature, but are further effective lures whereby the 
world is persuaded to ever greater perfections. By virtue of God's 
objective immortality in the world, the values achieved in the world are 
guaranteed a continual relevance to the world despite the perpetual per­
ishing of finite occasions.
83lbid.. p. 532.
CONCLUSION; A Comparison of the Finite^-God Concepts of 
William James and Alfred North Whitehead
Exposition of the finite-theisms of James and Whitehead has been 
completed. If the presentations of each man’s philosophical position 
have been accurate, then it would seem that the following conclusions 
would be justifiable.
The nature of the differences between the finite-God positions of 
James and Whitehead on the one hand, and the infinite or absolutist theo­
ries of God which they oppose, really reduces to a question of motive 
based upon evidence and implications. A philosophical motive is not 
tersely stated, as the foregoing chapters will show; yet it conveys a 
basic understanding of the extent to which James and Whitehead consider 
reality open to our understanding. For instance, one who views the ques­
tion of reality as beyond the realm of speculative conceptions, would 
develop a theory of God and/or man in an extensively different way from 
the idealist. Motive and the degree to which reality appears philosophi­
cally intelligible seem to correlate.
The infinite-God theories present a problem for James and Whitehead 
because of a conflict in basic doctrines. The infinite-God position ac­
cepts propositions about the nature of God as necessarily true; probabil­
ity does not enter the picture because truth is necessarily demonstrated. 
A philosophical position which holds that we can know with certainty that 
God exists as an infinite being has read a great deal into human experi­
ence. Absolutist theories interpret basic facts of experience and try to
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show a necessary connection with God, who is positioned as infinite 
above nature. What is accepted by the infinite-God theorists will have 
to stand the attack of the finite approach. The finitistic approach to 
the problems of the natural world is of a different nature from those of 
the infinitistic. Evil, for example, would have to be explained by the 
infinite theory in reference to a God already established as infinite.
It could have no purpose nor evidence any worth for the finite position. 
The meaning of evil must be controlled by that which has already been 
accepted as necessarily true.
James' finite-God theory was developed in reaction to both tradi­
tional theism and the philosophy of the Absolute. I have tried to show 
that James considered the Absolutist's position intolerable. The Abso­
lutist's position was popular at the time of James' writing, and it 
posed a formidable threat to the value-structure which James held.
Whitehead is critical of the traditional Christian approach, which 
claims a deity who supposedly rules the world by fiat. Since the idea 
of a personal God is not among the intuitive insights of man's religions, 
and since the idea of a Divine Ruler who disposes of the world according 
to his own whim and fancy is neither metaphysically intelligible nor 
reconcilable with the insights of moral sensitivity, then Whitehead sees 
no reason to embrace the idea of a God who transcends the world in such 
a radical way as to create it ex nihilo. However, Whitehead does insist 
upon the doctrine of God as indispensable to religion, for the doctrine 
of God has an apologetic function to perform.
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Basic differences between James and Whitehead have come to the sur­
face as we. have viewed the reasons and the philosophical motives employed 
in their finite-God theories. For James, the problem of evil is one of 
the evidences for the finitistic approach. However strong this impulse 
might be, it is basically the preservation of select life-giving values 
and the satisfaction of personal needs which lie at the core of James’ 
theism. Speculative areas of development become secondary to him.
For Whitehead, any discussion of God must occur within the context 
of a total metaphysical scheme. Therefore, the analysis of Whitehead’s 
concept of God includes how God functions in relation to other meta­
physical entities and principles of his scheme— entities such as actual 
occasions and eternal objects, and principles, such as creativity and 
valuation. God is an actual entity distinctive by virtue of his primor­
dial valuation of all eternal objects, everlasting by virtue of his 
physical prehensions of all occasions of the world as they come into be­
ing, providential by virtue of his luring of the world toward more cre­
ative ends and by virtue of the weaving of the creative achievements of 
the world into a unison of immediacy. Whitehead, by virtue of the meta­
physical scheme he employs, is quite open to the speculative areas of 
development, whereas James was less inclined toward them.
The philosophical motives which actuate James and Whitehead in their 
theistic approach show some basic differences. The emphasis on voluntar­
ism is stronger in James than it is in Whitehead. James’ reasons for such 
strong voluntaristic motives stem from his desires. He suggests that one
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should take a position in which he is aligned with the most satisfying 
idea of God. James has questioned the veracity of the intellect and 
found it to come up wanting. His finitistic approach, he suggests, can 
deal more decisively with the real world.
Voluntarism is not so strong within Whitehead. Instead, the sig­
nificance of Whitehead's motives involves a combination of the following 
tasks: the empirical study of religious phenomena, the analysis of
religious intuition, the coordination of the distinctive insights of re­
ligious intuition with other sorts of insight, the ultimate incorporation 
of religious intuition within a metaphysical scheme, and the testing of 
the adequacy of the motives by their illumination of perennial problems 
of religious understanding and a comparison with alternative theories con­
cerning God.
James suggests that our desires could provide us with evidence, but 
for Whitehead this form of desire does not enjoy the primacy which James 
gives it. Like James, Whitehead views the intellect as inadequate, in 
the sense that it can give no clear-cut, conclusive and final answers to 
all questions. For James, no necessary truth is possible; therefore, all 
matters pertaining to God are considered inductively as evidence which 
could change our conception of God.
In addition to the ençirical evidence for the finite nature of God, 
Whitehead is concerned with how religious intuitions, clarified by meta­
physical definition and analysis, can be applicable to the civilization 
of man. By "civilization" Whitehead means not only human culture as it
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has existed historically, but human life Ideally as It might become.
Like James, Whitehead agrees that religion can contribute creatively to 
the moral and aesthetic civilization of man. Whitehead believes he has 
formulated a more adequate concept of God than the Inflnlte-God approach. 
God Is that factor In the world which lures the world toward civiliza­
tion and Is a final cause urging each creature toward that good which 
Is possible for It. God becomes the source of peace, and the unity of 
adventure beyond the mere activity of adventure, without which civiliza­
tion would be Incomplete.
In our present consideration, the finite theisms of James and 
Whitehead, I have attempted to make explicit the boundaries regarding 
philosophical Intelligibility discovered In their respective motives.
I have contrasted briefly their boundaries with the Inflnlte-God posi­
tions, In order to show how these boundaries sometimes limit conceptions 
of God, either finite or Infinite. By comparison. It has been possible 
to demonstrate that the problem of limitations arises both with respect 
to the scope of overt evidence offered for this finitistic concept of 
God, as well as a discovery of what directions are open In one's attempt 
to formulate a theory of God.
As a pragmatist, James presents a flnlte-concept of God which Is 
basically empirical. His open system shows that God will in some very 
definite ways be connected with this concrete world. Some of these ways 
are discovered in terms religiously meaningful to man. I have shown one 
to be the place of religious experience which stresses the Immanence
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of God. James expected some practical demonstration of God in a per­
son's life.
Whitehead chooses to develop an organismic philosophy in which 
creativity becomes the ultimate metaphysical principle. To account for 
the process of change, novelty, and creativity, Whitehead has claimed 
two natures for God. We have demonstrated how both natures, the primor­
dial and the consequent, are necessary to give a full explanation of 
what Whitehead means by a finite-God concept. Like James, Whitehead has 
an open system in which not all answers have been given, because not 
all the questions have yet been raised. Whitehead shows a relationship 
between God and the empirical data of concrete experience. While White­
head retains the transcendence of God through the primordial nature of 
God, he emphasizes the Immanence of God particularly through the conse­
quent nature.
When faced with the question of why we should believe in God,
James presents evidence based on practical lines of thought. His prag­
matic tack is shown when James states that he believes in God because 
he needs God. I have shown this as an option for the will-to-believe. 
James feels that volition can produce relevance in the meaning of life. 
He feels that it is rational to believe; it is part of human nature. 
Through the continued use of volition, man can align his present-day 
situation with his Intentions for the future. Perhaps another way of 
stating this would be to say that James feels that volition can produce 
a more meaningful dimension for the rest of one's life.
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Whitehead uses his ontological principle as justification for the 
nature of God. This principle states that to be is to be some real facet, 
or an unrealized possibility of experience, of some actual entity. An­
other similar principle is that of relativity. The relativity principle 
requires an actual entity to influence and/or be influenced by other oc­
casions of experience. These metaphysical principles suggest that God 
is necessary for any interpretation of experience and reality. Whitehead 
sees God as an integral notion for framing the system of reality. Within 
this system fact and interpretation are inseparable, for both belong to 
the world of experience. This finite God, then, is part of the world 
under explanation. God is an element in the analysis of experience.
For James, the works of God are empirically verifiable. From a 
psychological point of view, God brings comfort and encouragement to 
believers; He produces converts and saints. James uses intuitions and 
consciousness as the experiential ties one has with this finite God.
Akin to the discussion of the psychological dimensions, James suggests 
the possibility of nystical fulfillment. He is open to the mystic's 
experience because of its apparent workableness— its pragmatic fulfill­
ment. This mystical experience is accepted by James as being empirically 
verifiable; thereby, James presents it as further proof of God's exist­
ence. Let me remind the reader that James uses the term "experience" in 
a very broad sense. Through this expanded use of the term, James is 
able to accommodate both the traditional and the mystical segments of 
experience as empirical data. God is real because he produces real ef­
fects.
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For Whitehead, the dual natures of God, the primordial and conse­
quent, are essential parts of an adequate explanation of reality. God 
Is presented as an actual entity. We have demonstrated how God Is like 
and how He Is different from other actual entitles. Of Importance Is 
Whitehead’s view that God (as actual entity) explains the paradox of 
permanence and flux. God Is shown as the evolving actual entity; there­
fore, the progressive evolutionary theory Is conçatlble with Whitehead’s 
thought. Whitehead’s principle of concretion emphasizes God as an 
actual entity. It supports the doctrine that God Is an actual entity 
by his supplying Initial aim to each temporal concrescence. The prin­
ciple of concretion Is a reflection of the fact that the final real 
things are really processes.
Whitehead states that God’s primordial character Is the solution 
to the problem of process: God Is In organismic relation to the world.
Underlying all occasions Is God’s relation to the world of process. Fur­
ther, Whitehead shows that God Is the antecedent of particular occasions. 
Whitehead demonstrates this In two ways: God Is the substantial activity
underlying all occasions; and God Is the antecedent limitation of actual 
occasions. Without God, there would be no succeeding occasions. God, 
as both Infinite and finite. Is Involved In the present situation.
James has developed his finite theism on the pragmatic hypothesis 
that men "need" God. His use of the psychological constructs, as well as 
the moral Incentives, reflect his use of the human model. James holds 
that persons are "fused" with God. God experiences limitations like man;
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God exists in a finite environment. As a temporal being, God "has a 
history" like that of man. James appears to be more "person-oriented" 
in his finitistic explanations of God, while Whitehead appears to be 
more concerned with developing a finite-God theory within a metaphysical 
scheme.
Whitehead presents his theory of God as allowing God a dual nature. 
The primordial nature of God is a view of God as unified, omniscient, 
exclusively good— but "deficiently actual"— requiring the world for its 
concretion. The consequent nature of God shows the world as integrated 
into God's vision of perfection. Let me summarize some of the implica­
tions which come from a study of the consequent nature of God. God is 
conscious of the world, a fact which implies the objectification of the 
world in God. Occasions of the world become immortal, just as God is 
immortal. God is immanent in each occasion, supplying it with initial 
subjective aim, and instilling in it the desire for perfection (within 
its immediacy). The subjective aim of the occasion is part of God's 
overall vision for the world. God's consciousness of the world is the 
mental pole of the multiplicity of the world's physical objects in 
their concurrent "unison of becoming." Further, God's consciousness of 
the world achieves an integration— God's vision of the world. This vision 
is being completed by the eternal relationships of all eternal objects 
which form God's primordial nature.
Having analyzed the finite-God theisms of James and Whitehead, I 
would like to make a few final comments on their theories. Both men have
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broad views of "experience." The experience of God can come to man from 
many levels. Both men have strong theories of individuation; for James 
it is individual subjectivity, and for Whitehead it is selectivity. Al­
though the models which they use differ, both men recognize a teleologi- 
cal factor within reality. For James, the teleological factor is demon­
strated through decision-making. Whitehead stresses the subjective aim 
of the actual entity. The teleological emphasis is directed toward mak­
ing the future relevant to the present. James accomplishes this by al­
lowing a finite God to meet and help man in his existential predicament. 
Whitehead emphasizes the real order and fulfillment in nature.
Both theisms make a definite appeal to religious consciousness.
This is due mainly to the fact that each makes God a temporal being.
God has always existed, but He is still in the process of a temporal de­
velopment. The goings-on in the world affect God; He reacts to our situ­
ations, sympathizes, suffers, and rejoices with man. Man's relationship 
to God is based on a human model— like the relations between persons. 
James points out that this is the way the ordinary religious person 
thinks of God. God is meaningful to our everyday experience; therefore. 
He is eminently appealing.
Both James and Whitehead agree that a finite God is easier to under­
stand than the God of traditional theism. God is similar to man and can 
be thought of in analogous terms. Particularly James sees no need of 
struggling with the reconciliation of God's omniscience with the possi­
bility of future contingency, or God's goodness with the presence of
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evil. Man can experience and understand God in ways other than ana­
logically.
The moral incentive note of James’ theism seems delightful to some 
contemporary men. Perhaps out of a mixture of humanism and pragmatism, 
James has sought for man a more creative role in man’s course of action. 
God has been declared finite by both writers for the purpose of God’s 
living in a stimulating world.
The empirical element found in both theisms likewise make them ac­
ceptable to modern man. Whether it be from the existential approach or 
from the metaphysical, both writers are trying to throw light on certain 
elements of our ’’lived" world. Both men attempt to reawaken in man a 
sense of responsibility for his own life, thus trying to tie philosophi­
cal reflection to our everyday experience.
The finite theisms of James and Whitehead have attractive features 
for the contemporary mind. I have attempted to show that a deeper ques­
tion than attractiveness of theory has prompted both men to write. Both 
of them see reality as intelligible; therefore, the need of a finite 
God. As it is so well put in the study of Whitehead's two natures of 
God: the progress of the world is partially dependent on God, and the 
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DISSERTATION
A STUDY OF THE CONCEPT OF A FINITE GOD 
IN THE PHILOSOPHIES OF 
WILLIAM JAMES AND ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD
The flnlte-God theories of William James and Alfred North Whitehead 
have received great consideration as alternatives to the more tradi­
tional Inflnlte-God theories. In his major volumes, The Varieties of 
Religious Experience, Pragmatism, and A Pluralistic Universe, William 
James gives a concept of God which develops the pragmatic approach. Al­
fred North Whitehead, In Process and Reality, describes two natures of 
God through which the Imminent and the transcendent characters of God 
are presented.
The first part of this study Is a presentation of the thelstlc views 
of both James and Whitehead In an attempt to discover the evidence which 
each presents for the existence of God and the nature of the divine limi­
tation. A coordinate task will be the delineation of the basic conflicts 
which both James and Whitehead have with the Inflnlte-God position. Spe­
cial emphasis Is given to the philosophical motives of James and White­
head In relation to their philosophical methodology. Although James and 
Whitehead differ In their philosophical methods, both men consider their 
philosophical approach to God as partially an empirical one.
This dissertation Is predominantly expository. Its major purpose 
Is to explicate both James' and Whitehead's theories of a flnlte-God. 
Further, It will attempt to clarify some of the terminology used and to
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elucidate the cmceptual issues encountered. Both men are intent upon 
discussing God in terms which are religiously meaningful to man, namely, 
the area of religious experience. With neither James nor Whitehead do 
we find the certainty of knowledge about God which is claimed by the 
traditional theist's position.
Considerable exposition is given to James' ideas of the special 
need man has for God. Further, it will be shown that God has need of 
man, because God, too, has limitations. Whitehead gives us two notions 
of God: th primordial and the consequent natures. An examination of
both of these natures of God and their finite implications will be pur­
sued.
Finally, this dissertation will attempt a comparative study of 
the finite natures of God as given by both James and Whitehead. Implicit 
within this summary will be the motives which each man has suggested 
for the position of God as finite.
DISSERTATION
A STUDY OF THE CONCEPT OF A FINITE GOD 
IN THE PHILOSOPHIES OF 
WILLIAM JAMES AND ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD
The finite-God theories of William James and Alfred North Whitehead 
have received consideration as alternatives to the more traditional 
infinite-God theories. In three of his major works. The Varieties of 
Religious Experience, Pragmatism, and A Pluralistic Universe, William 
James develops a pragmatic concept of God. Alfred North Whitehead, in 
Process and Reality, describes two natures of God through which the 
immanent and the transcendent characters of God are presented.
The first part of this study is a presentation of the theistic views 
of both James and Whitehead in an attempt to discover the evidence which 
each presents for the existence of God and the nature of the divine 
limitation. A coordinate task is the delineation of the basic conflicts 
which both James and Whitehead have with the infinite-God position. 
Special emphasis is given to the philosophical motives of James and 
Whitehead in relation to their philosophical methodology. Although James 
and Whitehead differ in their philosophical methods, both men consider 
their philosophical approach to God as partially an empirical one.
This dissertation is to a significant degree expository. Its major 
purpose is to explicate both James' and Whitehead's theories of a finite- 
God. Further, it attempts to clarify some of the terminology used and to 
elucidate the conceptual issues encountered. Both men are intent upon 
discussing God in terms which are religiously meaningful to man, namely.
the area of religious experience. With neither James nor Whitehead do 
we find the certainty of knowledge about God which is claimed by the 
traditional theist's position.
Considerable emphasis is given to James* ideas of the special need 
man has for God. Further, it is shown that God has need of man, because 
God, too, has limitations. Whitehead gives us two notions of God; the 
primordial and the consequent natures. An examination of both of these 
natures of God and their finite implications is pursued.
Finally, this dissertation attempts a comparative study of the 
finite natures of God as conceived by both James and Whitehead. Implicit 
within this summary are the motives which each man has suggested for the 
position of God as finite.
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